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ABSTRACT
 In recent decades “virtue ethics” has become an accepted theoretical structure 
for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue 
ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists — the ancient Greeks, 
who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I 
believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist 
theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our 
treatment of others. 
 First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least some others (e.g. 
family, friends, loved ones) ought to give us non-instrumental reason for acting — that 
is, reason independent of consideration of our own welfare. Second, we think others 
are entitled to what we might call respect, just in virtue of their being persons. 
Eudaimonist accounts (the objection runs) either cannot account for these intuitions at 
all, or they give the wrong sort of account.
 My dissertation assesses the resources of eudaimonism to meet these lines of 
criticism. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 survey the views of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, to 
discover insights that are important for a successful response. In Chapters 5 and 6, I 
offer my own account, based on  what I call empathic identification. This is the habit 
or disposition of seeing things, in effect, through the eyes of others. Empathic 
identification is a process through which the interpersonal transmission of reasons for 
actions between persons becomes possible. I argue first that our interest in our own 
eudaimonia justifies us in identifying empathically with others as a general habit or 
disposition. Second, I argue that empathic identification explains our intuitions about 
the respect others are due. So empathic identification generates the right sort of 
explanation of our intuitions about the constraints others and their interests impose 
upon us after all, and renders eudaimonist virtue ethics a viable form of ethical theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
“There’s no need to ask further, ‘What’s the point of wanting
 happiness?’ The answer you gave seems to be final.”
 — Plato, Symposium 205a
 In the last half of this century moral theories known as virtue ethics have 
gained stature as alternatives to consequentialist and duty-based ethical theories. 
That stature has brought with it increased criticism of the viability of virtue theory, 
both in its modern incarnations and in the forms it took in the ancient views of Plato, 
Aristotle, and later Hellenistic philosophers. In this dissertation I assess one such line 
of criticism: the claim that virtue theory cannot properly account for the concern and 
respect which we ought to have for the interests of others.
 This line of objection needs spelling out, and that is the project of this first 
chapter. Later chapters will consider the extent to which the ancient virtue accounts 
recognized it and tried to come to grips with it, after which I will offer my own 
response to it. But before we can make sense of the objection, we need to understand 
what it is an objection to. That is where we begin.
Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics
 A number of recent views characterize themselves as virtue theories. I am 
interested in those of these views that may be called eudaimonistic, in that they accord 
a central theoretical place to the eudaimonia of the moral agent. ‘Eudaimonia’ is a 
notoriously difficult word to translate (it is often rendered ‘happiness,’ or ‘flourishing,’ 
but with problems in each case), so I will not attempt to do so. I take its meaning for 
the ancients who employed it to point (at a first approximation) to the well-lived life, 
and to the property(s) of human lives that induce us to regard them as happy and 
well-lived. Such lives involve a (subjective) sense of well-being, not merely occurrent or 
transitory, but as a stable attitude toward one’s life overall. Eudaimonistic virtue 
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accounts are those that claim that what we ought to do or be is determined by what 
will bring about our own eudaimonia.
 I am not primarily interested in any particular eudaimonistic virtue account, 
although the way I defend eudaimonism ultimately draws a great deal on Aristotle’s 
eudaimonistic virtue theory, and makes some distinctive claims about the connection 
between empathy and eudaimonia. But my primary interest is in a type of theory 
which can be (and has been) developed in a variety of ways. I have said that 
eudaimonistic virtue ethics accord a “central place” to the role of eudaimonia, and one 
way to characterize the type of theory I am interested in is to say in greater detail 
what that place must be. Theories of the type I am interested in share some core 
theses about eudaimonia. These are tenets which the primary ancient exemplars of 
virtue theory — the theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics1 — all accepted. By 
understanding the claims such accounts make about the role of eudaimonia, we can 
get an idea of the sort of theory which is the focus of my discussion. So just what 
theses does the pertinent sort of virtue theory maintain about eudaimonia?
Theses about Eudaimonia
 (1) Eudaimonia is a property of complete human lives, and accordingly the first 
thesis eudaimonist accounts share is that the primary locus of moral assessment is not 
acts, but lives. Human lives, rather than particular human actions or even patterns of 
action, are the appropriate level for the most fundamental kind of moral evaluation. 
 Another way to put this thesis is to say that, in the first instance, moral theory 
is concerned with how to live, rather than what to do. Of course, this is an 
oversimplification, because how we live is comprised of what we do in living it. Still, 
the distinction has bite. Typical consequentialist and duty-based moral theories focus 
on the right-making features of particular, discrete acts and decisions to act. Kantian 
theory, for example, focuses moral assessment primarily on “maxims of action” — the 
8
1Although the view of Epicurus plausibly could be included in this roster, I omit it for a number of 
reasons, one of which is the unique substantive conception of the human good (viz. pleasure) it 
embraces.
decision principles we employ in acting.2 Act-utilitarianism is (as the name implies) 
centrally concerned with which action, of a range of alternatives, will bring about the 
greatest good. Even rule-utilitarianism asks what rules of action will eventuate in acts 
that will bring about the greatest good. In each case, judgments as to what will make 
for the best (or right) kind of human life can be arrived at only by composition from the 
principles of action for particular, discrete cases.
 By contrast, eudaimonist virtue theories turn things the other way around. 
They maintain that what is of the first importance is that we understand how our lives 
can be eudaimon: what the best kind of human life is — what it consists in, what form 
it takes. Judgments of how to act in particular circumstances must be arrived at by 
understanding the framework for eudaimon life within which individual actions occur.
 (2) Eudaimonia is an objective criterion by which lives are judged. This is a 
tough pill for us moderns to swallow. More common is the notion that we (individually 
or perhaps as cultures) set our own standards for what counts as a good life — there is 
no fact of the matter beyond what we make of it, the expectations we establish for our 
lives.
 This is not the view of the ancients, and it is not part of eudaimonism. On these 
views, while the desires and expectations we form about and for our lives are of great 
importance, they do not exhaust the standard for good lives.3 There are also facts 
about us — about our natures, if you will — that impose demands on what counts as a 
good life.4 Exactly what our natures are, and exactly what demands on lives follow 
from our natures, are vexed questions about which there can be (and is) substantial 
disagreement among eudaimonist accounts. But I take that all would agree, for 
9
2Here I differ with Robert Louden, who claims that Kant, too, takes “agents” — lives —  to “come first” 
in ethics (Louden 1992, pp. 41, 44).
3It might be right that subjective satisfaction is a necessary condition for the objective standard in 
question. It is plausible to suppose that a life with which one is not satisfied (for whatever reason, 
including unrealistic expectations) cannot be the best kind of life to have.
4David Schmidtz makes a similar point in his moral theory, which has eudaimonist elements. He says, 
“What we ought to value depends on what we can value and on what would be good for us, which in 
turn depends on what we are like” (Schmidtz 1995, p. 27). “What we are like” is an objective fact about 
us, and introduces an inevitably objective element into what can count as our good.
example, that a life with a mental impairment which rendered practical rationality 
impossible would not count as a good human life, however satisfying it might be to its 
subject, and regardless of how well it measured up to his expectations for his life.5
 Richard Kraut has marked this point with admirable clarity. He distinguishes 
our modern (subjective) conception of good lives from the ancient and objective one I 
am attributing to eudaimonism as follows:
Our view has a certain subjectivism. On it, a person is happy 
only if he meets the standards he imposes on his life....This 
contrasts with an objectivist view, on which people should 
not be considered happy unless they are coming close to 
living the best life they are capable of....The objectivist 
thinks that it is not up to you to determine where your 
happiness lies; it is fixed by your nature, and your job is 
to discover it. (Kraut 1979, pp. 180-1).
As Kraut observes, however, it is one thing to insist that there is an objective standard 
for eudaimonia, and another to explicate what that standard is. Part of the attraction 
of the modern and subjective conception is that it frees us from the enormously 
difficult task of setting out and defending a conception of the good human life.6
10
5My distinction between objective and subjective standards of well-being differs from some of the recent 
work on the subject. L.W. Sumner, for example, marks the distinction as revolving around the necessity 
of the subject’s favorable attitude (Sumner 1995, p. 768): subjective theories accept, while objective 
theories reject, this requirement.
 I do not find this the most interesting place to mark an exclusive and exhaustive distinction. As 
David Sobel remarks, it is hard to see how any theory could insist that “a person’s attitudes are never 
relevant to ... her well-being” (Sobel 1997, p. 503). The more interesting question is whether her 
attitudes are all there is to her well-being. As case in point, Sumner locates Aristotle within the camp of 
objectivist theories, as I (using my distinction) do as well (Sumner, op. cit., p. 782f.) But on his view this 
means that Aristotle leaves no room for individual desires, preferences, and so on to play a role in one’s 
eudaimonia. I think this is an unduly restrictive and uncharitable understanding of Aristotle — 
ignoring, for example, the importance in his view of the cultivation of emotions, desires, and so on in 
accordance with virtue.
6And, moreover (as Kraut notes), from its implicit judgment about lives that fail to meet that standard 
for whatever reason, including genetic and other limitations which are out of human control.
 On the other hand, consider John Robertson’s observation based on the Platonic analogy 
between health and virtue: 
It might, for all we once knew, have been the case that what constituted health 
varied from individual to individual, and that some men could not physically 
flourish except in conditions that were debilitating to others. But such medical 
relativism has never seemed plausible and is arguably metaphysically impossible. I 
can only think that the corresponding hypothesis about morality owes its 
popularity to a prior commitment to the superficiality of morality. (Robertson 
1986, p. 133)
 (3) Though the good (eudaimonia) is an objective standard for human lives, that 
good is agent-relative rather than agent-neutral. This distinction, owed to Derek Parfit 
(Parfit 1984 p. 27), is an important one for our purposes.7 The point is that good 
human lives are, strictly speaking, good for those who live them, at least in the first 
instance. (Whether and how they can be good for others is a question we shall have to 
investigate.) The fact that the good of good lives is for the individuals that live them 
means that it is not something which can be aggregated or maximized across persons.
 The contrast here is with agent-neutral virtue theories, such as the 
“perfectionism” of Thomas Hurka.8 On Hurka’s view, all agents have equal reason to 
promote the perfection of any human life, whether that life is their own or not. That is 
why the value of perfected human life is agent-neutral.9 Hurka claims that 
“Aristotelian perfectionism cannot capture (basic) convictions if it is fully 
agent-relative, but it can if it is agent-neutral” (Hurka 1993, p. 62). Thus, we “must 
distinguish sharply between questions about what makes a person’s own life best and 
questions about how she ought, all things considered, to act” (ibid., p. 63). 
 Hurka’s reasons for rejecting agent-relativity for the good are too numerous to 
go into here, but one of them amounts to an objection that we shall consider at 
length.10 He says:
A moralistic agent-relative perfectionism can forbid acts 
that diminish the perfection of others, but its ultimate 
reason for forbidding these acts is that they make the 
agent’s life worse. This is the wrong ultimate reason. 
(ibid.)
Since the explanation agent-relative accounts offer as to the wrongness of acts of (say) 
harming others is fatally flawed — they locate the wrongmaking feature of the act in 
11
7I discuss it at greater length in Chapter 3, where I defend an agent-relative interpretation of Aristotle 
as against agent-neutral interpretations of him, and in Chapter 6.
8Cf. Hurka 1993. Richard Kraut also offers an agent-neutral eudaimonist interpretation of Aristotle in 
Kraut 1989. I discuss Kraut’s interpretation and reasons for rejecting it in Chapter 3.
9Or, to put it another way, “My thinking about what is good is impersonal” (p. 63).
10Hurka also makes this objection in Hurka 1999, pp. 69f.
its effects on the agent, rather than in its effects on the victim — agent-relativity 
should be rejected. Since this objection will be considered at length, all that needs to 
be said here is that eudaimonist virtue theories are committed to just the view of the 
good which Hurka finds problematic (namely that it is agent-relative), and reject the 
aggregative conception Hurka favors.
 (4) The way agents make their lives go well or ill is through the character traits 
and dispositions they adopt. Eudaimonism is a “virtue theory” because it identifies as 
virtues those traits of character or dispositions which lead to the best kind of life. Our 
interest in eudaimonia gives us reason to adopt these traits and dispositions, which is 
just to say that it gives us reason to be virtuous.
 The kinds of traits and habits to which eudaimonism points are not limited to 
those typically thought of as “moral.” Eudaimonism can endorse as a virtue any facet 
of one’s physical, mental, emotional, or spiritual being which bears on making one’s 
life a good one.11 Of course, some traits bear more crucially on eudaimonia than 
others. Practical wisdom is an obvious virtue, and I shall argue in Chapters 5 and 6 
that a disposition to identify empathically with others is, in effect, another.
 (5) The cardinal and distinctive claim of eudaimonism is that reasons for action 
are grounded exclusively in one’s interest in living and having a good life. Reasons for 
action take a number of forms, and serve a variety of purposes. The one of primary 
interest here is their justificatory role. We give reasons to justify what we do. And we 
can do this at a variety of levels. We can give what I will call a “proximate” 
justification for what we do pretty easily. My desire to break a window is a proximate 
justification for my throwing a rock at it. But of course you may well wonder why I 
wanted to break the window. To justify that I need to adduce a further reason, and you 
may ask again for a justification of that reason. But if our chains of reasons are not to 
be endless (or circular), at some point a final, or ultimate, justificatory reason must be 
12
11This is in contrast to even to the broad conception of the concerns of morality which Louden urges upon 
us, because he insists that there remains a necessary and useful distinction between the moral and the 
non-moral (Louden 1992, p. 19).  On my view, it is appropriate to distinguish between what is trivial 
and what is not among the aspects of one’s life and self, but this is not to carve out a domain of the 
non-moral.
given. Eudaimonist theories hold that the only fundamental reason that can be given 
—and thus the ultimate source of reasons for all that we do —is that what we do will 
contribute to our good or happy lives, to our eudaimonia.
 This is the connection between eudaimonia and virtue — it explains why we 
should choose the dispositions and traits we ought. We can, to a great extent, choose 
our dispositions and traits. The virtue theorist holds that most people are somewhat 
plastic at this level — that they are capable of choosing for themselves what habits 
and traits of character to cultivate. Thus, we must think about reasons for choosing 
the habits and traits we wish to develop and cultivate (though such choices themselves 
are subject to the traits and habits we already have acquired — which is why good 
moral education features so prominently in most virtue accounts). Eudaimonist 
accounts hold that such reasons stem from the prospect of living a eudaimon life — it 
is the fact that some trait or habit contributes to living such a life that gives one 
reason to adopt it.
 Some of the ancients held even stronger views about the connection between 
virtue and happiness. Socrates, for example, held that virtue was both necessary and 
sufficient for eudaimonia. However, eudaimonism as I shall consider it is not 
committed to this strong claim.12 While it does not rule out this stronger conception, 
the type of view I am interested in maintains only that virtue is generally necessary 
for happiness.13 
 The conception of reasons for action just sketched yields a two-level, or indirect, 
structure of reasons. We have reasons to be a certain type of person (that is, virtuous), 
and being virtuous gives distinctive reasons for acting. This allows for a significant 
degree of slack between reasons for acting on particular occasions and the “final end” 
13
12The role of “conventional goods” in the good life was hotly disputed by the ancients. To what extent 
does, for example, health or wealth play in the good life, beyond its role in or contribution to virtue? 
Eudaimonistic virtue theory, as I shall assess it, will not take a position on this issue.
13The connection is a causal one and, like most causal connections, this one may be subject to 
exceptions and “ceteris paribus” clauses, stemming from the fact that, whatever generalizations we 
make about human beings, they are always only generalizations, rarely (if ever) universal claims. An 
example of an eudaimonist view with this sort of general (not universal) connection between virtue and 
happiness may be found in Hursthouse 1987, especially Ch. 6.
of eudaimonia. One may have reason for acting in particular cases in ways that seem 
not to contribute at all to living well, or in fact even to detract from a good life. That is 
as it should be, given that the primary level of assessment is whole lives rather than 
individual actions. This structure of reasons for action will contribute to the responses 
to the objections we shall be considering.14 In turn, it also generates new objections, 
which I address in Chapter 5.
Why Eudaimonism?
 Now that eudaimonism’s core commitments are in hand, I can explain my 
interest in eudaimonist versions of virtue theory. My interest is not commonplace 
among modern virtue theorists. The modern revival of virtue ethics has spawned a 
variety of virtue theories, and in general these modern theories are not eudaimonist. 
Probably the best-known modern theory is Alasdair MacIntyre’s work After Virtue 
(1984), and eudaimonia plays only a small role in that account. The most worked-out 
of the modern views is Michael Slote’s From Morality to Virtue (1992), and eudaimonia 
plays virtually no role in his theory. We have already seen that Hurka’s virtue theory 
is not eudaimonist in the pertinent sense. So my interest in the eudaimonism of the 
ancient accounts is something of a throwback, and an explanation of it is in order.15 I 
have two reasons for finding eudaimonism to be the most attractive form of virtue 
theory.
 First, eudaimonism offers a comprehensive and unified theory, not merely of 
morality conceived of narrowly as the responsibilities and duties owed others, but of 
practicality — of the considerations that ought to determine how we live our lives. 
Ancient eudaimonism is a theory of practical rationality. It has at its core the claim 
14
14Nothing like much of what I claim here appears anywhere in the ancients. I know of nothing, for 
example, that even hints at an “indirect structure of reasons for action.” My claim is that these theses 
provide an adequate (perhaps the best) way of understanding the thinking and explicit theses which do 
appear in the ancient accounts. At a minimum, I take it there is nothing in these commitments that 
Plato, Aristotle, or the Stoics would have rejected, and that they would accept them as capturing 
important aspects of the theories they developed.
15It is a minority view, but there are modern eudaimonist ethicists. Philippa Foot, Rosalind 
Hursthouse, and Neera Badhwar all are sympathetic to the eudaimonism of the ancients.
that all our reasons for action arise from our interest in eudaimonia. What we have 
reason to do (roughly) is what is most conducive to living such a life, and if something 
fails to contribute to living well, then we have no reason to do it. This is a simple but 
ambitious theory of practical reasons. It might turn out to be false, of course, but it 
holds out the prospect of a conception of human life and action that takes as its 
domain all of our concerns as human agents and purports to give direction on how we 
can fit these concerns into a single overarching structure of ends.16
 The second reason emerges both in ancient theory and in modern descendants. 
Questions about what justification we have for what we do can be asked at a variety of 
levels. “Why did you throw the rock?” “I wanted to break the window.” “Why did you 
want to break the window?” “I wanted to ...” Any four-year-old can drive us nuts with 
progressively deeper questions about the reasons for doing what we do. But demands 
for reasons seem to stop when we say that we want to live a good and happy life. It’s 
not that no one can ask why we want to do that either. It’s just that it’s hard to know 
what could count as an answer to such a question. What can you offer as an 
explanation for wanting to live a good life? That desire is basic in a sense which makes 
further explanation impossible. A modern eudaimonist, Rosalind Hursthouse, puts the 
point this way:
...our question ‘How am I to live well?” ... is a question 
that any one of us is bound to be interested in because we 
all want to flourish/be happy/successful; the very idea that 
someone interested in life should not want to ‘make a go of 
it’ in this way is deeply puzzling. (Hursthouse 1987, p. 225)
 The passage which introduced this chapter illustrates Plato’s endorsement of 
this principle. The ancients seemed to take our interest in eudaimonia as being both a 
descriptive principle of psychology —a fact about how human beings normally work — 
and a normative practical principle about what we ought to seek. These two are not 
the same, of course, but the ancients seem either to have failed to notice this point or 
15
16Cf. Irwin: “The eudaimonistic outlook requires us to claim that all our reasonable concerns can be 
harmonized and made into a coherent set of values, and if we can show that a course of action promotes 
our happiness we must be able to show that it fits into this relatively harmonious and coherent set of 
values” (Irwin 1994, p. 165).
to treat it as of no interest.17 Whether and how the descriptive and normative 
elements of eudaimonism come together is an interesting question to be sure, but it is 
one I will not take up here.18 The form of virtue theory I will explore is one which take 
our interest in eudaimonia to be normatively basic: it is the ultimate source of all our 
reasons for action.
 But some modern critics find just this feature of the ancient accounts (and their 
modern descendants) to be a fatal drawback. They have felt that the eudaimonist 
account of our reasons for acting leaves unexplained some strong intuitions we have 
about the treatment we owe other people, and the way the interests of others can and 
should figure into our practical deliberations. Having laid out what eudaimonism 
amounts to, I now want to turn to the objections which have been raised to it, and 
which it will be my project to answer.
Problems with Eudaimonism
 The idea that reasons for action can arise only from one’s interest in eudaimonia 
seems out of kilter with some very basic common-sense intuitions about our reasons 
for action. If my daughter needs something, the fact that she does so seems to give me 
a reason for acting to provide it without any justificatory detour through my interest 
in living a good life. The fact that she is in need gives me a reason to act, period. Or 
again: the fact that the houses in my neighborhood are constructed with (highly 
flammable) shake roofs gives me a reason not to set off bottle-rockets, whatever the 
pleasure I would get from doing so. The fact that I would be exposing other people and 
their property to risk of great harm gives me a reason for acting (or abstaining from 
16
17Cf. Gregory Vlastos: in the Platonic corpus “desire for happiness is strictly self-referential: it is the 
agent’s desire for his own happiness and that of no one else. This is so deep-seated an assumption that 
it is simply taken for granted: no argument is ever given for it” (Vlastos 1991, p. 203).
18Robertson refers to the descriptive thesis as “Platonic internalism” (Robertson 1986, pp. 128ff), 
motivated in part by Socrates’ claim in Euthydemus that virtually everyone “wants to do well” 
(Euthydemus 278e). Perhaps the most famous descriptive account is Aristotle’s opening argument in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, but of course Aristotle immediately presses this descriptive account into normative 
service. How one is to get from the descriptive notion to the normative one — that there can be no 
source of reasons other than this end — is a tough question, but one that not crucial for the present 
project.
action, in this case), and that’s the end of it. Even some of my own interests seem to 
justify action without any further reference to my life going well as a whole — 
avoiding being bitten by a rattler, for example.19 In all these instances, interjecting 
the idea that I want to live a good life into my reasoning seems gratuitous, at best, and 
noxious, at worst. It is troubling to think that the interests of other people cannot give 
us reasons for acting in and of themselves, without being mediated by their 
contribution to our own eudaimonia.
 This common-sense line of thought underlies the objections to eudaimonism 
which I want to consider more closely. Some critics have rejected the ancient 
eudaimonist theories as “egoistic,” and cited thinking of just this sort as a reason for 
thinking they are objectionable. Now, it is not always clear just what “egoism” comes 
to in these objections, and why it is supposed to be a bad thing for a moral theory to 
be. In the end, the charge that eudaimonism is egoistic is not very useful as a way of 
formulating the lines of objection we want to assess.20 What is useful is considering 
the reasoning behind the complaints that ancient eudaimonist theories are egoistic.
17
19I owe this point, and the example, to David Schmidtz.
20Some defenders of the ancient accounts believe that the ancient theories are “egoistic,” but not in any 
problematic sense. Bernard Williams distinguishes between “formal” and “substantive” egoism. 
“Formal” egoism is the position that the sources of reasons for a person to act in a certain way or be a 
certain kind of person must “appeal to that person in terms of something about himself, how and what 
he will be if he is a person with that sort of character” (Williams 1985, p. 32).  “Substantive” egoism, on 
the other hand, involves a particular conception of the human good — on Williams’ view, 
desire-satisfaction or some similar subjective conception.  Williams maintains that the ancient accounts 
are formally egoistic in maintaining that ethical theory can and should justify itself to agents in terms 
of who they are and what they will become in adhering to it, and in advocating that agents develop and 
cultivate dispositions on the basis of how those dispositions will contribute to their own well-being — 
but that they reject the sort of conception of the good involved in substantive egoism (Williams 1985, p. 
50). Julia Annas agrees with Williams both that the ancient theories are egoistic in (only) the formal 
sense and that this is not objectionable:
Eudaimonist theories are formally self-centered, because 
they develop from the agent’s reasonings about her own 
life. But they need not be self-centered in content. 
Whether they are depends entirely on what the theory's 
candidate is for the specific determinate content of the 
agent’s final end.(Annas 1992, p.35)
Since ancient theories employ conceptions of the good that are not “self-
centered” — each gives the welfare of others a substantial place in their 
structure — they are only formally, and not substantively and objectionably, 
egoistic.
 Why Ancient Accounts are thought to be Egoistic
 A.C. Ewing complains of Plato and Aristotle that they “base morality on the 
conception that it is to our own true good to act rightly;” this, he says, amounts to a 
species of egoism, albeit one that is “higher” than merely hedonistic egoism (Ewing 
1965, p. 31). The ancients effectively accept the egoistic assumption that 
ultimately we cannot be under an obligation to pursue 
anything but our own greatest happiness and that our duties 
towards others are to be commended solely as efficient, 
though indirect, means of attaining this happiness. (Ewing 
1965, p. 21-2) 
Ewing’s worry appears to be that in these theories acting for the good of others is 
valued only as an instrumental means of bringing about one’s own greatest happiness. 
Advocating such merely instrumental regard for others is a serious failure in a moral 
theory. Ewing rightly insists that 
We ought not to treat either other people as a mere means to 
our own happiness or ourselves as a mere means to the 
happiness of others...the interests of others should be 
treated on just the same level as one’s own... (Ewing 1965, 
p.35)
 This points us to one of the major lines of worry about eudaimonism we shall 
consider. Because in eudaimonism the ultimate end of action is the agent’s own good 
(the objection runs), the interest an agent takes in the welfare of another can at best 
be instrumental to that end. In contrast, other sorts of ethical theory allow or require 
us to take some sort of non-instrumental interest in the welfare of others, and insofar 
as they do, they offer a conception of the ethical life that is more in keeping with the 
way we intuitively suppose we ought to be related to others and their interests. But 
eudaimonism — constrained as it is to find reasons for action solely in the good life of 
the agent — can see the interests of others as nothing but means for the realization of 
the agent’s good.
 There is a second aspect to Ewing’s objection to the egoism of the ancient 
eudaimonist theories. He rejects hedonistic egoism, in part because it proposes that 
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the reason a wrongful act (e.g. hurting another) is wrong is that it is not conducive to 
the agent’s greatest pleasure. And this is a skewed picture of the wrong-making 
properties of wrong actions. As Ewing puts it, “Even if in fact it is the case that it is 
never conducive to my own greatest pleasure to hurt others, it should be plain that 
this is not the main reason why it is wrong” (Ewing 1965, p. 28). The hedonistic egoist, 
in other words, is looking in the wrong place to find what is wrong with hurting 
another person. The wrong is not in any feature or property or state of the agent at all. 
Ewing does not say explicitly what is the main reason hurting others is wrong, 
because he takes it as obvious that what is wrong with such actions is their effects on 
their victims. 
 Ewing’s worry makes sense. Even if it is the case that it is never conducive to 
the best kind of life to hurt others, this just cannot be the main reason why it is wrong 
to do so. We need to look to the effects on the victims of wrongful acts to see what is 
wrong with them, but eudaimonistic accounts appear to look in exactly the wrong 
place to see what is wrong with certain kinds of wrong actions, such as those that 
harm others.21 To do an adequate job of accounting for what is wrong in wrong actions 
of this sort, we must (somehow) find reasons for action (or for refraining from action) 
in the effects of the those actions on others. But eudaimonism seems to have ruled out 
this possibility by insisting that reasons for action must be grounded in the agent’s 
good life.
 G.C. Field makes essentially this point in objecting to Aristotle. An important 
feature of morality which Aristotle just misses (Field says) is that morality “involves a 
reference to others beside ourselves” (Field 1966, p. 109). As Field reads him, Aristotle 
holds that what each one of us desires is a particular internal state — some “condition 
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21Annas formulates this line of objection this way:
...the good of others should matter to the agent just because it is 
the good of others, not because it is viewed as part of the agent's 
own overall good. Eudaimonist theories locate the good of others in 
the wrong place — as something which contributes to my own final 
good.(Annas 1992, p. 137)
of ourselves.”22 As Field sees it, this “final object of desire” (as Aristotle refers to it) 
thus is “ultimately selfish.” Of course, he allows, Aristotle recognizes unselfish action 
as an important part of the good life. But ultimately Aristotle’s rationale for a man’s 
unselfish action is that 
he really wants to do good to others because in doing this he 
exercises his own nature, and it is this aspect of it that 
makes it an object of desire to him. So that however much for 
the good of others the actual results of his action might be, 
he does them primarily because he is thinking of and aiming 
at a condition of himself. (Field 1966, p. 110)
Field’s complaint is that the good which ancient eudaimonism recognizes is made out 
to be just a state of the agent, with no obvious reference to external considerations 
which might be of moral significance.23
Modern Objections to Eudaimonism
 These complaints against ancient eudaimonism have modern counterparts. For 
example, William Wilcox has given voice to the worry that having a fundamental 
commitment to one’s own good will obstruct the kind of commitment to another which 
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22Field can also be understood as offering a criticism akin to what I made out as Ewing’s first objection, 
as arguing that the eudaimonist is incapable of valuing the right sorts of things, or of valuing them in 
the right way. On his view eudaimonism is preoccupied with states of the agent, preventing agents from 
aspiring to have the appropriate sorts of relations with other people. Such relations are not in the last 
analysis merely states of oneself, of course, so if internal states are eudaimonism’s sole or primary 
concern, then it prevents agents from involving themselves in the best or most complete ways with the 
lives of others. Now, nothing about eudaimonism entails the strong view that reasons for action arise 
only from internal states of the agent, so I will have little to say by way of response to this objection.
23A somewhat different objection to Aristotle’s “egoism” comes from  W.F.R. Hardie. His worry arises 
from the value Aristotle accords to living a complete life. Hardie agrees with Field that this makes 
Aristotle’s view of the good for man “ultimately selfish,” since on it no sacrifice of one’s life for morally 
worthy objectives can be countenanced (Hardie 1965, p. 293). The idea is that Aristotle’s interest in 
complete lives seems to mandate preserving one’s life under circumstances in which self-sacrifice for the 
sake of others appears to be appropriate, good, or morally required. Aristotle’s eudaimonism is thus 
objectionable because it insists on a complete life as part of the human good — moreover a part of that 
good which may not or must not be traded off for other parts of the good. Ewing objects to egoism on the 
same grounds:  “A weak point in the egoist’s case shows itself when he is asked whether it can ever be a 
man’s duty to sacrifice his life for another” (Ewing 1965, p. 31). Mark Carl Overvold accepts the 
somewhat less ambitious point that an attractive virtuous life is not compatible with the prospect of 
immediate self-sacrifice: “ If a prudentially-motivated person finds himself in a situation where 
choosing the moral life will force him to sacrifice his life the next day, I doubt that it would be rational 
for him to make such a choice” (Overvold 1984, p. 503). I take this line of objection to be a variant of the 
general objection that certain intuitively-valuable forms of commitment are ruled out by eudaimonism. 
Aristotle’s response to this general objection is discussed in Chapter 3 and I supplement that response 
in Chapter 5. A reply to this specific variant is in Appendix B.
 Still a further form of accusation that Aristotle is unacceptably “egoistic” comes from Nicholas 
White. I discuss White’s argument in detail and reply in Appendix A.
is required for friendship. He argues that someone with such a commitment (an 
“egoist”) must be prepared to sacrifice a friend’s interests on any occasion in which 
those interests conflict with his own to any degree (Wilcox 1987, p. 76).24 It does not 
help to think of this fundamental commitment as a “counterfactual commitment” 
which is “held in reserve” as “overriding,” while subjectively (and consciously and 
deliberately) one acts on the dispositions which one deems objectively to serve one’s 
norms most successfully.25 Wilcox’ claim is that if such counterfactual conditions have 
any force at all, they will prevent just the sorts of sacrifices for friends that friendship 
requires. The problem, in short, is that
the practical effects of the egoist’s particular commitment 
are so pervasive that little room is left for a concern for 
another’s well-being to have much practical effect. Too often 
there is a choice to be made that pits the welfare of a 
friend against one’s own pleasure. (Wilcox 1987, p. 79)
Wilcox’ point here is not explicitly the objection that only instrumental interest in the 
welfare of others is possible given a fundamental commitment to one’s own good, but 
his argument is clearly sympathetic to it. If a commitment to the good of another 
person — a friend — has reason-giving force only so long as one’s own interests are not 
sacrificed, then it is hard to see what real force it can have except through its 
contribution to one’s own welfare. The “egoist’s” fundamental commitment simply 
leaves too “little room” for the good of others to have non-instrumental practical 
reason-giving force for him.
 Thomas Nagel turns this objection the other way around: the egoist is, he says, 
afflicted with 
an inability to regard one’s own concerns as being of 
interest to anyone else, except instrumentally or 
contingently upon the operation of some sentiment. ...The 
pain which gives him a reason to remove his gouty toes from 
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24Cf. also Laurence Thomas, who claims, “The egoist must be prepared to exploit or to take advantage 
of others if he runs only a small risk of adversely affecting his long-range interests,” (Thomas 1980, p. 
73).
25This is Railton’s strategy for defending consequentialism in Railton 1988, and it is Railton’s defense 
that is the target of Wilcox’ argument.
under another person’s heel does not in itself give the other 
person any reason to remove the heel, since it is not his 
pain. (Nagel 1970, p. 85).
The force of Nagel’s point is not just that egoists can’t have the right kind of concern 
for others; it is that the egoist’s fundamental commitment prevents him from 
expecting the right kind of concern for himself from others. He can neither be nor have 
a genuine friend. The egoist is doubly deprived, that is, of the kind of intimate, caring, 
and loving relationships which surely must be part of the lives we should aspire to 
lead.
 Numerous modern critics have pressed the other line of objection to eudaimonist 
virtue theories, and with greater focus and force than did Ewing and Field. We have 
already seen Thomas Hurka’s version of this complaint. Samuel Scheffler has 
expressed it perhaps as well as any. In his discussion of “agent-centred restrictions” as 
they might appear in a virtue-based theory, Scheffler argues (in essence) that virtue 
theory faces a dilemma: either it must recognize a “moral point of view” which opens 
the door to maximizing theories such as consequentialism, or it must adopt an extreme 
view of the locus of moral rightness and wrongness as located entirely within the 
welfare of the agent — in effect bowing to Field’s charge that all the eudaimonist can 
seek is states of himself. Scheffler claims that eudaimonism
gives the wrong explanation of other-regarding norms. It 
appears to say that what is wrong with killing an innocent 
person, for example, is that such behavior, or the 
disposition to engage in such behavior, does not contribute 
to the well-being of the agent. Even if we agree that a 
disposition of this kind does not in fact enhance the agent’s 
well-being, however, that hardly seems like a full 
explanation of what is wrong with [say] killing the innocent. 
Surely any adequate explanation must make reference to the 
effects of such behavior on its victims. (Scheffler 1992, pp. 
116-7)26
The right sort of explanation needs to make the effects of (for example) acts of harm on 
the victim the centerpiece in their explanation of what is wrong with such acts. In 
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26Scheffler makes essentially the same point in Scheffler 1988, p. 55. 
Frances Kamm’s terminology, an adequate theory needs to have a victim-focus (Kamm 
1989, 1992). 
 Christine Korsgaard criticizes agent-relative theories of “deontological reasons” 
(duties not to harm, and the like) generally on this score. She claims that 
agent-relative accounts (such as eudaimonism) cannot explain the victim’s “right to 
complain” about harmful treatment. On such accounts, she says, the reason not to 
engage in such treatment of another person belongs to the agent, not to the victim, so 
that if the agent fails to act on that reason, the victim has no more basis for complaint 
than if the agent fails to act on any other reason she might have:
I have no reason to do anything about your [agent-] relative 
reasons, even to think about them, although I may happen to. 
I certainly don’t have any reason to complain of your conduct 
when you don’t act on them, and if I do, you may justifiably 
tell me that it is none of my business. If deontological 
reasons were agent-relative, the same thing would hold of 
victims. My victim could entertain the thought that I have a 
reason not to treat him this way, but that thought would give 
him no grounds for complaint. Astonishingly enough, it turns 
out to be none of his business. (Korsgaard 1993, p. 48)
In addition to Scheffler, Kamm, and Korsgaard, there is a veritable chorus of modern 
voices pressing this point.27 It is just implausible to think that the wrong in (say) acts 
of harm does not lie in the harm done to the victim; recognizing that fact requires 
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27In addition to the sources cited, others include Korsgaard 1996 (p. 134), Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1986, 
p. 197), David Schmidtz (Schmidtz 1995, p. 193 and 1997, p. 116), and Ronald Milo, who says, 
What's wrong about raping or torturing someone is not that in doing so one 
manifests traits of character (vices) that are incompatible with one's 
flourishing. It is rather that in so acting one is treating someone else in a 
certain way. For example, (one is) harming them — i.e., doing something to them 
that interferes with or undermines their flourishing, or treating them as a means 
merely. I am especially concerned to question the connection between the moral 
wrongness of other-regarding behavior and how this bears on the agent's own well–
being or flourishing or happiness. The wrongness does not seem to me to depend on 
this....(Eudaimonist virtue theory) does seem to want to ground (ultimately) the 
wrongness of certain ways of treating others on how the character traits 
manifested by such behavior affect the happiness or flourishing of the agent. 
Cruelty towards others does of course manifest a morally bad character trait. But 
what makes this character trait morally bad is not that an agent who possesses it 
cannot flourish or be happy. It seems rather to have to do with how having such a 
character trait disposes one to treat others - in ways that affect their happiness 
or flourishing. (Milo, personal communication)
finding reasons for action in effects on victims, rather than in the well-being of the 
agent. A moral theory that is driven by the value of the good life to the person living it, 
as eudaimonism is, seemingly cannot accommodate the constraints against doing 
harm and other forms of injustice.28 
The Two Main Objections
 The objections we have surveyed sort into two broad families of worry about 
eudaimonism. The difference between them is captured nicely by a distinction David 
Schmidtz has drawn between what he refers to as concern and respect for others. 
Schmidtz distinguishes these as follows:
First, we might care about other people, which is to say 
their welfare enters the picture through our preference 
functions.... Second, the welfare of others can enter the 
picture in the form of self-imposed constraints we 
acknowledge when pursuing our goals.... Insofar as one’s 
other-regard takes the form of caring about other people’s 
welfare, one exhibits concern. Insofar as it takes the form 
of adherence to constraints on what one may do to others, one 
exhibits respect. ... We manifest concern for people when we 
care about how life is treating them (so to speak), whereas 
we respect other people when we care about how we are 
treating them and constrain ourselves accordingly. (Schmidtz 
1995, p. 99)
 I shall adopt Schmidtz’ terminology in referring to the charges that eudaimonist 
virtue theories cannot properly account for either (i) the concern or (ii) the respect 
which we (intuitively, at least) think we ought to have for others. But these objections 
can benefit from a bit more focus.
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28A related objection comes from Robert Louden. His worry is that the agent-centeredness of virtue 
ethics prevents it from being able to say the right sorts of things about what he calls “intolerable acts.” 
Louden observes that certain sorts of acts are morally proscribed for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the agent doing them, but everything to do with the harm they inflict on their victims. “Such 
actions,” he says, “are to be regarded not merely as bad but as intolerable” (Louden 1984, p. 30-1). 
Virtue theories cannot account for this fact, he says, because
We cannot articulate this sense of absolute prohibition by referring merely to 
characteristic patterns of behavior.... When we ask why there is a law against 
e.g. rape or murder, the proper answer is that it is morally intolerable. (ibid.)
Louden’s target is virtue theory’s attention to dispositions or character traits that lead to the best kind 
of life. Since virtue accounts evaluates acts only secondarily — as the effects of the dispositions and 
traits that are the primary focus of moral assessment — they simply cannot provide the right sort of 
moral constraint against intolerable action. This is another way of saying that they cannot help but give 
the wrong kind of explanation of what is wrong with “intolerable acts.”
 The first charge asserts that eudaimonism cannot properly account for the 
non-derivative and non-instrumental nature of the interest, concern, or regard for 
others which we intuitively accept as both right and good. It is animated by the belief 
that we ought to have a non-derivative concern for the welfare or interests of at least 
some others — that is, a concern that is not derived from and does not reduce to some 
aspect of the agent’s interest in his own eudaimonia; otherwise (the thought seems to 
be) our interest in others necessarily becomes instrumental and self-regarding in an 
objectionable way. I cannot be a genuine friend, for example, if I see friendship solely 
as a means of making my own life better, and thus have one eye out for my own 
interests all the time. 
 We need not believe that we should have this sort of concern for all others to 
believe that it is appropriate in at least some relationships — in love, friendship, and 
familial relationships, for example. That is how I shall construe this objection — as a 
claim that eudaimonism excludes the possibility of non-instrumental concern for other 
persons. Thus, the first task for eudaimonism is to show that it is compatible with 
such concern for at least some others. A stronger defense would show that 
eudaimonism endorses or recommends some such relationships as part of the best kind 
of life. In Chapter 3 I will argue that Aristotle offers this stronger sort of defense, and 
that his defense is successful, at least in general outline. In Chapters 5 and 6 I will 
expand on his reply, but in a spirit of emendation rather than repair to the basic 
account he offers.
 The second charge is that eudaimonism cannot properly account for constraints 
of respect that are imposed by the interests of others on our actions in pursuit of our 
own welfare. Some care is required to formulate this objection usefully, because it is in 
the neighborhood of a great deal of controversy in ethical theory, in two ways, both of 
which I wish to side-step.
 The intuitive idea (which is simple enough) is that there are things we ought 
not do to (affect) others in advancing our own interests. There are constraints on our 
(permissible) actions irrespective of what our own interests are, and of whether or not 
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we take an interest in those whom the constraints protect. Sometimes these 
constraints are called deontic constraints. One area of danger is that this terminology 
is sometimes used to refer to “agent-centered constraints” — constraints that may not 
be violated even if by doing so more violations of the same kind may be averted. This 
conception of constraints has been the focus of recent consequentialist criticism,29 and 
this is a controversy I do not wish to enter here. The objection to eudaimonism draws 
on strong and basic intuitions, and I will use the notion of ‘deontic constraints’ to refer 
to the limits we intuitively accept, and sidestep the question when, if ever, these limits 
are defeasible, and why.
  A second danger arises with the use of the term respect. Often respect for others 
is taken to require a certain attitude towards others. For example, the Kantian 
conception of respect for persons requires seeing them not as mere means, but always 
as ends-in-themselves. Different moral theories will require different attitudes 
towards others, however, and I wish to sidestep any particular commitments of this 
sort in formulating the objection eudaimonism must meet. Thus, I will conceive of 
constraints of respect (deontic constraints —I will use these terms interchangeably) as 
behavioral constraints; for example, constraints against harming others.30
  The second task for eudaimonism, then, is twofold. First, it must provide a 
theoretical basis for the constraints of respect we think agents owe to others and their 
interests. Second, it must do so in a way which explains the victim-focused nature of 
our intuitions. The challenge here is not, as in the case of concern, merely to show 
compatibility between eudaimonism and this way of treating others, because it is not 
enough to show merely that eudaimonism does not conflict with respect. Constraints of 
respect are binding in a way that the value of non-instrumental concern for others is 
not. The latter is (to a degree anyway) optional, while deontic constraints are not. 
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29Cf. Cummiskey 1990, Kagan 1989, Scheffler 1982.
30In addition to doing no harm, some have thought deontic constraints proscribe breaking faith (deceit 
or false promising), failing to rescue others in dire danger, and interfering with the freedom of others. 
The extent of deontic constraints is as much in dispute as their nature and grounding, so I will focus on 
the central issue of constraints against harming others.
Thus, to succeed in meeting this charge, eudaimonistic virtue theory must show that 
respect for others is a necessary element of the best kind of life —that it is not a matter 
of choice for us in the way that, say, having close friendships is a matter of choice.
 The project of this dissertation is to show how eudaimonist virtue theory can 
make an adequate theoretical place for others, their welfare, and their interests, so as 
to meet these two lines of objection. The first step is to examine the ancient 
eudaimonist accounts to see whether and to what extent they are vulnerable to these 
objections, recognize them, and attempt to meet them. The next chapter looks at 
Platonic moral theory. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle’s attempts to explain the place of 
others’ interests in his theory, and Chapter 4 assesses Stoic responses to the same 
questions. In each case we want to see not merely whether they do in fact adequately 
meet these lines of objection, but what insights they might offer to us in formulating a 
version of eudaimonist virtue theory more capable of replying to the charges. 
 In Chapters 5 and 6 I develop a conception of empathic identification which, I 
claim, is needed for an adequate solution to the problem of respect. I argue that the 
best kind of life requires us to identify empathically with others, and that if we do so, 
we will have reason to treat others in accord with constraints of respect, and that our 
reason will be properly victim-focused in a way that explains our intuitions. But the 
need for this account will not be apparent until after we have considered the ancient 
eudaimonist accounts, so that is where we begin.
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2. PLATO
Give an answer yourself, and tell us what you say the just is. And don’t tell me that it’s the right, the 
beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you 
mean, for I won’t accept such nonsense from you. 
 — Thrasymachus, Republic 336c
 Not everyone thinks Plato succeeds in the task he sets himself in Republic.31 
Some doubt that his aim is to supply anything like our modern conception of justice. 
Others doubt that Plato attempts to offer anything like moral theory in the first place. 
There is enough merit to these worries to make it difficult to extract from Plato’s 
dialogues a clear line of response to either of the objections we are concerned with. 
That does not make the task unworthy of the attempt, however. Even if ultimately we 
do not get satisfactory answers to the objections by doing so, we can still learn from 
Plato.
 To do so, however, we have to begin by discharging the most radical of these 
doubts. Can we rightly see Plato as a source of moral theory? If so, can that theory be 
rightly understood as eudaimonist? If the answer to either of these is no, then it’s hard 
to see how thinking about Plato can contribute to our investigation.
Plato and Eudaimonism 
 Taking the latter question first: since Plato does not speak in his own voice, it is 
difficult to find many theses that he affirms consistently and unequivocally 
throughout his work. However, a commitment to eudaimonism is one of the exceptions. 
Present from the earliest dialogues through the latest is the theme that each person 
finds (and should find) his or her own eudaimonia to be reason-giving. It is explicit in a 
number of dialogues, such as Republic (352d) and Symposium (cf. 205a, quoted at the 
beginning of Chapter 1), Euthydemus (278eff and 282a), Crito (48b), Timaeus (90c), 
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31 Those writers who think he succeeds don’t agree on how he should be understood as succeeding.
and Laws (829a).32 There are also numerous dialogues (such as Apology, Gorgias, 
Meno, Philebus, Protagoras) in which eudaimonism is necessary as a presupposition 
for the dialectic of the dialogue. 
  Plato seems to take for granted three things: (i) that each person’s true interest 
is having a life that goes well (eudaimonia, eu prattein, eu zen, and agathos bios are 
interchangeable in referring to this kind of life and interest), (ii) that this interest 
provides genuine reasons for action,  and (iii) that each person is motivated to bring 
about such a life if they can determine how to do so. At the very least Plato accepts 
these theses as widely shared among his audience (as common-sense beliefs, or 
endoxa) and believes they are appropriate foundations for ethical reflection. He seems 
to regard eudaimonism as both normatively and descriptively true of us as human 
agents. It is quite difficult even to make sense of much of Plato’s discourse on practical 
philosophy outside of the context of a eudaimonist theory of reasons.
 It is another thing to say that Plato really has or offers a moral theory. Whether 
Plato offers us a theory is the subject of a long-running, complex, and difficult debate. 
But, like countless others who read his work, I find it natural to see him at work in 
exploring, developing, revising, rethinking, reworking, not a mere mish-mash of 
philosophical tenets but a relatively coherent conception of what the world is like and 
of what it is good for human beings to do and be, individually and in their political and 
social organizations. 
 I thus think it makes sense to do what I do here, to see him as concerned with 
themes that reappear in various dialogues and at various stages of his thought. I am 
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32Richard Kraut (1973a) argues that in Republic Plato develops and defends a conception of 
self-interest incompatible with eudaimonism — one which includes the welfare of others as part of one’s 
“extended” self-interest. He contrasts this conception of self-interest with “proper” self-interest, and 
gives as an example of it a father’s interest in his child: “His feeling for it may be such that he regards it 
as an extension of himself, so that anything that benefits the child ipso facto benefits him...the child's 
profiting is his profiting” (p. 333). He believes this account of extended self-interest explains why unjust 
treatment of others is excluded by Socratic justice (the “psychic harmony” of Book IV). I think this kind 
of motivational structure is important, and indeed will draw on it in my own account of concern, but I 
don’t find it in Republic. Moreover, even if we did it would provide at best a very lame answer to the 
problem of injustice. Why not act unjustly toward those for whom we do not have this concern? Kraut’s 
answer: “Evidently, he sees that certain ways of treating others are inappropriate even when we have 
no fellow-feeling for them, and since such behavior is not motivated by love of others, he reasons that it 
must be based on self-love” (p. 343). This approach is defective from the start, as we shall see in greater 
detail in looking at Aristotle.
committed only to the view that Plato has positive views which emerge through his 
dialogues, not to the stronger position that he has a monolithic and unwavering moral 
theory of which these views are parts. Some of these views are, nevertheless, fairly 
consistent throughout his work: his commitment to eudaimonism is one. Others 
include his commitment to virtue as necessary for eudaimonia and his metaphysical 
distinction between the worlds of “being” and “becoming.” Others doctrines receive 
differing treatment in different dialogues: his views on eros (love) and philia 
(friendship) took on different (and perhaps more determinate) forms as he pondered 
them, as did dikaiosune (justice) and sophrosune (self-knowledge, self-control). So 
while it requires care to extract from Plato’s writings the raw materials for responses 
to the objections from concern and respect, it is not obvious that the project is doomed 
from the start. The best way to decide whether Plato can help us is to go ahead and 
consider what he says.
Concern
 Plato does not directly address the question about the non-instrumental value of 
attachments to particular other people — whether or not the value of such 
attachments is found solely in their contribution to our own good life. The closest he 
comes is his discussions of friendship (philia) and love (eros). But a significant 
complication in thinking about these discussions is that our worries about valuing 
others in a merely instrumental way gets tangled with the question of what role 
individual others — as particular individuals — play in his views, especially as objects 
of eros. A considerable amount of critical literature addresses this second issue, and it 
is one that vexes not only Plato scholarship but also modern conceptions of attachment 
and love.33 This entanglement directly affects Plato’s helpfulness in understanding 
non-instrumental concern within a eudaimonist framework.
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33See, for example, Ronald de Sousa’s handling of the problem in de Sousa 1987.
 Some critics have run the two problems together. Gregory Vlastos — hardly 
unsympathetic to Plato overall — indicts Plato for a general blindness to the nature of 
the concern for others which we find important: “Plato is scarcely aware of kindness, 
tenderness, compassion, concern for the freedom, respect for the integrity of the 
beloved, as essential ingredients of the highest type of interpersonal love” (Vlastos 
1981, p. 30). What support is there for Vlastos’ indictment?
 One source of support is a striking form of instrumentalism about the value of 
persons that emerges in Republic. There, Socrates broaches the idea that in the ideal 
polis what citizens deserve is wholly tied to how capably they perform their jobs. He 
cites approvingly Asclepius’ judgment that “He didn’t think that he should treat 
someone [as a physician] who couldn’t live a normal life, since such a person would be 
of no profit either to himself or to the city” (407d-e). The idea seems to be that once you 
cease to be of service, you cease to be of value — a rather alarmingly instrumental 
conception of the value of citizens in the ideal polis.34
 Lysis seems explicitly to endorse instrumentalism about friendship (philia). 
Running through the dialogue is the assumption that friends must be useful to each 
other, that this is the basis for friendship.  Socrates asks, “are we going to be anyone’s 
friend, or is anyone going to love us as a friend in those areas in which we are good for 
nothing?” (210c). He argues that the man who is to be a friend is so “for the sake of 
something and on account of something” (218d). To end a regress in the ends for which 
one is a friend, Socrates claims that there must be a terminus (the proton philon) for 
the sake of which all other “so-called friendships” exist (220ab). Since our ordinary 
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34An astonishing confusion on Socrates’ part about the difference between valuing something 
instrumentally and valuing it for its own sake is revealed in Book I of Republic. Socrates counters 
Thrasymachus’ claim that rulers rule for their own advantage, not for the advantage of their subjects 
(340c-41a), with the argument that “no kind of knowledge seeks or orders what is advantageous to itself 
... but to what is advantageous to the weaker, which is subject to it” (342d). Thrasymachus points out 
that this commits Socrates to the claim that shepherds seek what is advantageous to their sheep, rather 
than to themselves. Indeed, Socrates does claim that the “true shepherd” is concerned “only to provide 
what is best” for the sheep, and in doing so he repudiates the idea that this is merely instrumental 
concern, that it is “not looking to what is best for the sheep” (345c). Here Thrasymachus is obviously 
right and Socrates obviously wrong (cf. Reeve 1988, p. 280 n. 15). A good shepherd of course does take 
an interest in his sheep, and may even come to care for them in a way (as for example we do with 
domestic pets), but if he lets such concern for his sheep get in the way of the ultimate ends of his 
shepherding, he won’t be much of a shepherd after all. Why Plato has Socrates maintaining otherwise 
here is not clear.
(so-called) friendships are merely ways of loving the proton philon, ordinary friendship 
is merely instrumental.
 However, this dialogue really cannot be cited as an expression of Plato’s views 
on friendship. It ends in indecision (aporea): the dialogue concludes with Socrates’ 
admission that “what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out” (223). Although 
Plato’s objectives in aporetic dialogues are not always clear, it seems that he is more 
interested in exploring commonly-held views on various topics than he is in arguing 
for a view of his own. Lysis — like other dialogues (e.g. Euthyphro) — does more to 
challenge the views of those who claim to have a firm grip on friendship (or piety) than 
to defend Plato’s own ideas.35
 The root of Vlastos’ complaint is the worry that Plato seems to treat persons as 
in important senses fungible — that one is as good as another, and they can be 
swapped out when the ends they serve are better served by doing so. The Republic 
case reveals how the worry about instrumentality and the worry about fungibility can 
converge.  One’s value stems from what one can contribute to the flourishing of the 
polis. When one can contribute little or nothing, one ceases to be of value, and the polis 
is better off by swapping out the non-contributory citizen for one in whom the polis’s 
limited resources will be better invested. So fungibility seems to be a consequence of 
merely instrumental value, and perhaps Vlastos’ indictment can be understood as a 
complaint about an underlying instrumental conception of value in Plato’s views on 
philia. 
 The issue of fungibility is even more of a problem for Plato’s conception of love 
(eros). As objects of love, individuals do not appear in a favorable light. Vlastos 
believes that the particularity of the persons who are objects of our love, friendship, 
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35A non-aporetic dialogue with a suggestion of merely instrumental concern for a friend is Alcibiades. 
Here, Socrates argues for the value of sophrosune — self-knowledge — for eudaimonia (134a). But in a 
move that foreshadows Aristotle’s well-known conception of a friend as “another self” (NE IX:1166a31), 
Socrates claims that knowledge of one’s own soul is possible only through knowing the soul of another: 
“if the soul, Alcibiades, is to know itself, it must look at a soul, and especially at that region in which 
what makes a soul good, wisdom, occurs...” (133b). It’s not clear that in this story there is any value to a 
friend beyond their value in helping one become virtuous. On the other hand, there is nothing that 
excludes non-instrumental value in the Alcibiades story either, so it too is inconclusive.
and concern is somehow lost in the ideals (especially beauty) they represent and 
instantiate:
[T]o think of love for them as love for objectifications of 
excellence is to fail to make the thought of them as subjects 
central to what is felt for them in love....[Plato] has 
evidently failed to see that what love for our fellows 
requires of us is, above all, imaginative sympathy and 
concern for what they themselves think, feel, and want. 
(ibid., p. 32)
 Part of the source of Vlastos’ concern here is Plato’s metaphysics. The middle 
books of Republic distinguish between “knowledge” and “opinion,” and between 
“philosophers” and “lovers of sights and sounds,” on the basis of what each take to be 
real (475ff). “[P]hilosophic natures,” Plato says, “always love the sort of learning that 
makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is and does not wander 
around between coming to be and decaying” (485a). The object of attention for such 
people is what is real: the world of Forms, not the world we live in. Such thinkers will 
not consider human life to be important (486a; cp. Phaedo 65dff). This makes it 
difficult to recognize the flesh-and-blood others who are the objects of our love and 
friendship as the appropriate sorts of things in which to invest our attention and 
energy, given that their reality is dubious at best. One consequence appears to be that, 
as Shirley Robin Letwin puts it, “To the degree that Plato’s lovers fasten on any 
particular person, they are pursuing an illusion” (Letwin 1977, p. 134).
 The problem is at its apex in the accounts of eros in Phaedrus and (especially) 
Symposium.36 Symposium begins, inauspiciously, with an obviously instrumental 
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36In Socrates’ second speech in Phaedrus, he recounts a myth of a “procession” in heaven, led by Zeus 
(246eff). Souls that make themselves most like god fly high enough to catch sight of what is real and 
true, of “what really is what it is” (247e, 248a-c). This includes the vision of true Beauty, “the best and 
noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it” 
(249e). The memory of this Beauty produces a kind of “madness” in its mortal beholder (ibid., 251d), 
which is relieved only by his vision of a beautiful boy (251c). This vision temporarily stops the “pain and 
the goading”  (251e); this relief the soul of the lover “is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more 
important to it than the beautiful boy” (252a). Plato describes what happens in the lover as being 
“moved abruptly from here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here” (250e). 
The “driving need” the lover has is to “gaze at the god” (253a). It is hard to see how the beloved can be 
accorded any distinctive or individual value in this process. In this sense the beloved is fungible, and 
the love of the lover for the beloved appears instrumental: the sight of the beloved “scratches an itch” 
that the sight of Beauty has planted in the soul.
depiction of love: the entire occasion of the dialogue (at least the speechmaking) is 
conceived of as praise for Eros (177c-d), but the model of propitiation the speeches 
employ is instrumental: they honor the gods because the gods give gifts (195a). 
Eventually, this mutually instrumental conception of love as a “fair exchange” is 
endorsed as the model of relation lovers engage in generally (218e). But the deeper 
worries come from the view of love Socrates attributes to Diotima. She describes the 
“ascent” that the wise lover makes in pursuit of his love. It begins with loving some 
one particular body, but that is followed by the realization that 
the beauty of one body is brother to the beauty of any other 
and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he’d be very 
foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and 
the same. (210b)
The ascent continues, from the beauty of bodies to the beauty of souls, then to the 
beauty of “activities and laws” (210c), finally to the beauty of knowledge and ideas and 
theories in the “great sea of beauty” (210d). The ultimate goal of love, Diotima says, is 
ideal Beauty: “one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from 
beautiful things and using them like rising stairs...” (211c, emphasis added). Not only 
is the human beloved loved only because he reflects the Form of Beauty, rather than 
anything particular to him, but it is explicit that his lover’s interest in him is 
instrumental on just those grounds: his love of the beloved is for the sake of ideal 
Beauty.37 
 The ideal Beauty has, and the mortal beloved has not, got the properties of 
immutability and eternality that, for Plato, mark what is real and what is really of 
value. As in Republic and Phaedrus, what is really the object of desire and knowledge 
is not the transient beauty in the mortal beloved, but “the Beautiful itself, absolute, 
pure, unmixed, not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of 
mortality” (Symposium 211e). The object of perfected eros is 
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37Compare Nygren: “It is not beautiful things as such that are the object of love and desire. It is only 
because of the memory they awaken of the higher world that they have any place in the scheme of 
Eros.... Plato’s interest in them attaches, not to their singularity and individuality, but to their being 
‘paradigms’, particular instances, which ‘participate in’ the universal beauty. They exist for him only as 
stepping-stones to this universal.” (Nygren 1982, p. 179 ).
not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, 
or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with 
itself, it is always one in form; and all the other beautiful 
things share in that, in such a way that when those others 
come to be or pass away, this does not become the least bit 
smaller or greater nor suffer any change. (211b)
 There does seem to be a problem of fungibility here for Plato: the ontological 
reality of the human beloved is ephemeral, and thus it cannot satisfy eros. As Socrates 
argues in Republic, the “nature of the real lover of learning” struggles
toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things 
that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither 
loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being 
of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is 
fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and that, 
once getting near what really is and having intercourse with 
it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, 
truly lives, is nourished, and — at that point, but not 
before — is relieved from the pains of giving birth.” 
(490a-b)38
 This is surely worrisome for an apologist for Plato’s conception of love, but ought 
it to worry us? It’s true that there seems to be an inescapable degree of fungibility to 
human objects of erotic love, but it’s less clear that their value is only instrumental as 
a consequence. It might be a function of the human condition that we cannot help but 
learn to love Beauty (say) by beginning to love imperfectly and transitorily beautiful 
people; and it might further be true that, in terms of conducing to the goal of loving 
Beauty itself, one person (as love object) is as good as another — they are in this sense 
fungible. But these facts together don’t entail that the love we develop for these 
35
38de Sousa is critical of the import of Plato’s metaphysics for love just in virtue of the fact that they 
disregards the radical this-worldliness of our emotions (including love; de Sousa 1987, especially Ch. 5).  
In his discussion of Plato’s treatment of the appropriate object of love (see his discussion of “Plato’s Love 
Triangle,” pp. 112, 130f) , he argues that our attachments to others are the product (in part) of our 
emotional constitutions, and our emotions are responses to things in our world, not the world of Forms. 
This is why Plato can’t get it right as to how we ought to love individual other persons:
we are so wired as to require attachments in the course of our causal interaction 
with such individuals as are posited in our metaphysics. The fabric of our social 
and emotional life depends on our ability to transcend the original fungibility of 
all reactivity and transform it into nonfungible emotions. (de Sousa 1987, p. 
134).
individuals is only for their instrumental properties; it might be that, once having 
fallen in love with a person, they acquire non-instrumental value for us and cease to 
be fungible. I don’t mean to argue for these points here; that is a project in itself. The 
point is that for all we’ve seen, such a non-instrumental conception of (eventual) 
concern is not inconsistent with what Plato has said. More detail is needed to see 
whether, and to what degree, our concern for our loved ones might transcend their 
purely instrumental value as an entry-point to love of Beauty. 
 At this point we are at a fair distance from the objection we need to deal with. 
Originally, the worry was that in virtue of endorsing a eudaimonist theory of reasons, 
a eudaimonist virtue theory (such as Plato’s) would entail regarding others merely 
instrumentally, as means to one’s own eudaimonia. Now there are passages where 
such instrumentalism seems to be suggested (Republic 407, Symposium 177, and 
Phaedrus, especially), but these simply are not adequate to support a solid claim that 
Plato’s view of concern is only instrumental. In general,  Plato’s characterizations of 
love and friendship, both explicit and in his dramatic renderings of relationships 
throughout the dialogues, do not reflect anything like this objectionable sort of merely 
instrumental value. And it is not easy to see how we can get more support for such a 
claim through fungibility. The right thing to do here, I believe, is to mark the fact that 
there are some difficult questions to be wrestled with here, largely in consequence of 
Plato’s metaphysics, and carry on to see what else in his work might shed light on the 
objection we want to meet.
The Philosopher-King’s Concern 
 A persistent problem for Plato interpreters has been what to say about the 
reasons the philosopher-king has to stoop to governance of the ideal polis, as Socrates 
argues he must in Republic Book VI and VII. Rulership is not something that will 
attract true philosophers — “real lovers of learning” — because its occupation with 
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matters of the “world of becoming” are a distraction from the “world of being.”39  
Ideally, says Socrates, when such men have matured to the point that they can really 
benefit from philosophy, “they should graze freely in the pastures of philosophy and do 
nothing else” (498b). Of course, if they are free to do so, that will leave the polis bereft 
of the only people capable of really wisely ruling it. The only hope for the perfection of 
the polis and its citizens is if “some chance event compels those few philosophers who 
aren’t vicious ... to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not...” (499b).
 Socrates elaborates on this idea in Book VII, using the allegory of the cave. 
Those that have escaped the cave into the sunlight will be reluctant to go back. “It isn’t 
surprising,” Socrates says, “that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to occupy 
themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, 
eager to spend their time above” (517c). Natural though that desire may be, it isn’t one 
that can be indulged. The founders of the ideal polis, having compelled those with the 
“best natures” to “make the ascent and see the good,” cannot allow them to “stay there 
and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and 
honors” (519d). Therefore, those who have become philosophers must be compelled to 
“share the labors of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their time 
with one another in the pure realm” (520d).40
 Glaucon raises the natural question at this point: “are we to do them an 
injustice by making them live a worse life when they could live a better one?” (519e). 
Socrates says no, that in fact “we’ll be giving just orders to just people” (520e). But the 
reason why this demand is just is important. There are several possible explanations, 
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39Annas observes, “the insight into virtue which the philosophers get from studying and assimilating 
themselves to the order and structure of the intelligible world makes it clear that they are to escape 
from the task of concerning themselves with others” (Annas 1998a, ch. 3).
40We might think we should go light on the idea of “compulsion” here, since, if Socrates is right that it 
is“just orders to just people,” presumably they will willingly comply. Yet Plato speaks of having to 
compel the philosophers numerous times in both Books VI and VII. The suggestion that the 
philosophers will be recalcitrant is hard to ignore. Perhaps this bit of justice is just a bit harder to 
swallow than most other demands of justice. As Irwin suggests, for a consistent eudaimonist account 
what Plato really needs to show is that “the philosophers choose to rule because they regard it as just 
and they regard the just action as part of their happiness, so that they recognize no conflict between 
duty and interest” (Irwin 1995, p. 301).
one of which might be that there is a sort of concern for those left behind that the 
philosopher comes to have, in virtue of having seen and grasped the Form of the Good. 
There might, in other words, be something like a theory about non-instrumental 
concern for others in the offing here.41
 Here’s how such a rationale might go. Suppose that each of the citizens of the 
polis was valuable in such a way that the Good consisted (in part) of advancing their 
interests through the wise rulership of the philosopher. This is something that 
ordinary would-be rulers (say, sophists) might not grasp. It might be only on seeing 
and grasping the Form of the Good that one could appreciate the value each citizen 
has, and come to see their welfare as reason-giving in the way it becomes for the 
philosopher. What justifies the philosopher-king’s return to rule, then, is just his 
concern for his fellow citizens. There is nothing instrumental about that concern, so if 
this is the story Plato is giving us we might have a case of purely non-instrumental 
concern within the context of an overall eudaimonistic theory.
 It’s doubtful that this is actually the rationale Plato has in mind, however. He 
seems to offer two other lines of argument for “compelling” the philosophers to return, 
and neither has any clear connection with non-instrumental concern.
 The first is that it is the objective of the laws to “spread happiness throughout 
the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or 
compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can 
confer on the community” (519e). Now, it is possible to construe this in a way 
congruent with the non-instrumental concern rationale as suggested above, but I do 
not believe that is what Plato has in mind. The non-instrumental concern rationale 
would have the philosopher valuing the properly-ordered polis in virtue of the 
happiness it creates for each of its citizens — something like a utilitarian 
understanding of why the properly-ordered polis is good. It is good just because it 
makes good more lives for more people, each of whom is valuable. We might think of 
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41I owe this suggestion to Tom Christiano.
this as a “bottom-up” conception of the value of the well-governed polis, since it is built 
up in virtue of the value of the enhanced lives of the people who live in it.
 But I believe Plato has a “top-down” conception of the value of the ideal polis. 
That is, its value lies precisely in the fact that it is well-ordered. The ideal polis is an 
image of the “truth about fine, just, and good things” (520c), that is, of the Forms of 
the Fine, the Just, and the Good. The philosopher “studies things that are organized 
and always the same, being all in a rational order,” and then “imitates them and tries 
to become as like them as he can” (500c). His love for these Forms manifests itself in 
the activity of ordering what lies within his power to order —first himself, then the 
polis, where through his rule he puts “what he sees there into people’s characters” 
(500d).42 In governing he is a “craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of 
popular virtue” (ibid.). 
 The philosopher-king is thus certainly benefitting the citizens of the polis 
through his rule. The question is whether what accounts for his doing so is his concern 
for the citizens or his love of the Forms. Put this way, the latter, rather than the 
former, appears to be doing both the justificatory and the motivational work. The 
value he places on likeness to the good seems to be what drives him to govern, rather 
than a concern with his fellow-citizens in virtue of some non-instrumental value he 
comes to recognize or ascribe to them. It is, so to speak, The Good rather than their 
good that he intends to realize (though of course the latter is a proper part of the 
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42The idea of the activity of loving here connects with the sexual metaphors of Symposium, where Plato 
says that only by “getting near” and “having intercourse with” and “having begotten understanding and 
truth” with “what is” is the philosopher “relieved from the pains of giving birth” (490b).
former).43 Non-instrumental concern thus does not appear to be an essential part of 
this rationale.
 Socrates offers a second rationale for the return of the philosophers, and it 
doesn’t seem to be any more connected with non-instrumental concern than is the first 
rationale. This seems to be something like a principle of reciprocity (or perhaps 
gratitude). In an echo of the argument from Crito, Socrates says the philosophers 
would be justified in refusing to return to cities other than the ideal polis — those in 
which their development as philosophers has been “spontaneous,” i.e. not in 
consequence of the design of the city and the reciprocity among its various classes 
(520b). By implication, the philosophers in the ideal polis owe a debt to their 
fellow-citizens for the very upbringing which is responsible for their escape from the 
cave into the sunlight, and that debt is to be repaid by wise governance. But, like the 
account that focuses on the order the philosopher comes to love,  it is difficult to see 
any part of this story modelling anything like the sort of non-instrumental concern for 
others which we’d like to vindicate as part of an adequate ethical theory. On the whole 
Plato’s view of the return of the philosophers to the cave is not of much use in 
advancing our project.
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43Versions of this rationale are offered in Cooper 1977a, Annas 1981, Kraut 1992, and Irwin 1995, with 
varying takes on its implications for eudaimonism. Annas and (especially) Cooper both believe that, 
upon coming to know the Form of the Good, the philosopher-kings acquire a new reason for action, and 
whatever commitment they had to their own eudaimonia is transcended. Cooper puts it this way:  “The 
just man recognizes a single criterion of choice: What, given the circumstances, will be most likely to 
maximize the total amount of rational order in the world as a whole? .... Not only does he not do 
everything he does out of concern for his own good, he never does anything for this reason. His reason 
for acting is that good-itself demands it. That his good demands it is strictly irrelevant” (p. 156-7). 
Annas accepts roughly this picture of the motivation of the philosopher-king, but claims that it is in 
deep tension with the balance of Plato’s moral theory (cf. p. 333ff). White makes something of the same 
point (“a rule ... is someone who not only has a firm grasp of the notion of the Good, but who is also 
moved to pursue it and the exemplification of it in the world” — White 1979, p. 195), but believes this 
involves sacrifice on the part of the philosopher. 
 I do not believe that is the right way to understand the choice that confronts the philosopher: 
the conflict with the requirements of justice makes failing to rule not a real option for the philosopher, 
and not good for him, so it is no sacrifice to forego it. Reeve puts the point succinctly: “a life of pure 
philosophy is not reliably available outside of paradise” (Reeve 1988, p. 203). While I accept the idea 
that there are difficulties in understanding how we are to understand the philosopher-kings to be 
motivated, I see no reason to accept anything as strong as what Cooper advocates. As Annas notes, it is 
in tension with the balance of Republic itself. Moreover, if Plato really was departing from eudaimonism 
at this point, it is the only point in a large corpus of work of which most endorses eudaimonism more or 
less explicitly. This is insufficient evidence here, I think, to believe that Plato actually departed from it. 
We shall encounter something like this view of reasons for action — and its relation to eudaimonism as 
a theory of reasons for action — again when we look at the Stoics.
What We Can Use
 In fact there is nowhere in Plato the sort of explicit account of non-instrumental 
concern for others which Aristotle undertakes (as we shall see in Chapter 3). It simply 
does not appear to have been a problem for him, and we have already seen that his 
preoccupation with metaphysical issues led him to views of what we seek as our good 
that provide an awkward framework in which to try to deal with the objection from 
concern. However, it is worth observing that some of the really interesting moves in 
Aristotle’s account of non-instrumental concern for others are foreshadowed in Plato.
 Among the provocative accounts of love (eros) in Symposium are the quite 
different stories of Aristophanes and Diotima which nevertheless have a common 
theme. Both suppose that our conceptions of ourselves are in fact rather elastic: on 
both accounts eros reveals to us that we can be ourselves in very different ways than 
what we might uncritically suppose. Aristophanes tells us of lovers who find this in a 
form of reunion into a unified whole (191d); the end-point of erotic love is that “one 
person emerge[s] from two” (192e). Diotima informs us that “giving birth in beauty” is 
what we humans can have in lieu of immortality (206bff). Somehow, the suggestion is, 
we can come to recognize the propagation of virtue in others as in some important 
sense an extended form of ourselves.
 It’s hard to know what philosophical theses Plato thought we should take away 
from these passages. What is striking about them, however, is that in them Plato 
invites us to reconsider the nature of the boundaries we place on what we identify (and 
identify with) as our own. Through eros, he says, those boundaries can change. We can 
come to see others’ interests as our own.
 This idea is, I shall argue, an important feature of Aristotle’s argument for the 
compatibility of non-instrumental concern for others with eudaimonism about reasons 
for action. And here it is, broached in Plato. Potentially, at least, this insight can help 
us with the various forms of non-instrumental concern that we find important. There 
is “mundane” philia or friendship, of the sort that can’t reasonably be thought to 
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derive from eros or beauty, and which any plausible account of the good human life 
must (we think) accommodate. There is the love of parent for child, and child for 
parents. There is the love of siblings and other familial relations. For each of these, we 
need an account of how it can and should occur without being merely instrumental, 
and nothing in Plato comes close to explaining how such relationships, and the 
reason-giving force they involve, can be justified on eudaimonistic grounds.44 But the 
potential reach of the idea that the extent of the interests with which we identify 
ourselves is malleable includes all these relationships. If Plato has given us nothing 
else of use in responding to the objection from concern, he has given us at least this 
foundation for such a response.
Respect
 Though Plato seems clearly to assume that virtue —hence eudaimonia — 
requires respect for others, it is not so clear why he thinks this is so, or that he 
believes an account is due of why this is so. The closest he comes is the argument for 
justice (dikaiosune — sometimes translated more generally as ‘morality’) in Republic. 
But this is a notoriously problematic argument. Many have thought it fails to explain 
why interpersonal justice is required for the best kind of life — or perhaps (a bit more 
charitably) that it attempts to answer some question other than why we should respect 
others in our dealings with them.
 The problem is usually located in the kind of answer Plato has Socrates give to 
the challenges of Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus.  Cephalus actually 
introduces something like our intuitions about constraints of respect in Book I, when 
he says that wealth provides security against the need to wrong others — by cheating, 
lying, or not paying debts (as well as miscellaneous impieties) — which might be 
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44Diotima points us to the desire for immortality not just in humans, but in all animals, as an 
explanation for the fact that parents will die for their young (Symposium 207b-e). It’s surely right that 
what we have in common with other animals goes some way towards explaining this feature of the love 
of parents for their children.  But it would be a mistake to think that this exhausts it, and that what in 
us is different from other animals does not contribute to, inform, and shape our love for our children. 
And of course Diotima’s hypothesis does nothing to explain the love of children for their parents, or 
what I have called “mundane” friendship.
unsettling to the conscience of someone facing the near-term prospect of Hades 
(330d-331b). Cephalus’ commonsense view seems to be that wronging others in these 
ways is bad, and that this sort of wrongdoing is liable to be punished in the afterlife, 
so one is best off with a record free of such wrongdoing. This is a very understandable 
prudential explanation for observing moral constraints on how we treat others. But it 
fails to explain why these constraints are what they are, and it is open to the critic to 
insist (with good reason) that Cephalus has missed the moral point of the obligations 
he has named; that in fact his just conduct does not reflect morality at all, but merely 
enlightened self-interest.
 This is the point of Socrates’ probing of Cephalus’ uncritical conception of 
morality and justice, and in response Thrasymachus is provoked to claim that justice 
is a mere artifact of convention, by which the weak have a rationalization for 
capitulation to and exploitation by the strong: justice just is the advantage of the 
stronger (338c). This means that it is actually better to be unjust (hence strong) and 
reap the benefits of exploitation than to be just (hence weak) and be exploited for the 
advantage of one’s masters (343d).
  Of course, Socrates disagrees, and the dispute which shapes Republic is on. 
Notice, however, that what has begun it is a view about the nature and requirements 
of justice very much in accord with our interest in respect for others. Thrasymachus 
argues, in effect, that the interests of others provide no reason for action or restraint; 
in fact, he says, the way to the best kind of life lies in being prepared to take 
advantage of just those situations in which one can improve one’s own prospects at the 
expense of another’s. To the extent that Plato refutes this view, he may help us 
understand respect in the context of a eudaimonist virtue theory.
 Glaucon and Adeimantus too are worried about respect. What the Ring of Gyges 
would provide is freedom from the constraints that social sanctions of various forms 
impose on exploiting others. With the ring one could (it seems) advance with impunity 
one’s own interests at the expense of others (359dff). Gyges gets wealth, sex, and 
power by wronging others, and his victims are powerless to stop him. Given that 
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impunity, the worry is, what reason does Gyges have not to harm others in just the 
way he wants to? A response to this challenge would go right to the point of the 
objection to a eudaimonist account of respect.
 Famously, however, this does not appear to be the question that Socrates 
answers. What we get is an explanation and vindication of the claim that one has 
reason to have a just soul. Socrates lays out a conception of justice which focuses on a 
way the soul can be ordered within itself. His notion of justice as realized in souls is 
developed through an analogy to the just polis, and cashed out as a condition in which 
each part of the soul — its reasoning, spirited, and appetitive elements — is “doing its 
own” (441e). That this conception of justice is very different than the one we began 
with — one centrally concerned with one’s relation to others — is something Socrates 
acknowledges explicitly:
And in truth justice....isn’t concerned with someone’s doing 
his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is 
truly himself and his own. One who is just....regulates well 
what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in 
order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of 
himself ...[and] he becomes entirely one, moderate and 
harmonious....he believes that the action is just and fine 
that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and 
calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that 
oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that 
destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so...(443c-3)
This is, in one way, a compelling account of a very desirable and admirable inner state. 
It may not even be off the mark for us to think of it as a kind of justice, as a kind of 
“rightness” about one’s internal constitution.45 But, at least as it stands, it tells us 
nothing about how or why we ought to respect others. It’s not obvious how other 
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45Compare Laws IX:862b, where the Athenian decrees that “The description ‘just’ is applicable only to 
the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character or outlook.” This represents a 
further way in which justice as a property of the treatment of others (as opposed to the motivation for it) 
seems to have been revised away.
persons or their interests enter in to it at all. In this sense it is unhelpful as an 
account of respect, worthwhile though it may be in other ways.46
 David Sachs has argued that the problem here turns on a distinction between 
“vulgar justice” (what Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus and presumably those 
who raise the objection from respect are worried about) and “Platonic justice” (what 
Socrates’ account fleshes out). Sachs accuses Plato of assuming fallaciously that being 
Platonically just will entail being vulgarly just and vice versa (Sachs 1971, p. 47.) If 
that assumption were valid, then Plato would have succeeded in showing that one’s 
interest in living the best kind of life gives one reason to be just in the vulgar sense — 
that is, to act under the sorts of constraints that are conventionally regarded as just 
(and which are close to our notions of respect). But, Sachs says, Plato gives no 
argument for either component of the crucial assumption, and both of the requisite 
entailments are implausible.
 In one sense Sachs’ complaint is not squarely on target. Plato is not beholden to 
defend exactly the notion of justice that Thrasymachus, Glaucon, or Adeimantus holds. 
What does need defense, as modern critics of eudaimonism point out, is the claim that 
living the best kind of life necessarily involves or requires seeing others and their 
interests as imposing constraints on what one can do, on respecting them in something 
like the way we have characterized. This is the deep part of the challenge that 
Socrates’ interlocutors pose, and it does not seem that Socrates’ account is really 
responsive to it.47
 What’s needed, of course, is a theoretical bridge between the account of justice 
he does defend, and the kind of respect that we want to see vindicated. In other words, 
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46Cf. Annas: “There is a genuine problem, why justice should, so conceived, make me respect the rights 
of others. Why should the best realization of my nature be constrained by the needs and interests of 
other people also trying to realize their own individual projects as best they can?” (Annas 1981, p. 331). 
But Schmidtz sees the glass as half-full rather than half-empty, observing that “even if Plato failed to 
connect rationality to justice, he did in the course of the argument connect rationality to integrity” 
(Schmidtz 1995, p. 110).
47Cf. Schmidtz: “Glaucon did not ask whether the individual needs to give each part of himself its due. 
He did not ask whether society needs to give each part of itself its due.  What he asked was whether the 
individual needs to give each part of society its due. If Thrasymachus neglects to give other people their 
due, must he at the same time be neglecting to give a part of himself its due?” (Schmidtz 1996, p. 119).
what we need to see, given the argument of Republic, is that respecting others and 
their interests is necessary for the well-ordered soul.48 Possibly Plato intended his 
analogy between the soul and the city to provide this bridge, but if so it does not 
succeed. Just as we want to know what implications for a well-ordered soul there are 
as to relations with others, we would need to see what implications there are for a 
well-governed polis on other cities. He does give us a bit of this (more on this below), 
and what we get is suggestive, but hardly adequate for a complete account of respect. 
The connection is one Plato does not clearly make.
 Even if he made it, he would still face the second part of the objection from 
respect. Suppose Plato could show that our interest in having the best kind of life gives 
us a reason to be just in the sense of respecting others and their interests. Is this the 
right kind of explanation for why we should be just? It appears to make the reason we 
ought not to be unjust — the reason we ought not, say, to harm others — that by doing 
so we would deprive ourselves of the best kind of life. This rationale lacks victim-focus, 
and does not seem to be at all the right kind of reason not to harm others. 
 So there appears to be a significant theoretical shortfall in accounting for 
respect for others on the kind of eudaimonist foundation Plato employs.49 In the end, I 
think Plato does believe he has solved the problem, but his solution is unlikely to 
satisfy skeptics about his metaphysical commitments, which probably includes most of 
us. Even so, we can learn from his account. But the way we can best do so, I believe, 
requires us to shift a bit our understanding of the question Plato is trying to answer. 
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48Here I agree with a number of critics of Sachs, that all Plato needs to defend is this necessity claim, 
not the further claim that external justice is sufficient for the well-ordered soul.
49One might think this is an unfair charge to make against Plato’s account. One might construe 
Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus not as asking what reason there is to be just, but as seeking a 
demonstration that being just is not against their best interests. (This seems especially true of the latter 
two.) (Schmidtz invites us to understand the “why be moral” question in just this way  — Schmidtz 
1995, ch. 5.)
 But this won’t do the job for our purposes. If Plato is committed to eudaimonism, then 
ultimately all reasons for action can be traced to our interest in living the best kind of life. So if we have 
a reason for respecting others, it must come from that interest. That reopens Plato’s account to this 
charge.
Dikaiosune and Sophrosune
 At the very point in his argument where Plato presents his “internalized” 
conception of justice of the soul, he goes on to draw some very interesting conclusions 
from that conception. If we have any doubts, he says, that justice “in us” is as Socrates 
describes, we can “dispel them altogether” by considering “ordinary cases” of justice 
(442d). He then cites some commonplace examples of interpersonal injustice: 
embezzlement, robbery, theft, betrayal of friends, untrustworthiness, adultery, 
disrespect.  Plato claims that the kind of justice he has described — the patently 
internal state of the just person — is the cause of the incompatibility of these sorts of 
injustice with the justice of the soul.
 Why does he think this? He gives us no ostensible reason to think that there is 
any impossibility in the idea of the well-ordered soul committing injustice against 
another person.  Is Plato just too dense to see that he has committed a blatant 
non-sequitur? Less tendentiously, is this either an oversight which is a consequence of 
his infatuation with the internalized conception of justice he is developing, or a 
deliberate fallacy to mask a weakness in argument? Vlastos thought that there is a 
problem with Plato’s argument on just this point, but maintained against Sachs that 
the error is “neither inexplicable nor irreparable” (Vlastos 1981, p. 131). My view, on 
the other hand, is that there is no error here at all (or at least not the one Sachs and 
Vlastos suppose there is). Plato has an argument which needs ferreting out.
 To see it, consider first Plato’s treatment of the virtue of sophrosune — the 
cardinal virtue that is often translated as “self-control” or “temperance” or 
“moderation.” In Republic, it is presented as a kind of agreement between the better 
and worse parts of the soul or the city as to which should rule (432a).  In particular, in 
the soul it is described as “the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires” 
(430e).
 But this conception of sophrosune is relatively novel: in Plato’s earlier dialogues 
and to the Greeks generally it referred to something like decorum or proper 
comportment with respect to others and society, and involved a distinctively social sort 
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of self-knowledge.50 Having sophrosune required that we not suppose ourselves to be 
isolated individuals, but to see ourselves as embedded in particular natural and social 
conditions, so that it involves the self-knowledge required to see what sorts of relations 
we stand in with various aspects of our situation, in particular how we stand with 
others.51
 In other words, sophrosune is a virtue of recognizing and understanding the 
nature of the relationships between people and the way they appropriate parts of their 
common world. It requires a self-knowledge which crucially entails a grasp of how we 
fit into our world.52 Sophrosune has a crucial social aspect that is, at the same time, 
connected with knowledge of one’s self.53 So while sophrosune refers to the state of a 
self or soul, part of its meaning picks out a distinctively outward-looking grasp of what 
is appropriate between oneself and others.54 In Alcibiades Socrates concludes that 
without sophrosune, we not only don’t know ourselves, but we don’t know what belongs 
to us, or the properties of what belongs to us, nor anything about what belongs to 
others (133d-e), with the suggestion that in consequence we can’t possibly act properly. 
If it is not quite identical with dikaiosune, sophrosune is at least in the ballpark of the 
conception of respect for others with which we are concerned.
48
50For this reason, and because it is so very hard not to interpret sophrosune as “moderation” of some 
form, I will use the term untranslated, to draw attention to the pertinent aspects of its complex nature. 
I rely heavily here on North 1966 and Annas 1985.
51In Charmides the suggestion (taken over in Republic for dikaiosune) is floated that sophrosune is 
“doing one’s own” (161b). In Rival Lovers, sophrosune is linked to the knowledge of good and bad in 
oneself, as a necessary condition of the knowledge of good and bad in humans generally (138a). 
52In Protagoras Socrates says that the “art of measurement” (metretike techne) will “save” us, at least 
from mistakes in our evaluations of how things appear to us.  This suggests too that there is value in 
accurate vision of oneself as related properly to the world and the conditions in which one acts. Cf. 
Protagoras 332a: Socrates and Protagoras agree that when people act correctly and beneficially, they 
are acting sophronos. Those who do not act correctly act foolishly, and those who act in this way are not 
sophron.
53This function of sophrosune also figures in an early passage in Meno.  Here Socrates secures 
agreement from Meno that it is not possible “to manage a city well, or a household, or anything else, 
while not managing it sophronos and justly” (73a). 
54A similar thought may be attributed to the Athenian in Laws IV, where he argues that justice and 
sophrosune go hand in hand (cf. Laws 716).
 This makes Plato’s argument for sophrosune in Gorgias quite striking. Socrates 
links dikaiosune and sophrosune as the “states of organization and order of the soul” 
which lead people to become “law-abiding and orderly” (504d). Just as in Republic, 
Plato here gives us both an “inward turn” of the previously “outward-looking” virtue 
and a link between internal states and external consequences. But, again just as in 
Republic, Plato does not explain or argue for that linkage: he merely postulates it.55
 Socrates argues from the premises (i) that the excellence (arete) of a thing comes 
to be present in it through its organization (506d) and (ii) that the organization and 
order of the soul is sophrosune, to the conclusion that the sophron soul is the good one. 
At this point Plato makes the same sort of crucial and mystifying move he makes in 
Republic. Here’s what he says:
And surely a sophron person would do what’s appropriate with 
respect to both gods and human beings. For if he does what’s 
inappropriate, he wouldn’t be sophronon....And of course if 
he did what’s appropriate with respect to human beings, he 
would be doing what’s just...(507a-b)56
Plato is doing with sophrosune here exactly what he does with dikaiosune in Republic 
(at 441d-e). There, he supposes that the sort of order of the soul which he characterizes 
as justice goes hand in hand with “having and doing one’s own” in the city. In Gorgias, 
order of the soul is characterized as sophrosune and from it, Plato thinks, comes 
appropriate action with respect to gods and men. And there is no more argument in 
Gorgias as to how this connection is to be understood than there is in Republic. 
 Now, it is one thing to suppose that doing this once is the result of an oversight, 
or an error in argument, or some other form of mistake on Plato’s part. But supposing 
that he makes the same mistake, in two different dialogues, with two different virtues, 
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55Callicles “assents” to the proposition that these states have this effect with his non-committal “Let it 
be so” (ibid.). The argument Socrates has offered for it is by analogy to the state of the body — health — 
that results from organization and order, but of course such an argument is only as strong as the 
analogy, and while Callicles has accepted it to begin with (504b), he might have decided that his reasons 
for rejecting Socrates’ conclusion give him reason (in retrospect) to have resisted the analogy when it 
was offered.
56He then goes on to draw the requisite eudaimonist conclusion: that “the sophron man, because he’s 
just and brave and pious ... is a completely good man, that the good man does well and admirably 
whatever he does, and that the man who does well is blessed and happy...” (507c).
is a very different thing. It is much more reasonable to suspect that there is an 
underlying thought which (Plato supposes, at least) makes both moves plausible.
Passions, Appetites, and the Soul
 The key, I believe, is found in the moral psychology that is under development 
in Gorgias and which is made explicit in Republic. In Republic we get a conception of 
the tripartite soul that is different from anything found elsewhere in Plato.57 The 
analogy between the city and the soul rests on the idea that both have three parts: a 
reasoning part (logistikon), spirited part (thumos), and appetitive part (epithumia). 
What is important for our purposes is that in these dialogues the “spirit” and appetites 
are thought to be parts of the soul, instead of intransigent elements of the body with 
which the soul is saddled.58
 This is significant because the appetites and passions essentially relate us to the 
external world.59 They connect us with the various objects of desire with which 
external justice is concerned. Spirit (passion) is oriented to our relations with other 
persons: desires for “control, victory, and high repute” (581a). Appetites are oriented to 
satisfaction of bodily needs (food, drink, sex, wealth).60 This conception of the soul 
gives Plato what he needs to make an intelligible connection between the soul that is 
dikaios (and sophron) and the notions of external justice with which he (and we) 
began. The ways one acts in relation to external goods (hence external justice) are, via 
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57 Though it bears similarities to the tripartite conception of soul in Phaedrus and Timaeus.
58Contrast Phaedo 82e. This is an oversimplification, of course. The spirited and appetitive parts of the 
soul are not immortal (611c), so there is still an important qualitative difference between them and the 
reasoning part. But far from mitigating the significance of their being included in the soul, this fact 
about them brings out the importance of the fact that they are not simply consigned to the body. One 
reason Plato might have had for making this somewhat contorted move, I think, is just to facilitate the 
connection between internal and external justice I sketch.
59This, at least, is their function. It is certainly possible to have appetites and passions stimulated 
through misperceptions, memory, or other internal processes so that on some occasions they are not 
hooked up directly with the external world. But I take these episodes to be parasitic on their general 
task of connecting us with our environment. I thank David Schmidtz for raising this point.
60This distinction between passions and appetites is similar to Cooper’s, in which passions are 
distinguished by an essential “self-referential” aspect that appetites are not (Cooper 1984, pp. 14-6). I 
take that “self-reference” to be an aspect of one’s conception of oneself as a social creature.
their desiderative bases in appetite and passion, controlled and ordered by the 
reasoning part of the soul. 
 This interpretation requires that our concerns about external justice be seen as 
about something other than merely who has (gets) what. Just action with respect to 
others needs to be seen as action by agents on whom the external goods exert an 
attractive force. On the view of Thrasymachus, this force is thought to be good (or at 
least nothing to be limited or constrained), and the “natural” order is one in which, 
while each person does what he or she can to get the goods which exert this attractive 
force on them, the stronger will have a natural advantage when conflicts (inevitably) 
arise; so to them go the lion’s share of such goods.
 Plato’s view is different.  The attractive force of these goods acts on the spirited 
and appetitive parts of the soul — that is where the motivation to seek and acquire 
these goods comes from. But in the just soul — which is also sophron, in that the 
appetitive and spirited parts agree to be ruled by reason — the reasoning part imposes 
order and limit on those attractive forces, and on the parts of the soul in which they 
are felt. As Helen North puts it, in this conception of the soul, sophrosune regulates 
and orders the appetites and passions, rather than suppressing them (North 1966, p. 
169). The good of the soul lies in the order that the reasoning part imposes on the 
attraction of and response to the goods of the other parts.61 
 In Philebus Plato takes this notion farther. Here he attributes desire entirely to 
the soul on the basis of a conceptual argument about the kind of thing desire must be 
(35c). Even more interesting, he seems to hold that one’s identity — the self one is 
enjoined to know by the Delphic oracle — includes not merely one’s soul, but one’s 
bodily goods, and even one’s external goods (48d-e).62 So the move to incorporate the 
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61In this respect Rosalind Hursthouse goes too far when she claims that “Plato seems to think that 
ideally the appetites, or the desire for bodily pleasures, would be eliminated entirely” (Hursthouse 1984, 
p. 90). This, at least, is not the case for the embodied soul at issue in Republic (cf. Irwin 1995, p. 218). 
Much more plausible is her suggestion that “reason provides rational objects for the passions....A 
passion that in other animals is essentially connected to physical self-preservation can be transformed 
in us into a passion connected with the preservation of what is best in us” (ibid. pp. 88-9, emphasis 
added).
62Delphic self-knowledge and recognition of one’s property are also linked at Laws XI: 923a.
relations with things in the world which are the subject of external justice, into the 
domain of internal justice as developed in the moral psychology of Republic, is one of 
considerable consequence for Plato.63
 In Laws, Plato puts these ideas about the ways we can adjust our “object-
relations” to work in a very interesting way. The Athenian identifies as “the highest 
kind of wisdom” achieving an “accord” between pleasure and pain and one’s rational 
judgment (689d).64 He reveals what he means by this kind of “accord” in Books I 
through III, where he develops the idea that we can modify our pleasures and pains — 
we can change the way that we respond to stimuli from the world that impinges upon 
us. This means that the ways in which we value or assess (and thus respond to) 
various parts of the world we encounter are subject to reflective or rational appraisal. 
He thus provides us with a sophisticated, reflexive conception of a mental state which 
is both choosing what to find good in the world it encounters, and is responding in 
appropriate ways to the feedback it gets from acting upon it.
 This, then, is the connection Plato is thinking of between internal and external 
justice. A soul in which the appetites and passions have been justly ordered is one 
which will eventuate in temperate and externally just action, because the order of the 
internal states determines the relations the agent will have with external goods. The 
untrammelled desire or greed (pleonexia) which is the source of external injustice has 
no motivational foothold in the just soul. Simply put, the internally just person has no 
reason to be externally unjust.65 
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63Jonathan Lear pays especially useful attention to this aspect of Plato’s “object-relations theory” (Lear 
1992 and 1993).  I differ from Lear’s insightful analysis of the argument of Republic primarily in 
wanting to emphasize not the order imposed on the polis, but instead on the order imposed on the object 
relations of the appetite and passions. I think this helps relieve the pressure Lear’s account generates to 
“reify” the political theory which is used to illuminate the moral theory in Republic.
64 At 693c the connection between this wisdom and sophrosune is re-established when he virtually 
identifies the two.
65This conclusion is stronger than the one Annas draws. It is more than that desire, having been 
channelled into the goods of the reasoning part, is correspondingly weaker for the goods of the spirited 
and appetitive parts (Annas 1981, p. 155; cf. Republic 485d-e). It’s not merely that their motivational 
force has been undercut, as it were, but that that force has been exactly and appropriately fitted to their 
objects by the reasoning part of the soul.
 Plato throughout his work seems to conceive of virtue as a kind of skill or craft 
(techne), in embodying a kind of knowledge. The craftsman has a sort of knowledge of 
his craft and the materials of it that enables him to see just what is to be done.66 The 
virtue, or skill, of the just person consists in having just this sort of grasp of the 
“materials” of human life. She sees just which parts of it are to be ordered in just what 
way. This explains why Plato thinks that the just person will respect others and what 
belongs to them.67
 Something like this kind of comprehensive grasp of how things are to fit 
together — to be ordered — is widely recognized as part of Aristotle’s virtue theory (as 
we shall see in Chapter 3), and will play an important role in the conception of 
practical wisdom I draw upon in my argument for eudaimonistic respect in Chapters 5 
and 6. However, Plato is not often recognized as having such a conception as part of 
his moral view, and  I think it is significant to see that it is, in fact, a component of his 
account of justice and morality in Republic and Gorgias, among other dialogues.
Remaining Problems
 Neither we nor Plato are out of the woods yet. Two significant difficulties 
remain. First, even if what we have so far is right, it still fails to capture the 
victim-focused aspect of our intuitions about respect. Plato has framed the problem 
with injustice as an issue of its effects on the agent, rather than on its victims. Surely 
what is wrong with the actions that Gyges undertakes with his ring is not simply that 
they are bad for him (though Plato may be right that they are bad for him). The reason 
it is wrong for Gyges to murder the king is because by murdering the king Gyges is 
inflicting a harm on his victim (i.e. the king). It is plausible to suppose that that will in 
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66In Gorgias Socrates contrasts a “craft” with a “knack” on the grounds that the former, but not the 
latter, has “account” (logos) of what it is about. A craft, by contrast, “has no account of the nature of 
whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it’s unable to state the cause of each thing. 
And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft” (465a).
67Schmidtz finds a similar connection between respect and integrity: “integrity involves not only 
honestly presenting ourselves to the world but also integrating ourselves into the world, achieving a 
certain fit” (Schmidtz 1995, p. 112). Plato’s view of psychic harmony seems to involve a comparable fit. 
turn have repercussions in Gyges’ soul, but to get things the right way around we have 
to start with the harm to the victim, as critics of eudaimonism urge. But it is not 
obvious how the story we have can do this. This isn’t to say there can be no such story 
— it’s just that such an account is needed and we don’t presently have one.68
 Second, the specter of Thrasymachus’ conception of justice has not actually been 
banished. The argument so far establishes that the passions and appetites must be 
brought under the control of reason, and ordered and controlled by it, for sophrosune, 
justice, and (consequently) psychic harmony and happiness. But what, exactly, is the 
nature of the order that reason is to impose? What pattern or constraints ought it to 
impose on the passions and appetites?69
 For all we have said so far, it is open to Thrasymachus to argue, for example, 
that the just and orderly soul manifests itself in greed and tyranny. He advocates a 
sophistic picture of the natural order in which external goods are distributed according 
to the power and strength of those who aspire to have them. (That’s why the lion’s 
share goes to the lion, not the squirrel.) If he is right that this conception is a (or the) 
natural order, then it is open to him to argue that it is the order which reason ought to 
impose on the passions and appetites: in effect, that the sophron and just soul is one in 
which the passions and appetites are “controlled” into going for all and only what the 
natural resources of the agent (physical attributes, mental abilities, and so on) are 
capable of acquiring safely. And if that’s right, then we are back where we began with 
Sachs’ fallacy: why are the inner goods Plato has argued for incompatible with the 
acquisition of external, conventional goods in ways that manifest no respect for others? 
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68Compare Irwin, who distinguishes common justice (c-justice) from Plato’s account of psychic harmony 
(p-justice), then observes: “If a c-just person must avoid c-unjust actions out of a specific motive — say, 
out of concern or respect for the interests of others — then Plato has not shown that the p-just person is 
c-just simply by showing that she lacks any motive for c-unjust actions” (Irwin 1995, p. 261).
69Adkins complains that “From Plato’s argument, the instructions which the intellect should give to the 
appetites cannot be determined” (Adkins 1960, p. 289).
We need a story that excludes Thrasymachus’ conception of order from an acceptable 
notion of justice of the soul.70
 Jonathan Lear suggests that the order arises from the structure of the just polis 
itself: that just those appetites, for example, will be cultivated (and, presumably, in  
just the quantities) which can be satisfied within the well-ordered polis (Lear 1992, p. 
200). But this suggestion is too narrow to be of general use: it requires an appeal to a 
well-ordered polis which, Plato agrees, may never be realized and which, moreover, is 
otiose from the standpoint of moral theory (Republic 592b).
 We might try appealing to the health of the body and soul, as an integrated 
unit, as a criterion for order. Plato suggests something like this as a criterion for 
“necessary” desires at Republic 558-9. But if this is not in fact blatantly circular as a 
solution to our problem, it is so close to being so that it will be of little help. What we 
are after is a conception of order that will make our souls healthy (to borrow the 
analogy developed in Gorgias: cf. 464b). It hardly helps to say that any acceptable 
account of order will be one that eventuates in our health. Worse, sometimes justice 
can be lethal for the combination of body and soul. Socrates’ taking of the hemlock in 
the name of justice only served to hasten his death.
 Plato in fact has a much more powerful response, which is suggested by the 
theme of virtue as a kind of knowledge, and is the explicit topic of Republic books V 
through VII.71 There we find the description of the philosopher-king, who has 
progressed through an arduous process of training and education which culminates in 
knowledge of the Form of the Good (517b). Though Socrates is notably chary of 
describing what this knowledge amounts to, his emphasis on education in 
mathematics (525b), astronomy (530b), and “harmonics” (531b) suggests that what is 
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70Irwin raises essentially this same concern about Plato’s argument through Book IV (Irwin 1995, pp. 
282-3).
71Here in large part I follow Kraut (1973b, 1992).
significant about this Form is that it is itself a kind of order in the highest degree.72 
Perhaps, then, (as suggested earlier) the reasoning part of the just soul imposes on the 
passions and appetites an analog (of some sort) of the order it discovers among the 
Forms in coming to know the Form of the Good. This is the knowledge that the “craft” 
of virtue consists in. Certainly Plato believes that the soul’s knowledge of the Good 
competes with the strong attractive force of the goods to which our passions and 
appetites respond, the “bonds of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened to it 
by feasting, greed, and other such pleasures and which, like leaden weights, pull its 
vision downwards” (519a). 
 Socrates comes close to saying, in so many words, that the Form of the Good is 
the final theoretical link between psychic and external justice:
No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things 
that are has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to 
be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people. 
Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized 
and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another 
nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates 
them and tries to become as like them as he can.(500b-c)
 What should we think of this argument? We have not grasped the Form of the 
Good, so we don’t, after all, have just the sort of insight Plato suggests is necessary to 
see how psychic and external justice connect. Suppose, however, that for purposes of 
argument we accept that insight into the Form of the Good reveals the connection 
between a just soul and respect for others.  In that event, Plato has shown that if one’s 
soul does know and is ordered (somehow) by the Form of the Good, this order will 
ensure external justice.73 
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72Cf. Cooper 1977, p. 155. See also Timaeus 90d for a similar claim as to the ultimate object of our 
understanding.
73Of course, as Annas observes, external justice so conceived does not rule out manipulating others for 
good ends, since this is just what the Guardians are to do with so-called “noble lies” (Annas 1981, p. 161; 
cf. Republic 459c). This is one way that the external justice which results from psychic harmony may 
approximate to, but not be extensionally equivalent to, the commonsense conception of justice which 
launches Republic, and (perhaps) our modern intuitions about respect.
 Still, however, if we doubt that there is any ideal of Goodness of which we can 
have the sort of knowledge Plato supposes, he won’t have solved our problem: we still 
lack a specification of the order that our souls are to have.74 And of course we still 
need an account of how it is that it is the harm to others that underwrites our 
intuitions about injustice, rather than disruption to the agent’s psychic harmony.
 Does this mean Plato’s theory is defective? We will consider this question again 
in Chapter 4. But whether it is defective as a theory or not, in any case it does not 
supply us with answers to the questions we are asking. Nevertheless, Plato has drawn 
our attention to something important. The connection he has established between the 
way that we act on others and the internal psychological states that eventuate in those 
actions in virtue of their “object-relations” is an important one. Though it is not the 
full story, it is an important part of the full story, as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6.
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74The problem isn’t solved if we abstract away from the Republic to the general claim that virtue is a 
kind of knowledge, as Plato seems to believe very generally, because we still need an account of what 
that knowledge is of. Why, in particular, does Thrasymachus’ sophist conception of natural order not 
count as the requisite kind of knowledge? Perhaps the true philosopher can see that it does not, but 
that’s not of much help to us. We will encounter this dialectical situation again in considering the Stoics 
(Chapter 4), whose views are close to Plato’s on this point. 
3. ARISTOTLE
the good man should have a standard both of disposition and of choice and avoidance with regard to 
excess or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being — as said above — as reason directs. 
... But this, though true, is not illuminating. (Eudemian Ethics 1249a25)
 Aristotle is undoubtedly the best-known of eudaimonistic virtue theorists. 
Indeed, a substantial proportion of the criticisms leveled against eudaimonism are 
generalizations of objections to Aristotle’s view. Aristotle notoriously holds that “it is 
for the sake of [our eudaimonia] that we all do everything else” (NE I.12: 1102a3). It is 
easy to see how this commitment could give rise to questions about the possibility of 
both non-instrumental concern for others and respect for others in his moral theory, 
and in this chapter I assess what Aristotle has to say about those questions. 
 Aristotle is deservedly known for his attention to the value of friends. In the 
first part of this chapter I explore how his views on friendship bear on the issue of 
concern. My view is that Aristotle has an account of the human good, and a conception 
of the best kind of friendship, that reveal how non-instrumental concern for at least 
some others is wholly compatible with eudaimonism.
 He is less helpful on respect. The second part of this chapter considers three 
ways we might try to extract a eudaimonist account of respect from Aristotle’s ethical 
and political work. I find that, as in Plato’s case, Aristotle has useful contributions to 
make, but also like Plato, Aristotle’s explicit account does not give us all the resources 
necessary to address the problem.
Concern
 We have intuitions that an important form of concern for others is not merely 
valuing them as instrumental — to our own happiness or anything else — but valuing 
them for their own sake. That such-and-such is essential to my friend’s welfare ought 
(we think) to provide me a reason for seeking it without any further consideration of 
my own happiness, and any account of our relations to others that can’t recognize or 
accommodate that fact cannot be right. 
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 In fact Aristotle shares this intuition. He thinks we not only can but should 
have such concern — concern for others “for their own sake” —  for at least some 
others. Such concern is especially, if not uniquely, characteristic of “perfect” (or 
“character”) friendships,75 and he distinguishes this kind of concern from merely 
instrumental forms:
those who love each other for their utility do not love each 
other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they 
get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake 
of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love 
ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. 
Therefore those who  love for the sake of utility love for 
the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love 
for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is 
pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the 
person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.And 
thus these friendships are incidental; for it is not as being 
the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as 
providing some good or pleasure. (NE VIII.3:1156a10-18, 
emphasis in the original)
How can loving others for themselves be reconciled with his commitment to 
eudaimonia as that for the sake of which we do all that we do? To understand his view, 
we need first to apprehend some distinctive aspects of its conception of the human 
good, and then see how his account of friendship puts that conception of the good to 
work in explaining concern for others for their own sake.
The Human Good
 Aristotle’s solution to the problem, to make a long story short, turns on the idea 
that the human good is such that we can share in each other’s good in important ways. 
Now, the idea that we can share in each other’s good may strike us as odd, so this 
feature of his view needs elaboration.
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75John Cooper argues that non-instrumental concern is the “core of Aristotle’s own analysis of philia 
(Cooper 1977b, p. 621). If this is right, then all three of the forms of friendship Aristotle distinguishes 
are non-instrumental. I shall not take up the question whether Cooper is right about that. Instead I will 
consider only “perfect” friendship, which is certainly intended to characterize non-instrumental concern; 
my references to “friendship” simpliciter intend that highest form of friendship.
 We can begin with Aristotle’s well-known stratagem for discovering what our 
good as humans is: we first identify our function (ergon) as humans, since the 
goodness of a thing is thought to “reside in” its function (NE 1.7: 1097b26f). Aristotle 
thinks we discover the good of an X by determining what is distinctive about X’s 
function or operation. In the case of us homo sapiens, Aristotle argues that our 
distinctive function is rational activity, so the human good must be “the activity of soul 
in conformity with excellence,” such excellence being accordance with a “rational 
principle” (1098a8, a16). 
 What does he mean by “excellent activity of soul”? Aristotle begins NE Book I 
with the idea that as agents we live our lives pursuing ends. Some ends we seek for 
the sake of other ends, some we seek just for themselves, so they fall into a sort of 
hierarchy. This means that a clear grasp of what is atop that hierarchy (that is, our 
ultimate end or telos) is of great importance to us in prioritizing what we seek and 
thus in living our lives.76  Here the rationality that is our distinctive function comes 
into play: we can use our reason to impose order and structure on the ends we seek. 
This suggests that “excellent activity of the soul” is seeing one’s life as a 
rationally-ordered structure of ends, and utilizing that insight as an organizing 
principle for one’s life and activity.
 This suggestion is borne out by Aristotle’s discussions of practical wisdom 
(phronesis) and of the true lover of self. In his discussion of the intellectual virtues in 
Book VI, Aristotle gives us a nuanced picture of a practical wisdom which does not 
merely deliberate and choose between competing structures of ends and means, but 
which consists in a “capacity to act” with regard for the good (NE VI.5: 1140b20). The 
practically wise person’s desires and emotions are in concord with the dictates of 
reason (VI.2: 1139a30), and he or she is guided by a particular sort of perception as to 
what is right and appropriate (VI.8: 1142a30). So practical wisdom amounts to 
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76Aristotle is sometimes criticized for the way he formulates his argument to an “ultimate end,” but for 
present purposes such criticisms are irrelevant. A similar discussion in EE makes it a normative 
demand that we have such a structure: “not to have one’s life organized in view of some end is a mark of 
much folly” (EE I.2: 1214b10; cf. also II.10: 1226b29). This normative claim is adequate for purposes of 
the present argument.
organizing oneself — one’s aims, activities, perceptions, and emotions —  around what 
is really good for oneself as a human being and as the particular human being one is; 
this is the good performance of our function as human beings, and is the source and 
content of a eudaimon life.
 What is distinctive about Aristotle’s view here is that the virtuous person 
considers the sort of deliberative, reflective activity which practical wisdom requires of 
him to be his most essential self.77 In NE IX.7, Aristotle says the source of the “love” 
we have for the results of our activity is “that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e. by 
living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he 
loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence” (NE IX.7: 1168a6f). This is 
quintessentially true of the activity of deliberation as to how to order one’s life 
“according to a rational principle,” with perception, desire and emotion in agreement. I 
see my life as most truly expressive of my essential self when my life is the exercise 
and effect of my own practical rationality, and when my reason, desires and emotion 
are congruent:78
[The good man’s] opinions are harmonious, and he desires the 
same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for 
himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it 
is characteristic of the good man to exert himself for the 
good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the 
sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to 
be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and be 
preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he 
thinks. (NE IX.4: 1166a12f; cf. also IX.8: 1168b36)
Aristotle goes so far as to say that this is the truest form of self-love: the true self-lover 
is he who “gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys 
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77Marcia Homiak makes this point in Homiak 1981.
78This, of course, just is virtue as Aristotle conceives of it.
this. . . .That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, 
and also that the good man loves most this part of him” (1168b30, 36).79
 So Aristotle’s idea is that as humans our good lies in rational agency — in 
establishing a rationally-ordered system of ends and structuring our lives according to 
it. In such lives we find the expression of our “truest” selves, and in living them we 
come to identify with and love our intellectual capacities as actualized in our reflective 
practical rationality. So far so good. But how does this conception of the good help us 
understand how we can have concern for others for their own sake?
Friends and their Goods
 The crucial aspect of the conception of human good just sketched is that it 
makes intelligible a sense in which distinct individuals can share the same good. 
Insofar as our selves and our good are realized in rational deliberation, they are 
subject to being shared by others. That is, I can share in the very activity that 
constitutes my friend’s good — it can be an integral part of my life, and come partly to 
constitute my good. By choosing to love my friend, I make his good an end; and my 
deliberation about that end and its pursuit are part of the expression of my truest self 
and hence part of my good. His good becomes mine and (given Aristotle’s requirement 
of reciprocity for friendship — NE VIII.2, EE VII.2) mine his: “In loving their friend 
they love their own good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that 
other’s good.”80
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79This conception of the “essential self” renders Aristotle’s view of the self ineluctably particular and 
embedded in the particular life history of which the virtuous agent is his or her own architect. In this it 
differs from the more abstract conceptions of self in e.g. Kant, as well as in Plato and the Stoics, in my 
view to Aristotle’s advantage.
80NE VIII.5: 1157b32, Loeb/Rackham translation. Kelly Rogers claims that in this Aristotle was trading 
on a common idea: “since Homer's time, at least, one's friends’ interests were considered literally part of 
one’s own” (Rogers 1996, p. 294.) Terence Irwin understands Aristotle to claim at NE I.7: 1097b8-11 that 
“the good for an individual includes the good for his family, friends, and fellow-citizens” (Irwin 1985, p. 
118). I am not confident that this is the right way to understand the passage in question, but such an 
interpretation would be explained by the account of shared goods I am sketching here.
 This explains, I believe, the significance of Aristotle’s repeated and striking 
assertion that a friend is a second self.81 His reiteration of this claim suggests that it 
plays an important role in his understanding of friendship, and a conception of the 
human good on which the essential selves and goods of distinct individuals can be 
shared helps to explain why. Aristotle has in mind a particular and intriguing way in 
which our “ego boundaries” — the intangible borders which delineate me and my good 
from you and your good — are transformed in friendship, and in which it no longer 
makes sense to think of our respective goods as being entirely distinct.82 
 What allows for this transformation is an activity of reflective thought which, on 
Aristotle’s conception of what a self is, can be constitutive both of my self and of my 
friend’s self. This activity, Aristotle tells us, is one which is best shared with a friend, 
so “The man who is to be happy will ... need virtuous friends” (NE IX.9: 1170b18). 
Friends need to “live together,” to share a common life (cf. NE VIII.5: 1157b19, EE 
VII.7: 1241a16), because — unlike cattle, who merely feed together — friends “share in 
discussion and thought” (NE IX.9: 1170b12; cf. also EE VII.12:1245a10f).83
 But of course sharing in discussion and thought is possible without friendship: 
philosophers can do this with other philosophers (and do it constructively), even with 
people they detest. Aristotle thinks that shared deliberation can, in the context of the 
best kind of friendship, be characterized by a knowledge of each other, intimacy, and 
trust, which allow for a deeper and more distinctive form of shared activity. It is also 
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81Cf. NE IX: 1166a31, 1170b6, 1171b32; EE VI.12: 1245a29; Magna Moralia 1213a12.
82Cf. Nancy Sherman, who says Aristotle’s conception of friendship involves “mutual engagement ...a 
relaxing of one’s own sense of boundaries and control...a sense of union or merger with another” 
(Sherman 1997, p. 198).
 The interpretation I advance here is in stark contrast with that of Richard Kraut, on which “a 
boundary of sorts separates the happiness of each individual from that of every other” (Kraut 1989, p. 
148). Kraut’s view entails that the common goods of friends must be understood solely in causal terms 
(p. 149); the idea that the good of another can partly constitute one’s own good is ruled right out (p. 151). 
In particular, the idea that my friend is a second self is to be understood through my shaping of his 
character over the course of our association (ibid., p. 143). I find this implausibly weak as an 
understanding of Aristotle’s “second self” claims.
83As Sherman emphasizes, this should not be thought of as purely cognitive or without affect: friends 
“share an emotional life together,” having “a common core of well-cultivated emotions”(Sherman 1997, 
p. 205). Cf. EE VII.6: 1240a37-40. As individuals are embodied wholes of reason, affect, and desire, so 
are the selves that engage in deliberation in the context of friendship.
(as the shared activity of philosophers need not be) set in a context of mutual 
well-wishing (eunoia — NE VIII.2:1156a3). 
 Deliberation as an activity shared between friends thus differs both from 
discussion and thought among strangers and from deliberation as conducted 
individually and privately. It is something more and other than the individual 
activities of its participants, just as the playing of a duet is more and other than the 
individual activities of its participants. As a shared activity it makes a distinctive 
contribution to the lives and goods of those who participate in it. Of course, I cannot 
deliberate or act for my friend, nor he for me. Still, we can share the primary 
constituents of our respective goods — the activity of our souls in conformance with 
excellence. I can, through friendship, come to identify with the rational agency which 
constitutes his good, so that it becomes a constituent part of my good. My friend’s 
practical rationality makes him the person he is, and I come to consider him a “second 
self” through my involvement in his exercise of that practical rationality.
 The crucial part of Aristotle’s story is that we identify ourselves with our 
“reasoning parts” — with the practical faculties by which we order our lives and which 
are expressed in our practical agency — and that our good lies in the exercise of those 
faculties. It is because this part of my friend is “most essentially” him, and the part of 
himself he loves the best, that I can come to regard what is essentially him as 
“partially me,” making it possible for me to come to see him as a “second myself,” and 
vice versa. Since on Aristotle’s view my own good and the good of my friend lie in the 
expression of our rational natures, his good can become a constituent of mine in a way 
that it could not with another conception of the good.
The Possibility of Non-instrumental Concern
 Aristotle’s idea that friends are “second selves” in this way thus models one 
important way in which non-instrumental and immediate concern for others is 
possible even while reasons for action trace to one’s own eudaimonia. Since the welfare 
of friends (partly) constitutes one’s own good, one has reasons for action in the good of 
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those friends for their sake, without appeal to one’s own good conceived of as an end 
distinct from the good of the friend, and to which the friend’s good is instrumental. It 
is possible for me to do something both for my friend’s sake — because the fact that it 
is part of his good directly and immediately motivates me and explains why I do it — 
and entirely consistently with Aristotle’s eudaimonism about reasons for action. It 
constitutes part of my good, because it is embedded in the structure of ends that is the 
expression of my practical rationality, and which constitutes my eudaimonia.84
 This view does not conflate or break down the distinction between these persons 
as individuals. Aristophanes’ myth in Symposium depicts a notion of a union between 
friends which abolishes this distinction, and it is easy enough to recognize the danger 
of ceasing to recognize the friend as a distinct self, and begin to conflate the notions of 
self and friend.85 But Aristotle says nothing to controvert our sense that, as Lawrence 
Blum observes, genuine giving in friendship 
takes place within a relationship in which one genuinely 
understands and knows the other person, and understands one's 
separateness from him....it retains a clear sense of the 
other's otherness and of one’s own separateness and integrity 
as a person. (Blum 1980, p. 70)
 It is also important to distinguish the dynamics of this sort of identification with 
the loved one from those of sympathy or benevolence. In cases of the latter, there is 
motivation to seek the good of another without the kind of incorporation into one’s own 
good that characterizes one’s concern for “a second self.” Of course I may come to see 
the good of the person who is the object of my sympathy or benevolence as part of my 
own good on a transient basis; this is just to allow for the possibility of such sympathy 
or benevolence for his or her own sake. But in the case of philia there is, as Aristotle 
observes, both an enduring aspect to the identification with the friend (NE VIII.4: 
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84This understanding of Aristotle’s “second self” claims thus contrasts with that of Dennis McKerlie, 
who sees it as representing Aristotle’s belief that “friendship is as fundamental as self-concern because 
it rests on the same basis as my self-concern” (McKerlie 1991, p. 97). On my reading, seeing a friend as 
a second self is (pace McKerlie) compatible with “giving people the single fundamental goal of making 
their own lives as good as they can be” (ibid., emphasis added).
85Montaigne seems tempted towards this extreme in his essay on friendship.
1156b33, IX.1: 1164a13), and reciprocity in the way each partner to the friendship 
regards the other (NE VIII.2: 1155b33f, Rhet. II.4: 1381a1).
 The idea that the good of others can come to constitute part of our own good in 
this way does not seem implausible. For example, my daughter’s good is part of my 
good in this way. What benefits her — especially by contributing to her development as 
a practically rational being of the sort Aristotle has characterized — benefits me, and 
does so constitutively rather than (or at least in addition to) causally. That is to say, 
the right account of how her good affects me is not that (for example) her 
accomplishing something important for her is good for her, and my seeing her benefit 
in this way is good for me (though that may be true too); it is that I count her doing 
well in this way as part of my own good in a non-derivative way. Conversely, if she is 
harmed it is not merely that I become distressed at seeing her distress, but that the 
harm to her harms me as well, because of the way I identify with her and the part her 
good plays in constituting my good, through my love for her.86
 I take Aristotle to suppose that the welfare of another can have an immediate 
influence on our desires and motives in virtue of coming to constitute part of how we 
understand and experience our own good. That is, it’s not the case either that I seek 
my daughter’s good because of its effects on me (an instrumental idea), nor that I set 
aside my own good in promoting her welfare (a self-disregarding idea), but that I seek 
it in just the way I seek other aspects of my good, because it just is part of my good.87 
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86Though this is primarily true of other persons, it may also extend to other animate beings, albeit in 
an attenuated way. I might come to love my dog in such a way that his welfare partially constitutes my 
good, for example, although in virtue of the fact that we do not share a system of ends, as in the case of 
my (human) friend, it does so in a much more limited way. It is essential, however, that the other be the 
sort of thing which can have a good (viz. be animate). This is the point that Aristotle is bringing out at 
NE VIII.2: 1155b28. The case is different with my daughter. It is important here that I see her and love 
her as a self in the sense Aristotle draws our attention to. Her development as the particular rational 
and virtuous person she can be constitutes her good and partly constitutes mine, and setbacks to that 
development constitute harms for her and ipso facto harms for me. It is this account of her self and her 
good that makes the sharing of our goods possible. I thank Tom Christiano for bringing this implication 
to my attention.
87However, at the same time there may be a distinct way in which her good contributes to my good 
causally, hence which I seek on instrumental grounds. I may value her success both for her sake, and as 
part of my good, and also because her success (I imagine) makes me look good as a father. There is 
nothing about these two attitudes that renders them incompatible, and I suppose such admixtures are 
more common than not.
 At the same time, I need not seek it as a part of my good, any more than I need 
to seek any of my other ends as a part of my good. Perhaps the most difficult part of 
grasping the idea I am attributing to Aristotle is resisting the notion that concern for 
the other’s good ultimately does represent a mediated or instrumental form of concern 
— that because I take it to be part of my good I can not rightly be said to seek my 
daughter’s good for her sake. I must, after all (the objection runs), be motivated by the 
thought of my own good in seeking her welfare. But this is a mistake. What motivates 
and explains my seeking this good is simply that it is good for her. 
 This is a claim about both my motivation and my justification for seeking my 
daughter’s good. There may be many explanations for my being motivated to seek my 
daughter’s good, but on Aristotle’s view at least one of them will be that in virtue of my 
love for her I will see that I do have reason to seek her good, and as I become virtuous 
I will acquire desires to do what I have reason to do (EE VII.2: 1237a2). And that it is 
her good is, genuinely, my justification for acting to seek it.
 Some might doubt that this is really my justification, because it is not the 
ultimate justification for doing what I ought to do — viz. that it will contribute to my 
eudaimonia. But the fact that something is not my ultimate justification does not 
mean that it is not really my justification. As noted in Chapter 1, what counts as a 
justification depends in large part on the context in which justificatory issues are 
raised.88 Depending on the need for justification, different features of what I do may 
be salient. And given my love for and commitment to my daughter, what will be salient 
for me in acting is that what I do will promote her good. That is what motivates me to 
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88Cf. Chapter 1, p. 18.
act, what justifies me in acting, and what explains why I act. At the proximate level of 
justification, my concern for my daughter is wholly non-instrumental.89
 It is because I have come to identify myself with my daughter in crucial ways 
that I come to take what is good for her, for her sake, as good for me. Aristotle’s view 
captures the important point that her good and mine cannot be completely prized 
apart — they are interdependent and partly constitutive of each other.90As Anthony 
Price argues
parts of lives can be shared: one and the same act may count 
as contributing, as a constituent and not a cause, to the 
eudaimonia of two persons. It is this possibility that 
grounds Aristotle’s ideal of friendship. ...[and which] 
dissolves the obstinate dichotomy between egoism and altruism 
(Price 1989, p. 106).91
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89It might be helpful to think of this point in terms of de re vs. de dicto ways for me to conceive of what 
I am doing. De dicto it is my daughter’s good that motivates me, though de re it is part of my good, and 
in reflecting on what I ought to do or in justifying what I do, I have recourse to this feature of my action 
as a fundamental reason for it. But it is the de dicto role that my daughter’s good is playing in my 
practical deliberations that motivates and explains what I do, and which will be the primary 
justification I offer for acting as I do on her behalf.
 This is tantamount to the view Julia Annas takes in attributing to Aristotle a distinction 
between what motivates and what justifies the virtuous agent in acting virtuously or loving a friend 
(Annas1988, pp. 11f — to which discussion I am greatly indebted). A similar point about the way 
virtuous motives are represented to the person who has them is made by N.J.H. Dent (Dent 1984, p. 
177).
 White is critical of this strategy (White 1995, p. 275, n. 32): he finds no reason to attribute it to 
Aristotle. I do not see that Aristotle’s distinction between ends we seek purely for their own sake ends 
we desire for the sake of something else (NE I.2) is not amenable to interpretation along Annas’ lines, 
but in any event I think something like the de dicto/de re distinction I suggest here is necessary to make 
any sense at all out of Aristotle’s thought there. Cf. Appendix A.
90However, at the same time there may be a distinct way in which her good contributes to my good 
causally, hence which I seek on instrumental grounds. I may value her success both for her sake, and as 
part of my good, and also because her success (I imagine) makes me look good as a father. There is 
nothing about these two attitudes that renders them incompatible, and I suppose such admixtures are 
more common than not.
91This conception of overlapping goods underwrites Aristotle’s reference to the “marks of friendship” 
(NE IX.4).  Aristotle says we think a friend is one who (i) wishes and does what is good for the sake of 
his friend, (ii) wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake, (iii) one lives with and (iv) has the same 
tastes as another, and (v) grieves and rejoices with his friend (1166a3-8). 
 The view sketched here explains why and how one seeks a friend’s good for his 
or her own sake.92 On Aristotle’s view, the goods of our friends as “second selves” 
figure constitutively into our conceptions of our own goods, and we thus naturally wish 
them good things as we wish them for ourselves. Further, the point that friendship 
involves a “shared emotional life” makes especially clear the basis for grieving and 
rejoicing with a friend. But this interpretation also gives special point to Aristotle’s 
idea that friends wish to “live together” (share a common life): this is because their 
lives —  the structure of ends and activities which constitute the lives of each 
— overlap or coincide to a significant degree.
 So Aristotle’s account of friendship provides a model for how non-instrumental 
concern for others is possible within a view which limits the source of reasons for 
action to one’s own eudaimonia. In Chapter 1 I claimed that, strictly speaking, this is 
all that is necessary to meet the objection from concern, since the typical expressions 
of the objection allege that non-instrumental concern is incompatible with 
eudaimonism. However, a stronger response is possible. Aristotle in fact argues that 
the sort of non-instrumental concern which is characteristic of philia is not merely 
compatible with the best kind of human life, but an essential element of it. It is worth 
touching briefly on what he says by way of this stronger reply to the objection. 
The Value of Concern
 If we think the importance of friendship ought to be recognized in the best kind 
of human life, we’d like an explanation from Aristotle as to why friendship is not only 
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92One might object to this view that it doesn’t ascribe enough reason-giving force to the interests of 
one’s friend when they are in tension or competition with one’s own interests. Nicholas White presses 
this objection against “inclusivist” forms of eudaimonism such as the interpretation of Aristotle offered 
here (White 1994, 1995). In Appendix A I treat White’s objection at length, but I can summarize my 
response by observing that if the goods of our friends and ourselves are sometimes in conflict, this would 
not be surprising, inasmuch as elements of what are naturally thought of as our own (proper) good are 
often in conflict as well. That we have to make hard choices among available competing goods is not in 
itself a problem. There might be a problem if Aristotle were to insist that such conflicts should be settled 
in favor of one’s proper self, instead of one’s friend, but Aristotle does not say this. He does discuss what 
Kraut refers to as “moral competition” in NE IX.9, but even here he does not suggest such conflicts 
should be settled by appeal to what in the end is self, versus other.
possible but necessary for such a life.93 Note that this is not a question about the 
nature of our concern — whether it is merely instrumental or not —but as to why such 
concern must be part of the best kind of human life. The right kind of answer is one 
that will show that having such concern for another person contributes to eudaimonia, 
but that does not make such concern merely instrumental. It is to give what I have 
called an ultimate justification for making and having commitments to others, and as I 
have argued the existence of such a reason for such commitment does not reduce it to 
merely instrumental concern.
 Our question here is one which, fortunately, Aristotle takes up explicitly. For on 
its face, the idea that friendship is part of the human good is in conflict with what we 
might call the autonomy of the human good: the idea that our good must lie within our 
own powers to realize.
 if the good life consists in what is due to fortune or 
nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, 
since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable 
by their care or activity; but if it depends on the 
individual and his personal acts being of a certain 
character, then the supreme good would be ... more general 
because more would be able to possess it... (EE I.3: 
1215a12-17)94
Aristotle’s argument for the value of friendship comes as a response to a problem that 
friendship poses, given this condition on the human good:
It is said that those who are blessed and self-sufficient 
have no need of friends; for they have the things that are 
good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing 
further while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a 
man cannot provide by his own effort; whence the saying ‘when 
fortune is kind, what need of friends?’ But it seems strange, 
when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to 
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93Cf. Cooper: “To show that the active expression of love is necessary in any satisfactory human life 
requires further argument establishing the fundamental importance of this intrinsically good activity 
vis-a-vis others with which it might compete for a place in a person’s life” (Cooper 1977c, pp. 312-3).
94The Nicomachean Ethics makes the same point: “the good we divine to be something of one’s own and 
not easily taken from one” (I.5: 1095b25).
assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external 
goods. (NE IX.9:1169b4-10)95
This way of posing the problem affords Aristotle a natural answer: if one is 
self-sufficient, one has friends, simply because friendship is something that the good 
life cannot be without.96 To put it the other way around (and more usefully for our 
question), a life which lacks friends is not the best kind of life. Aristotle gives a 
number of reasons for thinking this.
 First, he says, the good person needs friends to do well by (IX.9: 1169b13). 
Second, man is by nature social and it is in our nature to live with others 
(IX.9:1169b18, cf. Pol. I.2:1253a3). Third, with others we can be more continuously 
active (IX.9:1170a5). Fourth, a virtuous friend is needed as an opportunity for 
perception and reflection on oneself and on one’s good and pleasant life (1170a13-b13, 
EE VII.12: 1244b20-1245a36). Finally, not completely distinct from the fourth idea, is 
the inherent good of shared activity as shared activity (IX.12: 1172a1-15, EE 
VII.12:1245b2-10).97 Some of Aristotle’s arguments on these points are simply 
tortuous, and I will not rehearse them. But the last three points, I believe, fit together 
into a recognizable general idea about our need for friends, and it is this idea that is 
worth considering.
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95Cf. EE VII.12: “For one might doubt whether, if a man be in all respects independent (autarkes), he 
will have a friend, if one seeks a friend from want and the good man is perfectly independent. If the 
possessor of excellence is happy, why should he need a friend?” (1244b2-3). (Autarkes is translated here 
as “independence,” rather than “self-sufficiency,” as in the NE passage cited in the text.)
 As a condition on our final end, what I am calling the autonomy condition seems to be subsumed 
by Aristotle into “self-sufficiency” (autarkes), and has further bearing on self-sufficiency as a formal 
condition on our final end. However, autonomy would seem to be a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for self-sufficiency (construed as that which is lacking in nothing). If the good is wholly within our 
power, then having it would ensure that there was nothing further that could add to it, while the 
converse does not appear to hold. The good could be something to which nothing could added, without 
being wholly within our power (unless the thought is that such good could be improved upon by having 
it lie wholly within our power, in which case the autonomy condition would appear to be more basic than 
the self-sufficiency condition).  I do not believe Aristotle has these conditions (nor the relation between 
them) adequately sorted out, but I will not belabor the point here.
96Hence, it is clear that for Aristotle virtue (excellence) cannot be sufficient for happiness, since 
friendship as a relation is not a moral or intellectual excellence, though being the kind of person a 
friend is may be one. This, I take it, is Aristotle’s point in saying of friendship that it “is an excellence or 
implies excellence” (NE VIII.1:1155a4).
97Magna Moralia adds a further distinct argument: that loving another is itself a good, and indeed a 
better good than being loved (MM II.11:1210b5-7).
 The general idea is that we are by nature creatures who do better in the 
company of our kind than by ourselves, and as a general claim this seems hard to 
dispute. The fourth and fifth points add a focus on distinctive aspects of what is 
possible in a social life (under certain conditions) but not a solitary life. These are the 
opportunity for activities which are good for us to engage in but which are possible 
only as shared activities, and the possibility of an activity (reflective development of 
self-knowledge) which, while perhaps barely possible in isolation, is better-performed 
through the sort of “mirror” the best kind of friendship affords. 
 Aristotle is not as clear as he might be as to why greater self-knowledge is 
possible through friendship, but his basic idea is intuitive enough. Our own natures 
can be somewhat revealed to us by the friends we choose; our friends can offer us 
perspective on our selves, our natures, and our actions, that we cannot achieve in 
isolation; through our intimate knowledge of our friends, we can arrive at insights 
about our shared human natures that enlighten us about ourselves; and so on. Friends 
also offer us an important line of resistance to self-deception. In Magna Moralia it is 
observed that “if a human being surveys himself, we censure him as stupid” (II.15: 
1213a5). This is because we know we are blind to our own deficiencies:
we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that 
we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame 
others without being aware that we do the same things 
ourselves; and this is the effect of favour or passion, and 
there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that 
we judge not aright). (121315-20)98
 Here I believe Aristotle to be right in the main, and I cannot improve on 
Cooper’s argument to this effect (which draws heavily on the Magna Moralia passage). 
He points out that in particular on Aristotle’s account of the human good — one which 
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98Cf. Pol. III.9: “most people are bad judges in their own case” (1280a16).
turns on the excellence of one’s intellectual and moral capacities —reflective 
self-knowledge is essential (Cooper 1977c, p. 297).99
 In short, on Aristotle’s view the intimacy and distinctive activities that are 
possible (at least in their highest forms) only through committed relationships are 
essential to the excellent performance of our human functions, and thus are necessary 
for the best kind of life. So the kind of relationship in which non-instrumental concern 
for another is possible is also one which we have reason — based on our goal of 
eudaimonia — to seek.
 I will return to this line of thought in Chapter 5 and offer some further reasons 
for seeing non-instrumental concern as an essential element of the best kind of life, 
but before moving on to discuss Aristotle on respect, it is worth summarizing what he 
has given us so far. He has not only explained how non-instrumental concern is 
compatible with eudaimonism, but he has given us some plausible and intriguing 
explanations for our intuitions that such concern is essential to a good human life. In 
broad outline, I believe, Aristotle has met the objection as to non-instrumental 
concern.
Respect
 Does Aristotle have anything comparably useful to say about the ways we are or 
should be limited in our actions in virtue of their effects on others, irrespective of 
considerations of our interests? How can he consistently claim both that our 
eudaimonia is that for the sake of which we do all that we do, and that other persons 
and their interests are reason-giving for us in their own right? Recall that the 
challenge is not merely to show that we ought not (say) to harm others, but that the 
reason we ought not to do so is properly victim-focused.
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99Cooper also emphasizes the significance and value of shared activities: “Shared activities are 
especially valuable for any human being since they, more than purely private activities, enable one to be 
continuously and happily engaged in things” (Cooper 1977c, p. 308). This aspect of Aristotle’s view of the 
human good is also brought out by Roberts (Roberts 1989) and Sherman (Sherman 1997).
  There are three lines of thought in Aristotle that might meet this challenge — a 
roughly Kantian understanding of his view of reason (nous), his views on justice 
(dikaiosune), and his view of the noble or fine (kalon). I will consider these in turn.
A Kantian Understanding of Nous
 Our discussion of Aristotle’s account of friendship, and in particular the role 
played in it by the conception of ourselves as “most essentially” our thinking element, 
suggests a way of thinking about the reason-giving force of others which might 
vindicate respect for others. The strategy is roughly Kantian in structure, as I shall 
explain.
 Recall that in his discussion of friendship in NE Aristotle focuses on our nous — 
our “most authoritative element” — as that with which we are “most properly 
identified” (IX.8:1168b32). We see both ourselves and others, he believes, in the first 
instance as loci of practical rationality, as beings with the capacity to makes choices, 
develop plans, and pursue ends. If we are good this is the part of ourselves which we 
love most of all (IX.8:1169a2). Might we then argue that our appreciation for our own 
practical rationality can and should be extended to others, in a way which gives us 
reason to respect them?100 
 Consider, as a model for this argument, Kant’s famous argument for the 
Categorical Imperative in its Formula of Humanity. In the second section of the 
Foundations, Kant argues that rational beings such as ourselves must necessarily 
think of our own rationality as an “end in itself.” But further, he says,
every other rational being thinks of his existence by means 
of the same rational ground which holds also for myself; thus 
it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as 
74
100Charles Kahn claims that the nous in distinct individuals is one and the same thing. This is the way 
he explicates Aristotle’s view of friends as second selves: we have a common relationship to this 
“impersonal or superpersonal principle of reason” (Kahn 1981, pp. 35, 38). I don’t see anything in 
Aristotle that forces this extreme claim, nor is it necessary for the kind of argument I consider in the 
text.
a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all 
laws of the will.101
His idea seems to be that when we consider our own rational wills, we discover them 
to be valuable in a way which imposes constraints on the ways we exercise them. Then 
we recognize that other persons, in virtue of their rationality, are also loci of precisely 
the same sort of value, and in virtue of that value, we are constrained with respect to 
our treatment of them in just the way that we are constrained with respect to our 
treatment of our own rationality. These constraints give rise to (or perhaps just 
amount to) the kinds of constraints which respect for others requires. The force of 
Kant’s argument is that in seeing others as rational in the way we ourselves are, we 
perceive the value of their rationality and acquire reason to respect them, in a way 
that is not a function of any instrumental value they may bear for our interests or 
eudaimonia.102
 Has Aristotle the materials for a comparable argument, based on our 
identification with and love for our nous as “most essentially” ourselves? Here’s how 
such an argument might run along Kantian lines: we recognize the value to ourselves 
of our “thinking element” — indeed we find it constitutive of ourselves in a way that 
determines our good. So this capacity (and its actualization) is a source of value to us. 
Then we see that others have the same sort of capacity. In friends, indeed, (if my 
earlier reading of Aristotle is right) we value this feature of them so greatly that its 
realization and promotion becomes part of our own good. But even in the case of those 
for whom we do not develop this kind of concern, we nevertheless can accord them 
sufficient value to be objects of respect in the way we seek to vindicate. The fact that 
they have the kind of nature that is valuable in this way grounds their reason-giving 
force for us in the way that respect requires.
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101Beck trans. p. 47; Academie p. 429.
102This construal of Kant’s argument follows Korsgaard 1986b and 1996a. The Kantian notion of 
respect it tries to justify involves more than the merely behavioral manifestation of respect that is at 
issue here, as noted in Chapter 1. But it plausibly entails those behavioral constraints, so is at least 
sufficient as a basis for (behavioral) respect, even if it is not necessary for it.
 Attractive as this strategy might be, we can’t make a Kantian out of 
Aristotle.103 Aristotle is prevented from making the kind of argument Kant does in 
virtue of the formal properties of his conception of value. In particular, in Aristotle’s 
view value is agent-relative, while the Kantian argument rehearsed above sees value 
(at least the value of rationality) as agent-neutral. It is this contrast between their 
respective views that allows Kant, but not Aristotle, to make the kind of argument for 
respect sketched above.104
 The idea that value is agent-relative means that the reason-giving force of 
something valuable is relative to or indexed to some particular agent or agents, in 
virtue of some particular relationship they stand in with respect to the thing of value. 
The contrast is with something being generally reason-giving for moral or rational 
agents per se, in that particular relationships between agents and the thing of value 
do not contribute to the value it has. 
 This distinction is sometimes marked by replacing references to an unqualified 
property good, with the qualified property good for. Aristotle makes this point explicit 
76
103This is not to deny that there are deep similarities between the views, as Korsgaard (cf. Korsgaard 
1996b) and others have argued. On the other hand, it is stretching things a bit to say, as Korsgaard 
does, that there is a “deep similarity in their general conception of what ethics is all about” (Korsgaard 
1996b, p. 227).
104Does Kant consistently subscribe to an agent-neutral view of value? This is a difficult question to 
answer, and I can’t settle it here. The point is that the argument Kant makes in explaining the Formula 
of Humanity works only if the rationality (“humanity”) of others has agent-neutral value. The 
rationality in a human being is of value to any and all human beings, regardless of whether it is their 
rationality or not — that is why its value is agent-neutral. If the value of rationality were 
agent-relative, then that value would obtain in virtue of some special relationship an agent stands in 
relative to some particular instantiation of rationality (probably his own, just because it is his own). But 
that is precisely the move that Kant’s conception of the Categorical Imperative is intended to head off. 
The rational acceptability of my maxim from the standpoint of all other agents binds me just because 
there is nothing special or reason-giving about my rational agency as opposed to theirs. So the value — 
the reason-giving force — of rationality must be agent-neutral for this argument to go through. This is 
consistent with Kant’s opening words in the Foundations, where he rejects the idea that “uninterrupted 
prosperity” in the absence of a “pure and good will” could “give pleasure to a rational impartial 
observer” (9/393). He goes on to say that under the worst of conditions the good will would nevertheless 
“sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself” (10/394).This 
perspective — the agent-neutral one of the rational impartial observer — is never clearly abandoned.
 It is more plausible to think that Kant acknowledges agent-relativity for at least some 
conditional values (viz. the value of anything other than a good will), and the obligations we get from 
the Categorical Imperative (e.g. the duty to perfect ourselves) seem agent-relative. However, Kant is not 
concerned with this distinction and he does not make his position on it obvious. What I take to be  clear 
is (1) that he needs “humanity” to be of agent-neutral value for his argument to go through at p. 429; 
and (2) that Aristotle does not endorse an agent-neutral conception of the value of practical rationality 
(nous), without which his version of the argument cannot succeed. I thank Tom Christiano and David 
Schmidtz for raising this issue.
in De Anima, where he argues that the difference between the true/false distinction 
and the good/bad distinction is that the former is “absolute” while the latter is 
“relative to someone” (III.7: 431b10-3). Ascriptions of “good” must be qualified by the 
subject (the “someone”) for whom it is good.105
 Now, Aristotle’s account of value is an agent-relative one because for each person 
the ultimate source of reasons is his or her own eudaimonia. That is the upshot of 
Aristotle’s eudaimonism. You and I each have a different ultimate source of final 
reasons:106  mine is my interest in having a good life, yours is your interest in having 
a good life. Your eudaimonia is not (at least in the first instance) reason-giving for me 
as it is for you, nor is mine reason-giving for you as it is for me. The value each of our 
good lives has is relative to the agent whose good life it is. This is what is at the core of 
the agent-relativity of eudaimonism.
 In contrast, in agent-neutral conceptions, value is, in principle, equally 
reason-giving for all moral or rational agents.107 Some have thought that the value 
Aristotle accords to eudaimonia is agent-neutral in this way. Richard Kraut, for 
example, rejects the view that Aristotle accords only agent-relative value to 
77
105It might be argued that Aristotle employs a clearly agent-neutral conception of the good when he 
speaks of the way “the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good” (Metaphysics 
XII.10: 1075a12). But, as Stephen Menn argues, this sense of ‘good’ is pros hen predication — a sense 
which is predicable of nothing else, including the good achievable by humans and in human life. 
Aristotle is quite explicit in Eudemian Ethics I.8 that good has multiple senses (1217b24), that the sort 
of “good in things unchanging” has no bearing on practical matters (1218b5), and that “the object aimed 
at is best, and the cause of all that comes under it, and first of all goods. This then would be the good per 
se, the end of all human action” (1218b9-11). For purposes of ethics, and practical philosophy generally, 
the good is the human good, and it is that, I am arguing, that must be understood in agent-relative 
terms.
106By “final” reason, I mean it in the sense in which Aristotle uses it (NE I.7): that for the sake of which 
something is done is in that respect “final” (teleion). Cf. Richardson 1992. 
107I say “in principle” because one might hold, for example, that one cannot have a reason to do 
something that one cannot do. In that event, something might be reason-giving for one agent, but not 
another, due to different limitations on what each could do.  For example, if you can save someone’s life 
by giving them medical treatment, you would have reason to do so while I would not, because I don’t 
have that capability. One might therefore say that the health of the patient, as a goal or value, is 
reason-giving for you but not for me. My qualification is intended to abstract away from differences of 
that sort, such that the health of the patient would be thought to be a source of reasons for both of us, 
insofar as it is something we can advance or promote (including abstaining from impeding or detracting 
from it).
eudaimonia.108 I quote him on this point at length, because his argument shows how 
important this issue is for grappling with Aristotle’s views on concern and respect 
(though Kraut addresses only the issue of friendship here):
when we look carefully, what we find [Aristotle] saying is 
this: happiness [eudaimonia] is the ultimate end for the sake 
of which one should always act. That is quite different from 
the claim that one’s own happiness is the ultimate end of 
one’s actions. Aristotle’s idea ... is that whether we act 
for our own sake, or for the sake of others, or both, 
happiness (our own or another’s) is the good we are 
ultimately trying to attain. He never says, in Book I, that 
one’s ultimate end should simply be one’s own happiness, and 
that the happiness of others should be promoted only as a 
means to one’s own. Such an instrumental attitude towards 
others would of course conflict with his idea that in the 
best relationships we seek the good of others for their sake. 
Aristotle’s conception of friendship makes it clear that the 
happiness of certain others should, by itself, provide us 
with a reason for action. And so we should not read Book I in 
a way that conflicts with this. In saying that our ultimate 
end is and should be happiness, Aristotle must be taken to 
mean that ultimately we are and should be aiming at someone’s 
happiness, whether our own or another’s. (Kraut 1989, p. 145)
Kraut’s argument is that if eudaimonia has only agent-relative value, that entails that 
the good of one’s friends can be only instrumentally valuable; since Aristotle clearly 
rejects the consequent, we must take him to think that the value of eudaimonia is not 
agent-relative, but agent-neutral: my having a good life has the same reason-giving 
force for you as it does for me, and vice versa.109
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108We have already encountered Thomas Hurka’s agent-neutral account of the value of human 
perfection (in Chapter 1). Hurka shares with Kraut an agent-neutral interpretation of Aristotle. He 
argues that, though Aristotle’s “perfectionist value” is not wholly agent-neutral because it disregards 
those outside the polis, it nevertheless is “not just agent-relative” because of the value it places on the 
ends of the state (Hurka 1993, pp. 66, 197). However, Hurka does not show that the value of the polis 
cannot be understood in agent-relative terms, and in fact I believe that is the most natural way to 
understand it, though there is not space to argue for the point here.
109In a similar vein, McKerlie says that Aristotle is clearer that eudaimonia is our ultimate goal than 
he is whose eudaimonia we should aim at. He rejects the view that “Aristotle gives to each agent the 
single fundamental goal of making his or her own life realize eudaimonia,” in favor of the claim that “we 
should also have as a fundamental aim that at least some other people realize eudaimonia” (McKerlie 
1991, p. 85). (Note that this is not Kraut’s conclusion: McKerlie accepts that it is special relationships 
with others which give their eudaimonia reason-giving force for us (cf. p. 99), as Kraut apparently does 
not.)  McKerlie’s argument is based largely on Aristotle’s view of friendship in NE IX, which, if my 
discussion of those views is correct, is congruent with wholly agent-relative value in eudaimonia.
 Two reasons justify rejection of Kraut’s claim that Aristotle understands the 
value of eudaimonia as agent-neutral. First, we have seen that Aristotle’s account of 
friendship (properly understood) shows that non-instrumental concern for others is 
consistent with an agent-relative conception of the value of eudaimonia — with seeing 
one’s own life as the only ultimate source of reasons for action. If my account of 
Aristotle’s view of friendship is correct, then the relationship of implication which 
sustains Kraut’s argument is broken, and there is no reason to reject the 
agent-relativity of the value of eudaimonia.
 But, second, Kraut also says that there is no reason from the textual evidence, 
at least in NE 1, to conclude that Aristotle has an agent-relative conception of the 
value of eudaimonia. On the contrary, I think the evidence is overwhelming 
throughout his ethical and political works that Aristotle, like Plato and Socrates before 
him, takes eudaimonia to be of agent-relative value. I take the agent-relative value of 
eudaimonia to undergird the structure of reasons found in Aristotle’s ethical and 
political works so completely that it is a strain to read him otherwise. This is precisely 
why Aristotle is generally read as endorsing the agent-relative value of eudaimonia.110 
 
 But of course Kraut has a competing comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, 
and on this interpretation it is no strain to read him as an agent-neutralist. I think the 
best reason to reject Kraut’s reading is that we can attribute the crucial premises of an 
argument for the agent-relative value of eudaimonia to Aristotle. Though he never 
makes either the premises or the argument explicit (perhaps because this question 
was not a live issue for him), it is plausible to understand him as endorsing these 
premises and hence the conclusion that follows from them. Here is how the argument 
runs:
 (1) If the value of something is asymmetrical between agents, its value is 
agent-relative. This is just what it means for value to be agent-relative.
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110Cf. Ackrill 1980, p. 21, Annas 1992, Cooper 1986, pp. 123-5, Hardie 1965 and 1968, Irwin 1988, pp. 
366-7, and Ross 1924, p. 230 (cited in Kraut 1989, p. 145n).
 (2) There is an asymmetry between the relationships agents stand in to the lives 
of themselves and with the lives of others. This asymmetry has two aspects. First, there 
is the purely subjective and experiential point that my life is the only life I will 
experience. I will undergo its pleasures and pains, successes and failures, in a direct 
way, unlike the pleasures and pains, successes and failures, of any other life.111  
 But second, on Aristotle’s view, there is a metaphysical point that the life I lead 
constitutes me — identifies and makes me up — in a way unlike any other life. We 
(human agents) are beings of a certain kind — essentially rational creatures for whom 
our theoretical and practical cognitive capacities and activities constitute the kind of 
thing we are. As we saw earlier, Aristotle thinks that it is not merely the case that 
carrying off these activities well makes us good specimens of our kind. Instead, in our 
(special) case, the activity of our “intellectual part” goes to constitute the particular, 
individual creatures we are. It is what makes us, us.  The point of all this is that both 
our identities and our good lie essentially in our rational activity.112 In this respect too 
we stand in a different relation with our own life than we do with the life of anyone 
else.
 (3) The value of eudaimonia (a good life) depends on the relationship one stands 
in to the life which is good. In other words, the value to you of eudaimonia —
understood as a source of reasons for action —depends on whether the life in question 
is your own. 
 Partly, this is a claim about value which follows from the metaphysical identity 
claims in premise (2). In part, this also reflects Aristotle’s insistence (NE I.8) that what 
is good is the first-person experience of living of the eudaimon life, rather than the 
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111I take this to be connected with Aristotle’s conviction that our final good must be something within 
our power: “the good we divine to be something of one’s own and not easily taken from one” (NE 
I.5:1095b25; cf. EE I.5:1215a15f, quoted p. 15 above). His idea is that the final end — the source of our 
reasons for action — for each of us  must somehow be thought to be up to each of us individually.
112Aristotle makes this claim in many ways and in many places; cf. NE IX.7: “we exist by virtue of 
activity (i.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity” 
(1168a6-8). Cf. also EE VII.8: 1241a39, Pol. VII.3:1325a32 for a sampling of the ways he employs this 
idea.
third-person observation that such a life is lived.113 But it is also, I take it, a 
motivational point.114 Aristotle supposes (NE I.2) that it makes a great deal of 
difference to us to grasp that for the sake of which we do what we do. Because my life 
will be not merely affected by but constituted by the choices I make and the kind of 
person I become (and because that is the only life the experience of which will be 
mine), I am motivated in the case of my life as I am for no other life to make it a good 
one (to be eudaimon).
 (4) Therefore, agents stand in an asymmetrical relationship with the value of the 
eudaimonia of themselves and others. It follows from (2) and (3) that my life is of value 
to me in a way no one else’s is. Conversely, my life is valuable to me in a way it is to no 
one else. It constitutes me and determines my eudaimonia, hence gives me reason for 
action, in a way no other life does.
 (5) Therefore, the value of eudaimonia is agent-relative. This follows from (1) and 
(4). Moreover, since on Aristotle’s view eudaimonia is the only ultimate source of final 
reasons, the value of all other human goods — in particular the value of rationality in 
ourselves and others —must be agent-relative too.
 Although the crucial premises (2) and (3) are controversial ones, and merit far 
more defense given modern concerns about agent-relativity, they nevertheless reflect 
commonsense intuitions about reasons and value which Aristotle does not call into 
question. In light of his acceptance of his acceptance of these premises, it is (contra 
Kraut and Hurka) right to ascribe to Aristotle the belief that human goods are 
agent-relative rather than agent-neutral.115
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113Thus Ackrill: eudaimonia is “doing well, not the result of doing well; a life, not the reward of life” 
(Ackrill 1980, p. 24).
114As noted in Chapter 1, the ancients (Aristotle included) do not clearly distinguish between this 
motivational point as a descriptive claim and the normative claim that we thus have reasons to act in 
line with this sort of motivational fact. Whether they are justified in the inference from the first to the 
second is an extremely interesting question which would take us far beyond this project.
115If I am right in my reading of Aristotle, he shares an intuition that guides some modern conceptions 
of well-being. The idea is that whatever role well-being is to play in moral theory, an adequate account 
of the value of well-being must have it that that value is for the person whose well-being it is; as L.W. 
Sumner puts it, “the prudential value of my life is its value for me” (Sumner 1996, p.37). Though he 
does not use this terminology, the thought is clearly that the value of well-being must be agent-relative.
 This, then, is the point that renders the Kantian strategy unavailable to 
Aristotle. On Kant’s account, the value of the good will and rational nature is 
agent-neutral. Kant does not make this point in these terms, but it is the 
agent-neutrality of this value which generates the argument for the Formula of 
Humanity. Kant moves from the fact that each agent values his own rational nature as 
an end in itself to the claim that regarding the rational nature of every agent as an 
end in itself is an “objective principle” which is categorically imperative for the human 
will (47/429). It is hard to see what could justify this move except the idea that the 
value accorded to rational nature in each of its instantiations is agent-neutral: it is 
equally a source of reasons for us whether the will in question is ours or not. This 
move will fail if the value in each case is thought to be agent-relative: no inference of 
the kind Kant needs here is available to support such an argument, because there is 
nothing about the fact that one agent A values some item X that entails that another 
agent must do likewise. Since this is the situation that confronts Aristotle’s view of the 
value of the rational natures of human beings, the Kantian strategy is not available to 
him. The failure of this strategy does not by itself mean that Aristotle cannot account 
for our intuitions about respect for others, of course. It means merely that if we are 
going to find a grounding for those intuitions in Aristotle’s ethical theory, we must look 
elsewhere.
Justice in Aristotle
 Aristotle has an account of justice in both his moral and political works, and 
initially it appears to respond to our concerns much more than, say, Plato’s account in 
Republic. In his central discussion of the virtue of justice, in NE V, Aristotle tells us 
that “justice alone, of all the excellences, is thought to be another’s good, because it is 
related to others; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a rule or a 
partner” (1130a3f). 
 This promises help with our investigation, because it sounds as though Aristotle 
might be responding to the same sorts of intuitions about respect for others we are. 
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The promising start turns out, however, to be merely a “general” account of justice. 
Aristotle moves right away  (1130a16) to a concern with “particular” justice, which is 
defined as that in virtue of which one makes just distributions (1134a1). In the end, as 
I shall argue, this discussion fails to give us the rationale we seek.
 For his account to succeed, it would need to solve two problems simultaneously. 
First, it must give an account of our intuitions about respect for persons, and in 
particular of our intuitions that all persons are deserving of this respect. Second, it 
needs to explain how respect is consistent with eudaimonism:it needs to show how 
such respect is consistent with seeking one’s own eudaimonia as the exclusive source 
of final reasons for action.
 Aristotle’s view, it turns out, can meet one of these challenges, but not both. The 
view of particular justice he actually develops is plagued with a deep parochialism or 
non-universalism. The constraints of respect it identifies are imposed by conditions 
which only contingently attach to other persons, and consequently fail to attach to all 
other persons. Thus, to the extent we believe that respect is due others universally — 
that is, to all persons independent of any contingent facts about them — we will fail to 
find an adequate grounding of this intuition in Aristotle.116 The problem is evident in 
his claim that “justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed 
by law” (NE V.6: 1134a29). The respect in which Aristotle believes others impose 
constraints on us is in the first instance a function of our political, legal, and 
contractual relationships, rather than anything applying to persons generally.
 The trouble begins with his supposition that particular justice is chiefly 
concerned with distributive and rectificatory issues. Now this needn’t be a insuperable 
obstacle: our idea that the constraints of respect apply universally might be construed 
distributively — as one in which persons are owed the sort of treatment that respect 
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116As Miller 1995 shows, Alasdair MacIntyre’s sweeping claim that the ancients had no expression 
correctly translated by our expression ‘a right’ is false. However, MacIntyre is explicitly concerned with 
“rights which are alleged to belong to human beings as such...supposed to attach equally to all 
individuals, whatever their sex, race, religion, talents or deserts” (MacIntyre 1984, pp. 68-9), and, as my 
discussion will reveal, he is certainly right that Aristotle’s view of justice does not sustain such a 
conception of rights. Perhaps we should say that Aristotle had a concept of rights, but that it is not like 
the conceptions which have come to dominate liberal thought, and for which we seek justification.
picks out in virtue of some property which all persons should be thought of as sharing 
in equally (the capacity to govern oneself by reason, perhaps).  This way of thinking of 
respect as a matter for distributive justice might be fruitful (if not clearly motivated), 
but Aristotle does not take this approach. 
 Instead, his tack is to characterize distributive justice as a matter of seeing 
persons as deserving in certain ways. He says that “all men agree that what is just in 
distribution must be according to merit in some sense,” while they nevertheless 
disagree over what merit consists in (NE V.3: 1131a24, emphasis added). Distributive 
justice is thus a “species of the proportionate” (1131a29). Insofar as we are 
distributively just we apportion according to merit; depending on the case, what is to 
count as merit may vary.117 For example, in distributing the benefits of economic 
cooperation, Aristotle says that 
it would not be just that he who paid one mina should have 
the same share of a hundred minae, whether of the principal 
or of the profits, as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine. 
(Pol III.9:1280a29; cf. also EE VII.10:1242b12f)
 Aristotle’s views about political authority are a special case of this view of 
desert. Aristotle believes that in constitutional government citizens should take turns 
ruling and being ruled, on the grounds that they are about equally suited to the tasks 
of political rule (Pol. I.12: 1259b4, III.12: 1283a9, III.16: 1287a13, VI.2: 1317b1, VII.14: 
1332b25). Political authority is something which is to be deserved, and the basis upon 
which it is deserved is “political excellence” (III.12: 1282b16, III.9). Now Aristotle’s 
view on political excellence differs in two ways from Plato’s. First, “political excellence” 
is roughly equally distributed among the citizenry; there’s no “expert” such as is found 
in Republic or Statesman (II.2: 1261a38-b3, VII.14: 1332b25). Second, the aggregated 
wisdom of the citizenry does not compound the defects in individuals’ grasp of what is 
to be done, but offsets or overcomes it (III.11: 1281a43). So equal share of rule by 
equals is both just and efficient as a form of constitution.
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117As Bernard Williams observes, this entails that for Aristotle the notion of a fair distribution is prior 
to that of a fair or just person (Williams 1981, p. 90).
 We might be tempted to think that Aristotle’s views that citizens are equally 
entitled to rule suggests that there is something about them that deserves respect of 
the form we are interested in. But there are two problems with this inference.  First, 
what is doing the work here is a desert-basis which, while perhaps roughly distributed 
among citizens, is explicitly not equally distributed among all persons, at least on 
Aristotle’s view. Some persons — women, natural slaves, and barbarians — are 
naturally suited only to be ruled, not to rule (I.5: 1254a34). Others might not be 
naturally excluded, but are rendered unfit by the lives of labor they must lead in order 
for the polis to prosper (III.5: 1278a20). Into this category fall “mechanics and 
laborers” — those who provide the “necessary services” within the polis. Their kind of 
life, Aristotle says, is inimical to the leisure which is “necessary both for the 
development of excellence and the performance of political duties” (Pol. VII.9: 
1329a1).Of course, we might think that Aristotle is simply making an empirical 
mistake here, which, if corrected, would show that all persons are equally capable of 
political excellence. I will return to this point below.
 Even if we think this, however, there is a further problem. All Aristotle’s view 
here establishes is a desert-basis for ruling and being ruled, not for forms of individual 
treatment.  It is not clear how the kind of entitlement which is at work in formal 
political equality could carry over to informal relationships between individuals. The 
merit-basis for the proportional distribution of political authority is excellence of 
character (Pol. III.9: 1281a3-6), and our intuitions about respect do not hold respect to 
be due in virtue of virtue (so to speak).118 This is a theory about political obligation, 
and the claims (some) citizens have on their state, rather than a theory about what 
individuals, qua individuals, have reason to do, and it is not based on any general 
account of persons which generates reasons for us to be constrained by them and their 
interests.
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118A danger of vacuous circularity exists here. If, as he says, justice is “not part of excellence but 
excellence entire” (NE V.1:1130a9), then just distribution will turn out to be distribution according to 
excellence, which is justice, viz. a disposition to distribute according to dispositions to distribute 
according to dispositions.... I don’t say Aristotle is stuck with this vacuity, and neither do I wish to 
belabor it, only to mark that there is a danger of it.
 Charles Young suggests a way around this problem. What we need to do, he 
says, is understand the attitude toward one’s fellow-citizens that Aristotle’s conception 
of political justice requires. Political justice, says Aristotle, is 
found among men who share their life with a view to 
self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately 
or arithmetically equal...(NE V.6:1134a26f)
Young’s proposal is that there is an attitude toward others described here which 
arguably could be extended to fill out the demands of what we are referring to as 
respect. The point of Aristotle’s view of political justice is that each of us is to see and 
govern ourselves as one among “free and equal members of a political community” 
(Young 1988, p. 245). If the virtue of justice is to see ourselves in this way, and regard 
others around us correspondingly, then we will act and choose justly, as
one who will distribute either between himself and another or 
between two others not so as to give more of what is 
desirable to himself and less to his neighbor (and conversely 
with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in 
accordance with proportion; and similarly in distributing 
between two other persons. (NE V.5: 1134a2f)
Arguably,  adopting this perspective would result in general respect for the welfare 
and interests of others: if we are just we will refrain from those sorts of actions that 
are unjust and in violation of the constraints of respect.
 However, this doesn’t completely solve the problem with Aristotle’s account. 
First, notice that Young has us driven by a conception of ourselves — and of the others 
falling under relations of justice with ourselves — as partners who are “sharing a life 
with a view to self-sufficiency.” This implies that constraints of justice rest purely on 
the necessity of community for the good life, which has untoward consequences. If 
justice arises out of these civic or political associations for the sake of utility, we end 
up with a notion of respect which is contingent on those associations. In particular, it 
is not clear how such respect would include in its embrace those who are not capable of 
contributing to a shared life of self-sufficiency. We may be unsure what exactly are our 
obligations to those who cannot contribute to cooperative productive endeavors, but 
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the notion that they have no claim to respect as persons is quite foreign to our 
intuitions here. It is not clear that this kind of contractarian thought is what Young 
has in mind, but he does not present a clear alternative to it either. I will return to this 
point below.
 Second, Young’s proposal does not establish a connection between respect and 
eudaimonia. Even if it yielded an account of respect with the proper scope, we would 
lack an understanding of how to reconcile the reason-giving force of claims of respect 
with the idea that our eudaimonia is that for the sake of which we do all that we do. 
What reason do we have to take up the point of view of political justice generally? Why 
should we defer to others when we are in conditions of scarcity? If we understand the 
source of all reasons to be our own eudaimonia, then we need to see how our 
eudaimonia gives us reasons to adopt the attitude Young is describing. The objection 
here is not that no such account can be given; it’s that such an account is just what we 
need, and the view Young ascribes to Aristotle makes no attempt to provide it. So 
Young’s strategy actually fails on two counts.
 A more promising strategy is to try to repair Aristotle’s conception of justice 
with respect to what he thinks disqualifies persons from claims to self-governance and 
political participation. Notoriously, he bars women and “natural slaves” from such 
claims on the basis of their alleged inferior rational capacities.119 Aristotle believes in 
the subordination of the “irrational” parts of a person to the “rational” parts (cf. Pol. 
I.5: 1254a34f), and women and slaves are excluded from citizenship on the grounds 
that they are by nature incapable of the proper degree of this subordination.120 
Aristotle appears to believe that the basis of legal rights is the capacity for this sort of 
rational self-governance, since it contributes to the end of the state (Pol. III.12: 
1283a14) and is essential for “political excellence.”
87
119 “The slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority...” (Pol. I.13: 
1260a12). 
120I ignore for the moment the complications introduced by resident aliens and other freemen who have 
the requisite natural capacity, but for other reasons (perhaps lack of education or development, or 
political expediency) are denied the rights of citizens.
 That helps to explain Aristotle’s insistence that justice is “between any man and 
any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement” (NE 
VIII.11: 1161b5). Perhaps he has in mind an idea recognizable from modern 
discussions of moral personality. Kant’s moral theory, for example, draws heavily upon 
the “fact of reason”: the idea that we experience ourselves as being capable of 
determining our wills based on reason rather than inclination (CPR, pp. 31, 48-9; cf. 
also Foundations, p. 65). Though Kant’s conception of “inclination” does not line up 
tidily with Aristotle’s notion of the “irrational” parts of the soul, the general idea that 
reason (under some conception) is to have authority over more recalcitrant aspects of 
our personality is readily recognizable as common to the two views.121
 Maybe we can generate from this an argument for respect. If Aristotle’s 
mistaken views about natural slaves and women are based on empirical errors about 
who possesses the features necessary for rights-claims, perhaps we can dispatch with 
the myopic limits he set on who is entitled to respect as a person. As it turns out 
everyone we would be inclined to recognize as a person —  as someone who constrains 
us in the way respect denotes —  satisfies the conditions which Aristotle erroneously 
believes are satisfied only by (some) upper-class Greek males. Perhaps in Aristotle’s 
view of political rights we have what it takes to underwrite a kind of value for persons 
which demands respect, whether those persons are actually citizens of the same polis 
(and capable of mutual benefit via agreement) or not. 
 Aristotle’s remarks in Politics VII.2 about constraints of justice which hold 
independent of political ties might encourage us in this interpretation. He maintains 
that conquest of other nations for the sake of “despotic” government is “irrational” 
(1324b23f); the only time conquest is justified, he says, is when “one party is, and the 
other is not, born to serve, in which case men have a right to command ... those who 
are intended to be subjects” (1324b36; cf. also Pol. I.7, I.8: 1356b21-25).122 Similarly, 
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121An even more recent example of this line of thought can be found in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 
argument that the Kantian notion of being subject to moral law is a necessary condition of having 
rights-claims against others (Thomson 1990, ch. 8).
122I thank Dan Russell for pointing out the implications of this passage.
he maintains that it is never right to hunt people for food or sacrifice (1324b40), 
apparently on the grounds that by nature we are not meant to be eaten (at least by 
other people) or sacrificed. The natural properties of natural slavery and natural 
mastery — as well as suitability for food or sacrifice — are reason-giving independent 
of political context, and if we chalk up Aristotle’s misguided conclusions about natural 
slaves and women as an empirical mistake, maybe we have a basis for claims to justice 
outside the bounds of the polis. 
  These passages are tantalizing because they strongly suggest that Aristotle 
shares something like our intuitions that all persons are entitled to respect just in 
virtue of being persons. But Aristotle gives them no theoretical explication, and there 
is a problem with trying to integrate them into his comprehensive practical (moral and 
political) theory. Doing so expands the scope of Aristotle’s conception of political justice 
at the cost of the connection between that conception and his eudaimonism. There is a 
reason why his conclusions about justice are parochial rather than universal, and the 
reason lies in his commitment to eudaimonism.
 Aristotle clearly thinks there is something important about actual political ties 
in establishing justice. In both his ethical and his political works he claims that law is 
necessary for justice, and thus that justice is a function of relations between citizens 
(NE V.6: 1134a29, Pol. I.2: 1253a38). In Eudemian Ethics he argues that justice 
requires antecedent bonds of contract or commitment: 
...generally all justice is in relation to a friend. For 
justice involves a number of individuals who are partners, 
and the friend is a partner either in family or in one’s 
scheme of life.(EE VII.10:1242a19f) 
This appears to be a repudiation of the idea that there is any general capacity to be 
bound by moral or rational constraints which gives rise to considerations of justice — 
indeed that there are any natural properties at all that are sufficient to give rise to 
claims of justice apart from political ties. Instead what seems to do the work is de facto 
considerations of actual commitment to others (in the family or the polis) which 
introduce constraints of justice.
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 Now, if we ask what in Aristotle’s broader theory justifies ascribing such value 
to individuals qua rational, potential co-citizens or partners, it is hard to see that 
there is any answer other than the purely instrumental or contractarian one that we 
benefit by doing so. This line of thought can justify according such value only 
conditionally, that is, upon the actual possibility that the other person offers 
cooperative benefits. But one serious problem with contractarian theories is that they 
leave us considerably short of the universality of respect for others which intuitively 
we think we ought to have, so if this is Aristotle’s view it will not be very helpful.123
 However, it is not quite Aristotle’s view. Fred Miller argues that the virtuous 
person comes to respect the rights of fellow-citizens because it is a necessary condition 
for a just constitution that citizens do so with each other, and living under a just 
constitution is a necessary condition for the best kind of life (Miller 1995, pp. 137-8). 
Still, this argument is not to be understood in purely contractarian terms: Aristotle 
rejects a purely contractarian view of the basis for political affiliation in claiming that 
the end of the state is not “mere life” but good life (Pol. III.9: 1280a29). The fact that 
for us as “political animals” good lives can only be found among communities of others 
affords the virtuous agent a reason both to choose political justice and not to defect 
from it even when he could do so, given Aristotle’s conception of virtue and the place of 
virtue in the good life (cf. Miller 1995, p.131ff).124 So the virtuous agent recognizes the 
aims and purposes of the state and the value of citizenship as necessary for a good 
human life.125
 This line of argument is responsive to the need to give a eudaimonic 
justification for adhering to the constraints of respect, but it at best blunts, rather 
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123Jean Hampton argues that “Hobbesian” contractarianism “gives us no reason to respect those with 
whom we have no need of cooperating, or those whom we are strong enough to dominate, such as old 
people, or the handicapped, or retarded children whom we do not want to rear, or people from other 
societies with whom we have no interest in trading. And I would argue that this shows that Hobbesian 
moral contractarianism fails in a very serious way to capture the nature of morality” (Hampton 1991, 
pp. 48-9; cf. also Hampton 1993 on Hobbesian contractarianism).
124This is, I think, the view which Young has in mind as well.
125As Miller puts it, “individuals require the structure of legal justice in order to realize their natural 
ends as excellent and reasonable beings” (Miller 1995, p. 135).
than eliminates, the force of the problem of the scope of Aristotelian justice. It offers no 
ready way to bring relations with some others under the umbrella of justice — those 
who are not part of one’s own polis, hence do not share in one’s political life and the 
constitutional basis for respect for fellow citizens, as well as those within the polis who 
do not or cannot contribute to the good life of the polis in the right way. As noted 
earlier, in Aristotle’s view this includes not only natural slaves and women, but also 
“mechanics and laborers.” So there are multiple groups of people which fail to fall 
under the conditions which, on Aristotle’s view, entitle them to the full respect of 
others; this is short of the kind of universality we think attends to the constraints of 
respect.126
 Moreover, it seems to be the wrong rationale even for those who are entitled to 
respect. For on this account it is in virtue of their membership in and contribution to 
the polis which is necessary for one’s own good life that others are entitled to respect 
from us. That doesn’t seem right as a basis for the bare sorts of constraints we feel 
obligated to as a matter of respect, as we have characterized it. I take our intuitions to 
be clear that whatever that basis is, it is not in virtue of properties (some) persons just 
happen to have, so there is no possibility of motivating and justifying them on the 
grounds Aristotle affords us.
 Aristotle’s conception of justice, while not wholly satisfactory, is nevertheless 
suggestive in an useful way. It fails to give us a rationale for respect for other persons 
— for all persons, irrespective of their actual or potential contribution to our political 
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126Miller argues on the basis of the passages considered above that the capacity for “some limited 
forms of co-operation or community” provides the basis for constraints of justice outside the polis (Miller 
1995, pp. 84-6). It is not clear how this should be thought to work. On the one hand, the most 
straightforward way to understand such an idea would be in terms of the instrumental disvalue of not 
cooperating with others with whom productive cooperation is possible. But that amounts to a sort of 
naked contractarian view of justice which Aristotle seems to eschew, and which is open to lethal 
criticism (see above). Another way to understand it, however, would be to understand Aristotle as 
pointing to a morally-significant form of kinship (suggeneia) with others (EE VII.10:1242a25). This 
might be construed as an anticipation of the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis, which underwrites a related 
argument (cf. Chapter 4). Perhaps the idea is of a sort of “natural equality,” which on Aristotle’s view 
entitles others to “the same natural right and worth” (Pol. III.16: 1287a14). However, here it must be 
noted, first, that Aristotle does not say in just what respect persons as persons are naturally equal so as 
to ground the application of principles of justice in such cases (and in the Politics passage, he clearly 
supposes that not all persons are naturally equal), nor, second, how kinship and the constraints of 
justice that could be thought to come with it can be reason-giving in a way compatible with 
eudaimonism. 
community — within a eudaimonist framework, because he fetters justice to political 
community in ways that are problematic both for the scope of respect and for its basis. 
However, he has pointed to our natures as essentially “political animals” as the place 
to look for a rationale for justice. We still need to know how such natures can give rise 
to universal respect for others, and how the reasons it gives us for respecting them can 
fit within a eudaimonist framework, but in my view it is an important start. More help 
is to be found in Aristotle’s conception of the kalon — the noble or fine.
The Kalon
 The doctrine of the kalon — roughly translated as the fine or the noble — is a 
distinctive feature of Aristotle’s moral theory. In pre-classical days, kalon was 
primarily associated with beauty as an aesthetic value, and there is something of an 
aesthetic element captured in translating it fine. Yet in Aristotle’s hands, it also 
denotes a clearly moral property, which is better captured with noble.127 In short, as 
with much other Greek moral vocabulary, we don’t have a simple translation for it, 
and in light of the subtle use Aristotle makes of the kalon, it is perhaps just as well not 
to influence our understanding of it by gratuitously importing nuances or overtones by 
translating it, so I will merely transliterate the Greek term.
 The doctrine of the kalon draws together and focuses Aristotle’s conception of 
virtue. The kalon is that for the sake of which, for example, the courageous person 
faces the things which are fearful (NE III.7:1115b13, III.8:1116b30, 1117a8); it is the 
“mark” at which the temperate person aims (III.11:1119b15); it is characteristic of 
liberality (IV.1: 1120a14) and magnificence (IV.2:1122b7); in fact in general “excellent 
actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble” (IV.1:1120a24, cf. also EE 
VIII.3:1248b35). So there is a deep connection between the kalon and virtue: it seems 
to be something like what the virtuous person seeks or aims at in acting virtuously. 
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127Here, as in much of this section, I am greatly indebted to Rogers 1993.
Since it is that for the sake of which the virtuous person acts, it appears also to be 
reason-giving from the perspective of virtue.
 Now, how can we make sense of this reason-giving force within Aristotle’s 
overall eudaimonism? In his view of friendship he says that in complete friendships 
the friend loves his friend for his own sake, but that nevertheless this is compatible 
with finding the exclusive source of ultimate reasons in one’s own eudaimonia. Is a 
similar reconciliation possible here?
 A further question, more pressing than in the case of friendship, is this: even if 
choosing the kalon is strictly speaking compatible with eudaimonism, is there any 
reason it must be part of the best life? This matters because we think respect for 
others is not merely an option: we are constrained by others and their interests 
whether we choose to be or not. If Aristotle’s doctrine of the kalon is to help us with 
our intuitions about respect, we thus need to know whether eudaimonia requires 
seeking the kalon, and if so, why?  
 These answers won’t help, of course, unless we can make out a connection 
between Aristotle’s doctrine of the kalon and our intuitions about respect. So let’s 
begin by attempting to understand this connection.
Respect and the Kalon
 The simplest possible link between the kalon and respect would be that 
Aristotle was denoting with kalon what we denote by respect. Terence Irwin offers a 
view of the kalon which is not far off this view. Irwin finds evidence in the Rhetoric 
that what Aristotle intends the kalon to pick out are benefits to others (Irwin 1988b, p. 
440; 1986, pp. 124-7). This allows us, Irwin says, to see in the kalon a “fairly 
recognizable concept of moral obligation” (1986, p. 130). Now, if this is not exactly our 
notion of respect for others, it is close. If Irwin is right, what Aristotle has in mind 
with his doctrine of the kalon is that the good of others has a reason-giving claim upon 
us, and that it is this feature of situations to which the virtuous agent, in acting for 
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the sake of the kalon, is responding. This is in the right ballpark for the sort of 
connection to respect we need.128
 Unfortunately, this simple approach will not work. The first problem is that 
even if Aristotle did intend by kalon benefit to others, that may or may not reflect a fit 
with our interest in respect. For respect, as I have characterized it, is a matter of 
constraint, rather than promotion. The intuitions we are seeking to explain with an 
account of respect are, at least in the first instance, limits on what we may permissibly 
do to others in pursuit of our own interests. We might, of course, be morally required 
to benefit others or promote their welfare, but the intuitions we are intent on 
justifying for present purposes are those that say we can’t harm them. Whether there 
is a sharp demarcation between “negative” duties not to harm and “positive” duties to 
benefit others is an issue in modern moral philosophy that distinguishes 
consequentialist from deontological or Kantian moral theories, and it is not clear how 
Irwin’s reading of Aristotle lines would treat that distinction. But I will not press this 
point, both because the nature of the distinction itself is contentious, and because in 
any case what Aristotle has to say on the subject grossly underdetermines any 
conclusion we might try to draw about where he would come down on that distinction.
 The real problem with Irwin’s proposal is that he has not captured Aristotle’s 
view. As Kelly Rogers observes, the basis for Irwin’s view is the Rhetoric, and we have 
good reason to doubt that Aristotle is representing his own views in the passages 
crucial to Irwin’s interpretation (Rogers 1993, p. 362ff). Rogers argues persuasively 
that the kalon is instead better understood from the ethical works as what is fitting 
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128There is, however, a complicating nuance in Aristotle which Irwin is quick to point out: since the 
kalon is the object of reason (EE III.1:1229a3), and reason seeks the agent’s own good (NE 
VI.5:1140a28), it would be a mistake to attribute to Aristotle the idea that the kalon requires 
self-sacrifice. Instead, what it picks out should be thought of as the common good (Irwin 1986, p. 132). 
Still, Irwin says, “the content of the moral virtues [and hence the kalon] is not determined by the 
agent’s own good, and for this reason Aristotle is not an ethical egoist” (ibid., p. 143). 
 However, he immediately adds that “the justification of the moral virtues ... does depend on 
appeal to the agent’s own good.” How this does not amount to at least “formal” egoism is not at all clear, 
in part because Irwin has not made sufficiently clear just what commitments he takes to be involved in 
“ethical egoism.” This seems to me to be a muddle, but the immediate bearing of Aristotle’s account of 
the kalon on the “egoism” of his overall view is not crucial in light of the other problems with Irwin’s 
understanding of Aristotle’s doctrine of the kalon, discussed in the text.
(prepon) and praiseworthy (ibid. pp. 356-60). So we cannot exploit the simple 
connection between the kalon and respect which Irwin proposes. We now face the 
problem of understanding the pertinent notion of “fittingness” and the basis for 
praiseworthiness; I will return to this point shortly.
 Even if Irwin’s reading were accurate, interpreting kalon as he proposes would 
merely recapitulate, rather than solve, the problem we face in attempting to reconcile 
eudaimonism and respect. For we would still be confronted with the question of how 
we could have reason to benefit others — all others, independent of particular 
commitments of philia to them —  when doing requires constraint on our pursuit of 
our own interests. That is the cardinal question at issue. For the moment, let us set 
aside worries about the connection between the kalon and respect and consider how it 
might be possible to choose the kalon both for its own sake and consistent with 
eudaimonism about reasons for action. 
The Kalon as a Source of Reasons
 Irwin’s interpretation aside, we have the kalon as something like the object or 
“mark” of virtuous action, and since it is that for the sake of which the virtuous person 
acts virtuously, Aristotle clearly believes that there is something reason-giving about 
it. How are we to understand it to be reason-giving consistent with his agent-relative 
eudaimonism about reasons for action?
 The first step is to understand how the kalon is represented in the thinking of 
the virtuous person. Bernard Williams argues that the kalon is the end or aim of 
virtuous action in only a de re, not a de dicto, sense (Williams 1995). That is, the aim of 
virtuous action is in fact kalon, though that need not be (and for the most part will not 
be) how the virtuous person represents it to himself.129 Typically, what the agent sees 
in particular circumstances and finds reason-giving are values of various sorts, to be 
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129Williams thinks this is not quite true of courageous and temperate actions (Williams 1995, p. 19; cf. 
Wiggins 1995 for similar doubts about courage), but I agree with Hursthouse that this idea extends 
even to these instances of virtue (Hursthouse 1995): the basis for action in such cases reveal what the 
virtuous person finds reason-giving, and this just is the kalon in a de re sense.
realized or preserved by action (or abstention). In this recognition of value, and acting 
to promote it, lies the kalon in virtuous action.130 It is these values that the agent 
finds reason-giving, not (at least in the first instance) the fact that promoting them is 
kalon. 
 This allows us to explain the reason-giving force of the kalon in a way similar to 
the account of being able to love a friend for his own sake, consistent with holding 
one’s own eudaimonia to be the sole source of reasons for action. As we saw in the case 
of acting for the sake of a friend, the agent is motivated by and has a proximate 
justification for what she does in terms of the good of her friend, while her ultimate 
justification for what she does is that it is a constituent part of her own good. 
 Now, exactly how the parallel story for the kalon is to work is not explained by 
Aristotle, but the essential idea must be that in seeking the kalon, the virtuous agent 
is seeking something which she (rightly) values as part of her own good. As Rogers 
observes, Aristotle “stresses that the noble is a ‘greater’, ‘more pleasant and more 
loveable’ good than the things which constitute our routine advantage” (Rogers 1996, 
p. 301). Part of becoming virtuous seems to be seeing that seeking and realizing that 
what is kalon is part of one’s good,131 and coming to love the kalon and be motivated 
by particular realizations of it because of this connection. Even this is perhaps not 
quite right, because what the virtuous agent values and responds to as reason-giving 
are particular features of situations which in fact (de re) share the property of being 
kalon. De dicto what the agent is motivated by is, for example, an occasion for 
generosity, while de re it is the kalon in that occasion which explains its value, and it 
is the fact that being the kind of person who responds in this way to occasions for 
generosity is the best kind of person to be, which ultimately justifies her in responding 
in this way.
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130Arthur Madigan says that “it is almost as though the kalon were a simple non-natural property, 
known by a kind of intuition” (Madigan 1991, p. 79). I think this is right, so long as we conceive of such 
properties as supervening on the kinds of value that are realized in particular — natural — conditions.
131As Rogers puts it: “The goods coalesce” (Rogers 1996, p. 301). Cf.  EE VIII.3:1249a10, MM II.9.
 Of course, we want an explanation just why such responses to the kalon are and 
must be a constituent part of one’s good, and a vital feature of such an explanation will 
be a clearer conception of just what the kalon is. But the essential point in reconciling 
the reason-giving nature of the kalon with eudaimonia about reasons for action is that 
virtuous action is motivated in one way — by the values located in particular features 
of specific situations — while it is ultimately  justified by its incorporation in the 
eudaimonia of the agent.
The Necessity of Finding the Kalon Reason-giving
 If this is right, the idea of seeking the kalon for its own sake is not incompatible 
with one’s own eudaimonia as the exclusive source of reasons for action. But this is far 
from a full explanation of the role Aristotle thinks the kalon plays in the virtuous life 
(as well as lacking any clear connection with our notion of respect). Given its close 
connection with virtue, and the centrality of virtue in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia 
(NE I), Aristotle clearly believes that the best kind of life is not possible without 
responding to the kalon in the appropriate way. Why might this be?
 A full answer here is difficult to give, in part because Aristotle is not explicit 
about it, and in part because drawing together a reply on his behalf involves much if 
not most of his ethical theory. But I think we can get the gist of it by attending to the 
property of the kalon that it is fitting.
 What does the idea of fitting mean? What is supposed to be fitting, and to what 
is it fitted? I think the view Aristotle has in mind turns on his conception of human 
agents as beings of a certain kind — the kind which he brings out in NE I.7 in 
speaking of the function (ergon) we have. It is this function that characterizes what we 
are, and which fixes what is good for us and what excellence in human activity is. It is 
this function which gives determinate content to Aristotle’s concept of the mean,132 
and it is to our nature so conceived that what is kalon is fitted. 
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132Here I follow a view I take to be roughly shared by Rogers 1996 and Korsgaard 1986a.
 When virtuous persons act virtuously, it is insofar as and because they see the 
action in question as being appropriate and suited as a response to human nature — 
in themselves and others —and consequently as valuable, and are motivated so to act 
thereby.133 These are, indeed, two crucial aspects of virtue: first, that one perceive 
correctly the suitability of particular responses to our nature and our good, and second 
that one be motivated by that perception. To be so constituted is to be responsive to 
“right reason” (orthos logos) which, Aristotle tells us, is the standard for virtue (NE 
VI.1: 1138b23).134
 This helps make it clear how being motivated to choose the kalon for its own 
sake is a necessary component of the best part of human life. Because the kalon is 
reflective of human nature and its distinctive excellence, to choose it just is to choose 
what is good for one as a human being.135 This is why there is no conflict between 
choosing the kalon for its own sake and one’s own eudaimonia as the exclusive source 
of reasons for action — they converge in being determined by our nature.136 Since our 
good lies in a particular form of rational agency (together with harmony between our 
rational, affective, and conative constitutions), typically the kalon will be what 
strengthens and reinforces that rational agency. The kalon is what makes us better as 
the kind of creature we are; this is where Aristotle’s eudaimonism and his 
perfectionism converge. Thus Korsgaard:
What the morally virtuous person finds pleasant, and so 
correctly judges to be good, is the kind of activity that 
keeps reason in control of the soul. What is morally good is 
what is good for the soul, and what is good for the soul is 
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133Cf. Rogers: “The fully virtuous person transforms the ordinary objects of his pursuit into noble ends 
by pursuing them not independently of, but, rather, insofar as they are dictated by, the noble” (Roger 
1996, p. 299).
134Cf. Korsgaard 1986a, p. 271f.
135Cf. Rogers: “One simply cannot strive for noble ends without concomitantly striving to better one’s 
own condition. We may regard this as the corruption of morality; Aristotle regards it as its beauty” 
(1996, p. 302).
136Hence Madigan: “Whatever account of kalon one takes, the notion of kalon does not suppose, and if 
anything undermines, any clear line between the benefit of a given self or agent and the benefit of other 
selves or agents” (Madigan 1991, p. 85).
what realized its full potential — the potential for rational 
activity....[V]irtue, then, is the perfected state of the 
human soul. It is the state in which a human being can 
perceive correctly, and be motivated by, considerations of 
what is noble and good, and so can engage in rational 
activity.(Korsgaard 1986a, pp. 276-7).
So response to the noble — the kalon — is thus an essential part of the best kind of 
life, because it is an accurate response to human nature and its good.137 Again it is 
important to emphasize that this is a de re description of the kalon: it characterizes 
how one is justified in seeking it. But part of Aristotle’s view is that in becoming 
virtuous one comes to seek what is kalon for its own sake. If I become virtuous I will 
learn, for example, to love learning: opportunities to learn will in their own right 
motivate me, and I may justify what I do in terms of the opportunity to learn, while it 
is at the same time true that I am ultimately justified in learning because in making 
me a better rational agent — a better creature of the kind I am — learning is 
conducive to my living the best kind of life I can.138
 But now we are back to the problem we began with. It’s easy to see how 
appropriate response to my own human nature could be constitutive of my good; 
ignorance of the kind of creature I am will very likely lead to catastrophe, and 
amounts to simple imprudence. But why is it necessary for me to respond similarly to 
the nature of other humans — say, with acts of courage or generosity, or even respect? 
We have seen that the reason-giving force the eudaimonia of any given person has is 
relative to that person; how are we now supposed to understand that the human 
nature of others is something which should evoke from us “fitting” responses?139
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137John Cooper makes the same point for the role of virtue in Aristotle’s account: “On Aristotle’s theory 
of moral virtue, the virtues are essential properties of humankind: a person realizes more or less fully 
his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties of character which count 
as moral excellences. And since individual persons are what they essentially are by being human 
beings, it can be said that a person (any person) realizes his own essential nature more fully the more 
completely and adequately he possesses the moral excellences” (Cooper 1977b, p. 635).
138It thus would not be a mistake to think of the kalon as a relatively “thin” concept: it gets its content 
from whatever is to be sought for its own sake, as a constituent part of the best kind of life. I thank 
Julia Annas for suggesting this way of thinking about what Aristotle intends here.
139A related question is how the praiseworthy aspect of the kalon can be thought to come into play.
 Here, in my view, we run out of answers from Aristotle. I see only two hints as 
to what sort of response can be extracted from his account. The first is his idea that we 
are by nature “political animals,” (NE IX.9: 1169b18, Pol. I.2: 1253a3), and the second 
is his view as to the necessity of friendship. We have already seen, however, the limits 
of an appeal to our political nature as a basis for constraints for justice: they justify 
respect for others only conditionally and parochially, not universally. Likewise the 
reasons for friendship ground particular commitments of philia, not respect for 
persons generally and unconditionally.  So neither of these lines of thought has the 
right scope for an adequate answer to our basic problem. If we are to have an account 
of respect, it cannot be through contingent bonds of commitment in either 
social/political or personal/friendship domains — it must be more general, and not 
conditional upon particular relations we may have with others. 
Conclusion
 We are confronted, then, with the verdict that Aristotle has not provided a 
solution to the problem of reconciling respect for others with eudaimonism as a view 
about the ultimate reasons for action. The agent-relative nature of eudaimonism 
prevents him from employing a Kantian strategy of basing respect for others on their 
rationality; we cannot accept contingent and limiting conditions of political affiliation 
or friendship as a basis for respect; and his account of the kalon falls silent at just the 
crucial point of explaining how the interests of others become reason-giving within a 
eudaimonist framework.
 So a further account will be required. However, Aristotle’s insights into our 
commitments to and relationships with others can help to ground such an account, 
because he has after all left us with some provocative suggestions. He has drawn our 
notice to the fact that we are by nature social and political beings who thrive in 
community, and this must surely be part of a eudaimonistic accounting for respect. 
Moreover, though it is left unexplicated at crucial points, the idea that respect for 
others might in an important way be understood as a sort of response which is suited 
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to its objects, viz. other persons qua persons, is one I will exploit. My argument will be 
that when we act out of respect for others — when we see them and their interests as 
reason-giving for us, irrespective of any particular interest we have taken in them — 
we treat them in a way which befits them, as beings who, like ourselves, have a full 
panoply of cognitive, affective, and conative capacities, and a conscious interior life 
which commands attention for its own sake. These are the building blocks of Aristotle’s 
views of friendship and justice. But there is nothing with adequate scope or detail in 
his characterizations of these commitments, so developing such an account will be my 
job after considering what we can learn from the Stoics on these questions.
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4. STOICS
neither justice nor friendship can exist at all unless they are chosen for their own sakes. 
(Cicero, De Finibus III.70)
 A conspicuous feature of Stoic ethical thought was the rejection of the parochial 
nature of Aristotle’s conception of justice. The Stoics were no happier than we are with 
the limits on respect for persons which his account imposes. The Stoics developed an 
account of impartial concern for others which included in its embrace all humanity, in 
this respect matching our own intuitions about the demand for respect for persons. 
This gives hope that Stoic ethical theory potentially could be of help in meeting the 
challenges to eudaimonism with which we are concerned. 
 The Stoics differ from Aristotle in paying comparatively little attention to philia 
—the form of commitment to others that emerges in relationships of friendships or 
love. However, this does not mean they have nothing to say about valuing others 
non-instrumentally. On the contrary, their conception of the eudaimon life involves a 
form of concern for others that is both universal in scope and non-instrumental in 
nature. Thus, the discussion of this chapter will consider Stoic theoretical resources 
for meeting worries about both concern and respect together. I shall conclude, however, 
that we cannot understand their account as succeeding in ways that advance our 
inquiry. It is not that they do not offer answers to our questions; rather, the suitability 
of their reply is limited for our purposes because their answers are embedded and 
justified in a systematic theory which few of us now accept. Nevertheless the Stoic 
view is worth considering both because they take more seriously than do the other 
eudaimonist theorists we have considered something like the problem of respect as we 
are concerned with it, and because the limits on the success of their reply will force us 
to consider what will count as a satisfactory response to the objections.
Methodology
 Understanding the arguments of the Stoics can be tricky. The Stoic system was 
holistic, unified, and deductively organized. Cicero’s Stoic mouthpiece Cato says of the 
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system that, “if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure” (De Finibus 
III.74). Without a grasp of the complete system, therefore, we may miss the support 
components of it enjoy from other parts of the system. This raises difficulties for 
piecemeal assessment of Stoic ideas. Reasons of space preclude discussion here of 
important parts of the system, and thus it will always be open to the Stoic to plead in 
defense of the view that we have failed to consider some feature of it which addresses 
whatever difficulties we encounter. This is especially problematic for us since we will 
skirt the central and important matter of Stoic value theory. The distinctive hallmark 
of Stoic ethical theory, especially as against Aristotle, was that virtue is not only 
necessary but sufficient for happiness. The kinds of things Aristotle would count as 
“external goods” (e.g. health, happy marriage and children, etc.) are in the Stoic 
system literally of no value for happiness (they are “indifferents,” although the Stoics 
do allow that they have “selective value”). This doctrine is as important as it is 
complex and subtle, and an adequate exposition of it is simply beyond the scope of the 
present project.
  But the Stoic view of what is required in our treatment of others is an 
implication of this value theory, and it raises a number of difficult questions about 
Stoic value theory. Many of the forms of attachment to particular other persons we 
normally think are good and appropriate fall into the category of “indifferents,” and as 
a result it is not clear what we have reason to do in our treatment of others. But we 
can get a grip on at least the outlines of the view by beginning with the Stoic account 
of the development of human nature, which turns on the distinctive Stoic doctrine of 
oikeiosis.
Oikeiosis
 Oikeiosis is another of those ancient Greek terms which is inevitably 
compromised in translation. Sometimes it is translated as “familiarization” or 
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“congeniality,” both of which have unhelpful connotations.140 The basic idea is that it 
is a process by which we come to discover as our own — to identify with, in some sense 
— what we previously thought of as other.141 This is very abstract; concrete examples 
of the two forms oikeiosis takes in Stoic theory may help make the idea clearer.
 One form of oikeiosis is sometimes called personal oikeiosis, and Cicero provides 
a somewhat expansive account of it in De Finibus.142 In humans, he says, as with all 
living creatures, the process of oikeiosis begins at birth: the infant “feels an 
attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own 
constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution” (III.16). The 
form of self-preservation Cicero is thinking of here is a strong one: it requires one not 
merely to survive but, as Cicero puts it, to “preserve oneself in one’s natural 
constitution” (III.20).
 As the child develops, its sense of self evolves. Children begin to take pleasure 
in their employment of reason (III.17), and part of this discovery is that they 
“naturally” are attracted to the truth and find “mental assent to what is false” to be 
“repugnant” (III.18). This is the first step in noticing that there is value for them in 
abiding by nature’s direction in exercising their rational capacities: “things in 
accordance with nature are ‘things to be taken’ for their own sake, and their opposites 
similarly ‘things to be rejected’” (III.20). This principle of choice becomes a habit, and 
finally develops into “choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature” (III.20). At 
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140Annas believes that “familiarization” is the best translation because it captures the connotations of 
family (1990, p. 94 n. 9). Long and Sedley translate oikeiosis as “appropriation” because they like the 
associations with property ownership (1987 (LS), p. 351). Perhaps the most intuitive access to oikeiosis 
is as an antonym to allotriosis, which does translate fairly readily, to “alienation” (Annas, op. cit.).
141Cf. Striker, who renders it “recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one” (1996, p. 
281).
142The language in what follows (as in much Stoic thought) is descriptive, but the ideas are normative. 
The Stoics describe what should occur unless things go wrong. They do, of course, recognize that things 
very often go wrong, but do not expend much effort in explaining why they go wrong, or the various 
sources of corruption of what they see as natural processes. As Gisela Striker observes, the “optimistic 
assumption” that oikeiosis is natural “makes it hard, if not impossible, for the Stoics to explain why 
most people in fact turn out to be bad rather than virtuous” (Striker 1996, p. 256), but I will leave this 
problem aside.
this point, an awakening occurs which signals a deep and abiding change in one’s 
conception of oneself as a human being:
Man’s first attraction is towards the things in accordance 
with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather 
becomes capable of ‘conception’ ... and has discerned the 
order and so to speak the harmony that governs conduct, he 
thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the 
things for which he originally felt an affection, and by 
exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion 
that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is 
praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake... (III.21)
The process of personal oikeiosis results in a shift, that is, from an initial natural 
inclination to seek one’s own self-preservation, to a conception of what is valuable as 
the exercise of one’s rational capacities in a certain way, viz. in accordance with 
nature.143 If things go right, at some point the transition from infancy to adulthood 
the child goes from choosing Twinkies over carrots, for example, to choosing carrots 
over Twinkies because carrots are good for her and Twinkies aren’t, to recognizing that 
it is more important that she choose for reasons than that she get either the carrots or 
the Twinkies. Then she sees that her choice of carrots was for the best possible reason: 
it is what nature directs her to. She internalizes, as it were, the order and direction of 
nature, as a process of the development of her reasoning capacities. Seneca puts a 
somewhat different spin on the same point: “every animal first finds his own 
constitution congenial [to himself]; but a man’s constitution is rational and so man 
finds not his animality but his rationality congenial [to himself]; for man is dear to 
himself in virtue of that part which makes him a man.”144 The point is that the 
instinctive drive for self-preservation which is common to all animals, takes the form 
in the maturing human child of an increased appreciation for and identification with 
her own rationality — with the exercise of her reason. 
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143Michael Frede characterizes this as not a development but a radical change in the soul of the child 
(1986, pp. 108-9). This has implications for the appeal to personal oikeiosis as a foundation for the 
appeal to nature as a normative standard, which will be considered below.
144Letters on Ethics 121.14, in Inwood and Gerson 1997 (hereafter IG), passage II-107. What Inwood 
and Gerson are translating as ‘congenial’ here is the adjectival form of oikeiosis.
 The other process of oikeiosis is social oikeiosis. In contrast to the personal 
variety, this process pertains to one’s understanding of the various relationships one 
stands in with others. We begin by identifying closely with ourselves and our 
immediate family, seeing others as alien, but end up identifying closely with all other 
people in virtue of their membership in the “human race.” Here too we come to 
internalize something we initially consider to be “other”. Hierocles gives us a vivid 
description of the process of social oikeiosis:
In general each of us is as it were circumscribed by many 
circles, some smaller, others larger....The first and nearest 
circle is the one which a person has drawn around his own 
mind as around a centre; in this circle is included the body 
and things got for the body’s sake. This circle is the 
smallest and all but touches its centre. Second, farther from 
the centre and enclosing the first one, is the one in which 
are placed parents, siblings, wife and children. Third is the 
one in which are uncles and aunts, grandfathers and 
grandmothers, siblings’ children and also cousins. Next the 
circle including other relatives. And next the one including 
fellow-demesmen; then the one of fellow-tribesmen; then the 
one of fellow-citizens and then in the same way the circle of 
people from towns nearby and the circle of people of the same 
ethnic group. The furthest and largest, which includes all 
circles, is that of the whole human race.
When this has been considered, it is for the person striving 
for the proper use of each thing to draw the circles somehow 
toward the centre and to make efforts to move people from the 
including circles into the included ones. It is for someone 
with familial love to [treat] parents and siblings, [wife and 
children, like oneself; grandfathers, grandmothers, uncles 
and aunts like parents, siblings’ children like one’s own, 
cousins like siblings] and so by the same analogy treat older 
relatives, male and female, like grandfathers or uncles and 
aunts; those of one’s own age like cousins, and the younger 
ones like cousins’ children....there remains the point that 
we should treat people from the third circle similarly to 
those in the second, and our [further] relatives similarly to 
those from the third circle.... We would hit a reasonable 
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mark, if through our own initiative we reduce the distance of 
this relationship to each person.145
The metaphor is clear enough. We begin by seeing others at various distances from 
ourselves, presumably as thereby having weaker claims upon our energies and 
practical reasoning. Through the process of social oikeiosis, those distances are 
reduced, to the point where the “centre circle” includes all those of the “human race.” 
Accordingly the strength of the claims others have upon us gradually increases, to the 
point where we no longer distinguish the claims and interests of others from our own. 
This is not, as in the case of Aristotelian philia, a product of the commitments we make 
to others, but a recognition of a kind of natural bond we have with them.146 As Cicero 
puts it, “The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel 
another man to be akin to him” (De Finibus III.63). This, clearly, is a robust sense of 
the community of humankind which corresponds to our own sense of the universal 
scope of respect for others. But precisely what does the recognition of this “kinship” 
entail? Whether the Stoics can defend their account of the outcome of the processes of 
oikeiosis is of little interest to us if we can’t connect that outcome with our interest in 
eudaimonic justifications of concern and respect. So I want now to suggest why the 
Stoics view that we should recognize our common membership in the human race as 
normatively significant responds to our questions about concern and respect.
The Normative Requirements of Oikeiosis
 The first of the important points in the Stoic view of human “kinship” is that 
non-instrumental concern is required, not merely for some others, but for all others. 
(How much concern —in particular whether varying degrees of concern can be 
warranted, is something we shall have to consider.) The second is that something like 
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145Translation by Julia Annas in Annas 1993, p. 267. A similar account of concentric circles of varying 
“degrees of fellowship” appears in Cicero, De Officiis I.53-4, but without the notion that these circles 
should or do collapse.
146Annas emphasizes the aspect of commitment in philia, and observes that social oikeiosis obliterates 
the bounds that such commitments have (Annas 1992, pp. 140f). This is an important feature of Stoic 
thought and a large part of what clouds their view as to what treatment of others is actually required of 
us. I return to this point below.
the constraints involved in our modern conception of respect for persons pertain to our 
dealings with others. Together these suggest that what the Stoic theory requires of our 
treatment of others is “thick” enough to bear evaluation as a counterpart of, or proxy 
for, our intuitions about respect for persons.
 On the first point, we can begin by observing that the model of social oikeiosis is 
parental love. Cicero attributes to the Stoics the view that “nature creates in parents 
an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace 
the origin of the association of the human race in communities” (De Finibus III.62). As 
with other Stoic doctrines, the point here is a descriptive-cum-normative one: the 
Stoics would cite the concern parents have for their offspring in most species, and 
maintain that, in the normal case, human parents are no exception. Arguably it would 
be a stretch to suppose that in the first instance natural parental love should be 
regarded as merely instrumental, and the Stoics certainly thought of this love as a 
form of non-instrumental concern. Stobaeus records Arius Didymus as holding that 
children are loved for their own sake.147 The doctrine of social oikeiosis is then 
supposed to explain how this “natural” concern gets extended: it is by seeing that what 
is valuable (on the Stoic view) in the ones we naturally love — their rationality — is 
common to all other humans. If this is right then Cicero’s observation supports the 
idea that our interest in others is not to be merely instrumental. But there is further 
evidence for this idea.  
 Cicero repudiates one merely instrumental explanation of the formation of 
human communities: 
It is not true, as some claim, that men embarked upon 
communal life and fellowship in order to provide for life’s 
necessities just because we could not manage, without others, 
to provide ourselves with our natural requirements.(De 
Officiis I.158)
If it were true that we just need others for the benefits of cooperation, he says, then if 
we could sustain ourselves by our own efforts we would have no use for others.
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147Stobaeus II.120, 8-20 W., cited in Pembroke 1971, p. 124.
 But that is not the case. Cicero claims that even if the necessities were provided 
by a “magic wand,” we would still “flee from loneliness,” seeking companionship (ibid.). 
Of course, this is not an argument against merely instrumental interest in others: 
seeking others merely to relieve loneliness is still a way of seeing others primarily or 
exclusively as instrumental.
 The clearest passages in support of the notion that we are to have 
non-instrumental concern for others focus on the value of friends. Cicero is quite 
insistent that the instrumental view of friendship is rejected by the Stoics:
the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that 
we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake 
of their utility....In fact the very existence of both 
justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not 
desired for their own sake. (De Finibus III.70)
Diogenes Laertius agrees that “one’s friend is worth choosing for his own sake” 
(VII.124, IG II-94).
 These are straightforward repudiations of instrumentalism as regards our 
interests in our friends, but their implications are both helpful and troublesome.148 It 
is helpful to think that social oikeiosis requires that we bring all humankind in (as it 
were) to the circle of concern we have for our friends. This yields a quite general 
account of non-instrumental concern for all others. But the view is troublesome, in 
that the demands of this process raise questions as to what, on the Stoic account, 
should be distinctive about commitments to particular others. In other words, this way 
of defending non-instrumental concern seems to come at the cost of an inability to 
recognize the distinctive claims that friendships and other particular relationships of 
philia carry with them. I will return to this point again; at present the point is to show 
that the Stoics do not believe our interest in others is filtered through consideration of 
how they may be useful to our lives or ends.
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148The troublesome implications I discuss are independent of other texts that seem to indicate equally 
clearly that the value of friends is purely instrumental! The Diogenes Laertius passage follows shortly 
after a claim that “a friend and the benefits derived from him are instrumental” (VII.96, IG II-94), and 
Stobaeus concurs (Anthology 5g, IG II-95). Glenn Lesses works out the tension in favor of 
non-instrumentalism (1993), but it is not crucial for present purposes exactly how their account of 
friendship is to be understood. 
 It is even more plausible to think that the Stoic view of our morally- and 
rationally-required relations with others roughly tracks our conception of the 
behavioral demands of respect for persons, and is possibly even more demanding than 
our modern notions. First and foremost, the Stoic abjures harming others. Diogenes 
Laertius says simply that the Stoics “harm neither others nor themselves” (VII.123, IG 
II-94). Cicero has clear Stoic inspiration when he writes that “a man who is obedient to 
nature cannot harm another man,” and that “we are certainly forbidden by the law of 
nature from acting violently against another person” (De Officiis III.25, 27).149 The 
conception of harm at work here is not merely bodily harm, but also involves the 
deprivation of property. Cicero says that “for anyone to take from someone else for the 
sake of his own advantage is more contrary to nature than death or pain” (ibid., II.24). 
Justice requires not merely that we not harm others but that one “treat common goods 
as common and private ones as one’s own” (ibid., I.20). Virtue also requires just 
distributions (“assigning to each his own”) and faithfulness to agreements (ibid., 
I.15).150 And Stoic “impartial concern” (as I shall henceforth refer to it) is not limited 
to these negative responsibilities. Justice requires, says Cicero, that one serve the 
“common advantage” (ibid., I.31). The very general demands on our treatment of all 
others on the Stoic view are thus quite substantial, and certainly incorporate our 
central intuitions about the requirements of respect.151
 I have already alluded to the most significant aspect of Stoic impartial concern 
as an improvement on Aristotle: it fixes the problem of parochial scope of respect. On 
the Stoic account, social oikeiosis embraces all human beings within its reach, and this 
is what our intuitions tell us about the scope of respect for persons. Stoic impartial 
concern, like respect, extends to everyone in the human community, and is not based 
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149Furthermore, we are obliged not merely not to harm others but to defend them from harm (De 
Officiis I.23).
150See also Stobaeus Anthology 2.5b1, 5b5 (I&G II-95) for the formulation of justice as what is due.
151Cf. Cooper: “We must understand developing rational agents as also seeing that they have reasons, 
given the benevolence of nature’s initial endowments, to care about other people as such and for their 
own sakes, to treat them fairly, and considerately, and humanely” (1996, p. 271).
upon or limited by contingent political associations or bounds of community.152 As 
Annas puts it, on the Stoic account there is “no defensible stopping-place until we 
come to have concern for every human just as a human being” (Annas 1992, p. 140). 
Nor is it constrained by the desert of those with whom we are dealing. Justice, Cicero 
declares, “must be maintained even toward the lowliest” (De Officiis I.41); moreover, 
he says, “we must exercise a respectfulness towards men, both towards the best of 
them and also towards the rest” (De Officiis I.99). The impartial concern which, on the 
Stoic view, is the product of social oikeiosis, thus seems to have the right nature and 
scope for an account of respect for persons.
 So far so good. It is a tenet of Stoic ethical theory that we ought to have and 
exercise a form of concern for all other people which answers well to our intuitions 
about both non-instrumental concern and respect for others. The next, and crucial, 
question is: how can this moral constraint be justified? In particular, how do the Stoics 
suppose it is compatible with eudaimonism as a theory of what we have reason to do? 
The Justification of Stoic Impartial Concern
 We can begin by asking what sort of normative force underwrites social 
oikeiosis. The Hierocles passage begins by sounding like a description, but is clearly 
supposed to carry normative import.153 What we need is a justification of the 
normative story, one which tells us not merely that we come to regard others as the 
account of social oikeiosis suggests (whether or not this account is descriptively 
plausible), but that we ought to do so —that we have reason to do so. What source can 
the reason-giving force of social oikeiosis have?
 The story has to be that impartial concern connects is necessary somehow for 
eudaimonia. The Stoics are as committed to eudaimonia as the source of reasons for 
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152Stoic theory is equally clear that oikeiosis does not extend beyond humanity, to animals. Cf. Cicero, 
De Finibus III.67.
153The comparable passage in Cicero is clearly descriptive: it purports to be a characterization of a 
“nature common to all animals” (De Officiis I.53-4).
action as are Plato and Aristotle.154 So we need to determine just what that 
connection might be. How is impartial concern essential for eudaimonia?
 One way to connect impartial concern and eudaimonia would be through the 
Stoic conception of virtue. Suppose we accept the claim (again, one the Stoics shared 
with Plato and Aristotle) that virtue is necessary for happiness. Now if we could show 
that virtue requires Stoic impartial concern, we would have the connection we need to 
make. But what conception of virtue can at once be thought necessary for eudaimonia 
and require Stoic impartial concern? How are we to flesh out such a conception of 
virtue?
 The Stoics do so through the notion of nature. We have already seen how part of 
this story is supposed to go. Suppose that impartial concern is natural for us — that 
not to have such concern is in some way a violation of our nature. If “following nature” 
in this way is an essential element of virtue, and virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, 
then we have the requisite connection between impartial concern and eudaimonia. The 
Stoics in fact believe not just that following nature is essential for virtue, but that it is 
identical with virtue. Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics hold that “virtue is a 
disposition in agreement” with nature; and that it is “perfectly in accord with nature 
for a rational being, qua rational” (VII.89, 94). So nature requires that we have 
impartial concern, following nature is virtue, and virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. 
Ergo, impartial concern is necessary for eudaimonia.
 Obviously this story doesn’t fly without more being said about “nature,” why it 
is a requirement of nature that we have impartial concern, and why “following nature” 
is virtue. So we need now to consider Stoic thoughts about nature.155
112
154Cf. Stobaeus: the Stoics “say that being happy is the goal for the sake of which everything is done 
and that it is itself done for the sake of nothing else” (Anthology 2.6e, IG II-95).
155Troels Engberg-Pedersen argues for an alternative connection. On his view the descriptive account 
is inherently normative, because it is what a fully rational, right-reasoning human agent will do (1986). 
This approach merely relocates the problems we are grappling with without solving them. What it is 
about what the fully rational person sees that commands this response? The same issues I shall raise 
below arise in his account, albeit in somewhat different form.
Nature
 Nature plays several important roles in Stoic doctrine. It is, as I have suggested, 
the focus for the Stoic conception of eudaimonia. According to Cicero, the Stoics held 
that our final end is “to live in agreement and harmony with nature” (De Finibus 
III.26). More specifically, “the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a 
knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with 
nature and rejecting what is contrary to it” (ibid. III.31). Indeed, for the Stoics the 
expression ‘living according to nature’ is equivalent to the expression ‘living well,’ as 
well as to ‘virtue’ (Stobaeus 6e, IG II-95).
 But there is an ambiguity in ‘nature’ as it features in the Stoic conception of our 
final end and in its other Stoic theoretical applications. One way to understand it is as 
human nature —the way we humans are as a species, in particular as rational 
animals. The other is as what may be referred to as cosmic Nature (following Long 
1971, ‘Nature’ with a capital ‘N’). The roles played by these two forms of nature vary 
among Stoic accounts, and it is controversial among modern scholars whether, or to 
what extent, cosmic Nature must be invoked to defend Stoic ethical precepts.156 But 
let us begin by considering just how far an argument for impartiality can go by 
considering only human nature.
 The simplest construction of an argument for Stoic impartial concern from the 
Stoic conception of human nature may be something like this.157 The upshot of the 
process of personal oikeiosis is that we come to identify ourselves with and value most 
our rationality. We see that the exercise of this rationality is our good as human 
beings, and the source of value for us. This recognition, however, is captured in the 
metaphor Hierocles gives us of the first stage of social oikeiosis — “the first and 
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156Annas argues that early Stoics (Cleanthes excepted) generally did not make essential use of cosmic 
Nature for ethical theory, and that its role in later Stoic accounts marks a significant change in Stoic 
theory (Annas 1993, pp. 160ff), although this claim is somewhat moderated in Annas 1995b.
157Nothing like a version of this argument appears in the Stoic texts. The closest is Cicero’s argument 
that “the power of reason, unites one man to another” in De Officiis I.11-12. However, that argument is 
too weak to support impartiality as opposed, say, to a limited and partial altruism. So the argument 
presented here is all surmise and reconstruction. I thank Julia Annas for suggesting how it must go.
nearest circle is the one which a person has drawn around his own mind as around a 
centre...” We can redescribe the process of social oikeiosis from this perspective as one 
in which we come to recognize that this thing which is most truly valuable in ourselves 
is present in others as well.158 In virtue of the rationality we can recognize in even the 
proverbial “furthest Mysian,” we come to affiliate or identify with others as bearers of 
rationality. Since this feature of ourselves is what we recognize as most distinctive and 
valuable, we recognize that the distinctions which obtain between individual people —
even such commonsensically important features such as whether or not they are 
family or friends or countrymen — is overwhelmed by the magnitude and value of 
what we have in common with all other people in virtue of our rationality. The reasons 
we might offer for partial concern turn out not to be genuine reasons after all, and at 
that point we understand that partiality on any basis is simply arbitrary and 
unwarranted.159 The only appropriate stopping-point for the kind of concern we begin 
by having only for ourselves is the whole human race.160 As Annas puts it, “The fact 
that someone is a remote Mysian rather than my father, say, is not a rationally 
defensible difference from the moral point of view” (Annas 1992, p. 141). The fact that 
this man is my father is much less significant than the fact that he, like all other 
hums, is rational. But likewise the fact that the furthest Mysian is rational is more 
significant —significant to me as rational — than the fact that this man is my father. 
So there is no basis for partiality either to oneself or those who might fall, on 
Aristotle’s view, within the reach of commitments of philia. Impartial concern is due to 
everyone.
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158In terms we have used earlier, we ascribe agent-neutral, not agent-relative, value to rationality, 
whether it is in us or in others.
159Cf. Engberg-Pedersen: “Reason has not provided one with any more justification for acting on one’s 
own behalf than for acting on the behalf of any other individual” (1986, p. 175). Compare Annas: 
“Failure to be impartial is displayed just as much in favoring one's spouse or friends as in favoring 
oneself” (Annas 1992, p. 145).
160Presumably, we stop there because animals do not have the requisite form of rationality and we 
don’t know of any other creatures that do. Rational aliens would, on the Stoic account, presumably be 
entitled to impartial concern.
 The problem with this argument lies in what we are to make of the culmination 
of personal oikeiosis. Personal oikeiosis is a process by which a rational (human) 
creature progresses from a merely instinctual striving for what is needed to sustain it, 
to the employment of reason instrumentally to get what it needs, to the crucial step at 
which it recognizes that the reason it has been using has its own distinctive and 
superior value — a kind of value that is incommensurable with the value of the kinds 
of things it was using reason to get. There is an awakening to the distinctive value of 
reason that changes everything for the rational agent. In a famous passage, Cicero 
offers an analogy for this process:
as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another 
values this new friend more highly than he does the person 
who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no 
means surprising that though we are first commended to wisdom 
by the primary natural instincts, afterwards wisdom itself 
becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we 
came to her. (De Finibus III.23)
How are we to understand what is grasped at the crucial point? Annas glosses the new 
insight as seeing that what matters is not getting or even seeking things per se but 
rather having and acting upon the right reasons for doing so: the upshot of the proper 
development of reason is seeing that “it is the reasons we act on that matter, not the 
consequences of acting on those reasons” (1993, p. 263).
 This is plainly false as a bit of descriptive psychology or anthropology. At best it 
is true in only a limited set of cases. It is clear that most people do not come to regard 
themselves this way — to see as what is most crucial about them that they act upon 
the right sorts of reasons.161 But the theory need not be construed as descriptive. As 
Annas observes, it is better understood as a normative account of how we should 
develop (1992, p. 43; 1993, p. 177).
 But this generates a further problem. At the culmination of personal oikeiosis, 
we identify with our rationality, as the capacity to be moved by reasons. But what is to 
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161Even if they do, they may, as Aristotle believed, ascribe only agent-relative, not agent-neutral, value 
to that feature of themselves.
count as a reason? We have, at this stage of the argument, a formal — rather than a 
substantive — account of ideal rationality. We see that we are (or are to be) creatures 
who act on reasons, but we do not yet know what counts as a reason for us.
 The situation confronting the Stoic argument is parallel, in certain respects, to 
the problem Kant faces in the Groundwork, where he makes the conceptual move from 
a will which excludes as its principle of choice any “empirical inclination” and thus 
must be determined by the representation of law itself, to the Formula of Universal 
Law as a substantive representation of the requirements of duty (400ff). The Stoics 
need to connect the outcome of personal oikeiosis formally considered as a condition in 
which we recognize that the only thing of value is acting rationally, to a substantive 
conception of rationality in which the reason-giving force of human nature is 
recognized as supplying the content of the reasons which personal oikeiosis leads us to 
value.
 No such connection is made in the extant Stoic texts. Further, there is a serious 
problem in attempting to make one by relying solely on a conception of human nature. 
For it is the nature of that nature (as it were) that we are trying to make out.162 
Suppose we grant that it is our nature (at least ideally) to act upon reasons, and that 
our eudaimonia lies in being reason-directed in this way. Now we ask what is 
reason-giving for us — that is, what reasons do we have to act upon? A dilemma 
confronts us.
 One horn of the dilemma is to see our good as perfecting our human nature as it 
develops through personal oikeiosis. That is, we see our rational activity as the 
perfection of a process begun instinctively and non-reflectively in us (as in all animals) 
from gestation forward. The problem is that in fact these processes seem to highlight 
the partial attachments we form to other people. In particular, as the Stoics 
themselves emphasize, the bonds between parents and children are the paradigms of 
attachment to others, and that would suggest that the proper task of rationality is to 
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162A point Annas recognizes: “For the ethical appeal to nature to have any real application... we need a 
theory of human nature that is less controversial than the practices and institutions in question” (1997, 
p. 189).
perfect the attachments of this sort that we have with family and other loved ones. 
This line of thought appears to lead to a rather Aristotelian account of philia, with its 
emphasis on relationships of commitment to particular others, rather than to Stoic 
impartiality. But it is supposed to substantiate the claim that partiality is 
unwarranted. Why should we be rationally required to transcend our natural 
inclinations to partiality, given that they are as developmentally and psychologically 
primary as they are —that they form as large a part as they do of nature’s plan for our 
early development?163 This horn of the dilemma seems to be at a loss to resist an 
Aristotelian conclusion as to the culmination of personal oikeiosis.
 The other horn of the dilemma is to focus on our rationality itself as the 
reason-giving feature that is common to human beings; on this tack this shared 
rationality is the all-important source of reasons for action. This preserves the defense 
of impartiality as against Aristotelian partiality, but at the risk of vacuous circularity. 
It is just the project of trying to understand what it is to be rational in the way 
humans should be that we are engaged in. This horn of the dilemma leads to the claim 
that what is important for us as rational beings is to act upon the recognition that it is 
important for us to act rationally, that is, as beings who recognize that it is important 
for us to act rationally. This is not very helpful as a substantive account of the reasons 
we will act upon as rational beings, as the culmination of personal oikeiosis. Since the 
substantive normative content of human nature is exhausted by our rational natures, 
we cannot flesh out what we, as rational beings, are to take as reasons without 
appealing to something beyond our human nature so conceived: either to a broader 
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163Engberg-Pedersen makes the point this way: 
The Stoics start developing their claim about the good from a 
consideration of what accords with a man’s nature and they maintain 
that viewpoint right through. But ‘natural’ goods [such as health, a 
good wife, intelligent and flourishing children, etc.] do accord with a 
man’s nature (and the Stoics admit that when they start their account 
of the good precisely from those goods), and these goods continue to be 
in accordance with a man’s nature no matter what more one will have to 
say later about man's nature and things that accord with it. (1986, p. 
145)
conception of our nature (e.g. as more than merely rational), which seems to invite 
Aristotelian lines of argument, or to some further source of content.164
 One might think there is a third alternative here, one which appeals to the 
notion of virtue to give content to our reasons. Perhaps in becoming virtuous we come 
to grasp how we fit into our environment and what sort of interaction with it is 
natural, and the content of our reasons comes from this grasp.165 Now the problem 
with this alternative is not so much that it must fail, but that if it succeeds it defers, 
rather than offers, an answer to the question we are asking. It says, in effect, that only 
from the perspective of virtue can we grasp the content of our reasons. Since we who 
are doing the inquiring are presumably not virtuous,166 that means that we are not 
capable of grasping the answer. If that is right, then our inquiry will have dead-ended. 
But before we accept this pessimistic (for us) conclusion, we ought to see if there are 
other avenues for justifying Stoic impartial concern. If there are not, we shall have to 
consider what to make of a situation in which the Stoics claim to have answers to our 
questions, but that they are answers we can’t see or understand.
 Another possibility is to see our reason as responding to a cosmic or universal 
world of natural order. We get a substantive account of what we have reason to do, 
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164Kant solves an analogous problem by claiming, famously, that the formal nature of our practical 
rationality generates the content of maxims of action through the Categorical Imperative. Of course, his 
view has long been criticized for being “empty formalism” on this score. But even if that is wrong, Kant 
can draw on the resources of his transcendental idealism and the idea that there is a noumenal self that 
gives shape to practical rationality. The Stoics — being materialists — do not have the same sort of 
resource to ground a substantive account of the content of reasons in the formal nature of our 
rationality.
165An alternative, and I believe less satisfactory, form of this alternative is this: we see our interests in 
e.g. health, food, and similar “indifferents” as reflecting their instrumental value in enabling us to be 
virtuous and consequently happy. This is not, I think a line the Stoics should take, for a number of 
reasons. One: the source of the value of such indifferents would be our eudaimonia, albeit only 
instrumentally and indirectly, and this the Stoics roundly reject. Two: such things can be used either for 
virtue or for vice, so their instrumentality is neutral between virtue and vice (this is Ariston’s point). 
Three: this move would seem to allow for a degree of commensurability between virtue and these 
indifferents which the Stoics reject. In this respect it is significant that the Stoics generally advert not 
to any instrumental value but instead to the “selective value” the preferred indifferents have in virtue of 
the fact that they are “according to nature” (cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.107, IG II-94). I thank Tom 
Christiano and Scott Labarge for discussion on this point.
166The Stoics are pretty clear that the virtuous are very few and far between. The demands of virtue 
are great, and “there is nothing in between virtue and vice” (D.L. VII.127), so most of us spend our lives 
in the latter category.
that is, by understanding how cosmic Nature intends things to go. This is the way 
many scholars have understood the Stoics as arguing,167 so we should not give up 
before exploring it.
Cosmic Nature
 John Cooper argues that we must grasp the Stoic conception of cosmic Nature to 
get a complete grasp of the Stoic conception of the requirements of rationality and 
morality:
we need especially to ask how and why it should be thought 
‘natural’ ... to adopt the very peculiar and certainly quite 
counterintuitive policy of regarding everything else besides 
fully rational and virtuous action as having no value except 
what I have called ‘pursuit’ or ‘avoidance’ value. I will 
argue that one cannot even begin to understand the reasons 
for this unless one takes into account, in conceiving the 
nature we are to live in agreement with, what Chrysippus says 
about the relation that holds between our natures as human 
beings and the single nature of the whole world. (Cooper 
1996, p. 271)168 
Cooper suggests that we should see human nature as a part of and in concord with 
universal or cosmic Nature — nature, that is, understood as everything we know. This 
connection emerges very clearly in Diogenes Laertius, who attributes to Chrysippus 
the view that this connection is essential:
Again, “to live according to nature” is equivalent to living 
according to the experience of events which occur by nature, 
as Chrysippus says....For our natures are parts of the nature 
of the universe. Therefore, the goal becomes “to live 
consistently with nature,” i.e. according to one’s own nature 
and that of the universe, doing nothing which is forbidden by 
the common law, which is right reason, penetrating all 
things, being the same as Zeus who is the leader of the 
administration of things. And this itself is the virtue of 
the happy man and a smooth flow of life, whenever all things 
are done according to the harmony of the daimon in each of us 
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167Among modern scholars, Cooper, Engberg-Pedersen, Irwin, Long, and Striker all endorse variants 
on this way of understanding Stoic ethical argument.
168Cf. Long 1996 for a similarly strong way of understanding Stoic ethical theory.
with the will of the administrator of the universe. 
(VII.87-8, IG II-94)169
There are enough identity and equivalence claims here to fund a small deductive 
system, but we need to focus only on the notion that living according to nature is living 
according to the nature of the universe. This claim is interesting for the Stoics, 
because they held that the nature of the universe is rational:
in the final analysis the only thing which is perfect is that 
which is perfect in accordance with universal nature; and 
universal nature is rational. (Seneca, Letters on Ethics 
124.14, IG II-110)
Zeus, the administrator of the universe, embodies cosmic Nature and imposes a 
rational design, a telos, on the universe in which we live and act. Moreover, this design 
is not only rational but benevolent. It seeks and promotes our good:
that which benefits in accordance with rational judgment is 
superior to that which does not benefit in this way; but 
nothing is superior to god; and benefiting in accordance with 
rational judgment is nothing but attending to man; therefore 
god cares for and attends to man. (Clement, The teacher 
1.87.83.2, LS 60I)
If we grant both the rationality and the benevolence of the design of cosmic Nature, 
then, can we can get an account of what we have reason to do as rational agents? The 
Stoics say that we should seek a “smooth flow of life in accordance with nature,”170 but 
what does that tell us?
 Maybe the nature of cosmic Nature (as it were) gives us a pointer as to what is 
pertinent about human nature in discovering reasons for action. Cosmic Nature is 
behind our human nature, and it is both rational and beneficent, and maybe that gives 
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169He goes on to say: “By nature, in consistency with which we must live, Chrysippus understands both 
the common and, specifically, the human nature. Cleanthes includes not only the common nature, with 
which one must be consistent, and not the individual.” The explicit identification of “human nature” 
here appears to give credence to Annas’ position; however, the concern of this passage seems to be more 
whether our individual natures or our (shared) human natures are important, rather than whether it is 
human nature or cosmic Nature that matters. But the dispute between Annas and the more common 
view is hashed out extensively in Annas 1993 and 1995b, and Cooper 1995 and 1996; I have nothing to 
add to it, and it is not crucial for the questions I am asking here, so I will say no more about it.
170Cf. Cooper: “nature is a benevolent, reasoning agent ... Nature is something to be followed for that 
reason” (Cooper 1996, p. 272).
us reason to accord special value to the rationality that is part of our human nature. 
What is important —what we should act on —is the possibility of recognizing and 
subscribing to the cosmic order.
 The idea would be, once again, that personal oikeiosis leads us to the point 
where we realize that the only thing that is really good for us is acting upon reasons. 
When we look at what reasons we really have, we recognize that ultimately it is the 
rational and benevolent plan of the cosmos that is the ultimate source of reasons, as 
Striker puts it that “the only thing that really deserves to be called good is the order 
and harmony of the universe” (1996, p. 268).171 Stoic impartial concern for others 
might on this account be vindicated as part of this appreciation for cosmic Nature. We 
realize that we are part of its grand order, and likewise that our fellow human beings 
are too. Thus Cicero: 
we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to 
whom we have given birth. From this impulse is developed the 
sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; 
this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their 
common humanity requires that one man should feel another man 
to be akin to him....It follows that we are by nature fitted 
to form unions, societies, and states. (De Finibus III.63)
Cicero is not concerned here to fend off worries that Nature may have intended for us 
to have partial concern for others; his thought is clearly that it is part of the order of 
Nature that human beings develop a concern for other humans merely in virtue of 
their humanity. Cosmic Nature has no rational grounds for preferring one of us to 
another, or for partiality to one person’s projects or desires over another’s. 
Consequently, there are no rational grounds for us to prefer ourselves to others, or to 
accord special importance to our own projects or desires. When we find our place in the 
cosmic order, our recognition of that place undermines any partial preferences we 
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171Cf. Long: “Nature stands to man as a moral law commanding him to live by rational principles, viz. 
those principles of thought and action which Nature, a perfect being, prescribes to itself and all rational 
beings (1971, p. 101).
might have, and we are driven to an impartial recognition of the value of each other 
person as a rational part of the rational cosmic whole.172
 Apparently the idea that cosmic Nature is rational must bear an enormous 
amount of weight. But even if we grant that Nature is rational, we need to understand 
what that comes to. In us, rationality consists in our capacity to act on reasons, though 
to understand what that comes to we also need to know what sorts of considerations 
are reasons for us. Don’t we have the same problem recapitulated for cosmic Nature? 
How are we supposed to know what counts as a reason for Nature and what doesn’t? 
And until we grasp that, how can we get the substantive practical conclusion the 
Stoics are arguing for here?173
 There is a further source of worry here. Whether we focus on human nature or 
on cosmic Nature to get content for our reasons, the implication is that our partial 
concern for others must be superseded by impartial concern. The very nature of partial 
concern itself has also been transformed, because our understanding of the interests of 
ourselves and our loved ones must also be transformed. Only our virtue really matters; 
every other aspect of us — our health, our projects, even our continued existence — is 
of only “selective” value. It is something we should seek only insofar as it is in the 
order of cosmic Nature to tolerate or sustain; if Nature removes it, we have no cause 
for complaint, because we have sustained no loss. If we are rational, then, we will 
regard others in precisely this light. Here is how Cooper makes the point: 
the Stoics want us to do more than accept [things such as the 
loss of one’s child to a horrible death from cancer at age 
15] as inevitable losses....We are to think of them as no 
losses at all; we are not just to accept but to welcome them, 
and welcome that not just, I take it, as what the universe 
needed, but as what we as part of that universe needed too. 
(1996, p. 274).
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172Cf. Cooper: this view of Nature supports “the famous Stoic insistence that we have duties of justice 
and humanity to all human beings merely as such: observation of nature gives us many bases, they 
think, for supposing that we were ‘made’ for that sort of thing” (Cooper 1996, p. 272).
173 A related worry is Long’s: “How is a man to know whether his reason meets [the condition of 
consistency with Nature]? As far as I can see, the Stoics gave no satisfactory answer to this question.” 
(Long 1971, p. 102).
Striker, too, is troubled by the Stoic account of the happy human life because it 
requires disturbing attitudes towards others and their welfare. “It is disconcerting,” 
she says, “to be told that the wise person will indeed love her friends, if they are 
virtuous — but not to the extent of being distressed if one of them dies, or longing for 
them when they are absent, or being pleased upon seeing them again” (ibid., p. 275). 
Stoic doctrine, in short, “makes us indifferent to things we ought to appreciate” (p. 
278).
 Is this really an advance in the direction of a more substantive and acceptable 
conception of what we have reason to do? Our project is to explore whether an account 
that adopts eudaimonia as the exclusive source of reasons for action can accommodate 
certain intuitions about how others ought to be treated. These include the notion that 
at least some others (friends, family, loved ones) are entitled to be treated as though 
their welfare, interests, and projects are reason-giving for us independently of their 
contribution to our own welfare. Furthermore, we are obligated not to harm others, to 
keep our promises to them, and to render aid to them even if not doing so advances our 
own interests. But the Stoics have redefined what is the interests of these others in 
such a way that our original intuitions are to be jettisoned. I am not to desire my 
daughter’s health, for example, or believe that it matters (to me or to her), but instead 
to seek it only so long as the universe “needs it,” and if and when it goes, to reject the 
idea that anyone has suffered any loss at all.
 The Stoic will reply that our intuitions here are defective, that they are based 
on a false notion of value which accords value to something other than virtue. In 
general, however, they characterize their view as consistent with our intuitions.174 
And we have already been warned that the structure of Stoic theory is holistic; maybe 
we should not be surprised that we are not persuaded by tearing at just a piece of it. 
Moreover, the Stoics have a natural explanation as to why we just aren’t getting it. We 
who are doing the doubting are not virtuous by Stoic standards. Our doubts about 
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174This feature of Stoicism is emphasized by Annas (cf. 1992, pp. 163f). Plutarch attributes to 
Chrysippus the view that Stoic value theory is “most in harmony with life and connects best with the 
innate preconceptions” (On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1041e, LS 60B).
these matters are the effects of our benighted vicious condition, whereas with the 
wisdom of virtue the Stoic sage can see the answers to our questions. Why should the 
Stoics have to give answers that are persuasive to the ignorant?
 Ought we to be satisfied with such a reply? I will conclude my assessment of the 
Stoics by taking up this question. Doing so forces us to confront the question what 
would count as a successful reply to the objections we are considering.
Conditions of Success
 We saw in Chapter 2 that the best account Plato can give of something like 
respect turns on knowing and having one’s soul ordered by knowledge of the Good. 
Since we lack that knowledge, that limited the help he could provide for our enquiry. 
Now we find the Stoics making a similar claim, and with even more force. Because we 
are not virtuous, we do not understand the way that following Nature gives us reason 
to respect others, to be impartially concerned with all other humans merely as 
humans, as virtue requires us to do. Should we count these conditional replies — if we 
had the requisite insight or knowledge, then we could see how our worries are to be 
met — as adequate or satisfying? After all, it does seem unfair to ask for a reply to our 
questions and then insist that the terms in which Plato or the Stoics respond are out of 
bounds. This is just what Thrasymachus does to Socrates to begin Republic:
Give an answer yourself, and tell us what you say the just 
is. And don’t tell me that it’s the right, the beneficial, 
the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me 
clearly and exactly what you mean; for I won’t accept such 
nonsense from you. (336cd)
It’s hard not to feel the force of Socrates’ complaint in response:
You knew very well that if you ask someone how much twelve 
is, and, as you ask, you warn him by saying, “Don’t tell me, 
man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six 
times two or four times three, for I won’t accept such 
nonsense,” then you’ll see clearly, I think, that no one 
could answer a question framed like that.... am I not to give 
any of the answers you mention, not even if twelve happens to 
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be one of those things? I’m amazed. Do you want me to say 
something other than the truth? (337ab)
Is asking Plato to give us something beyond knowledge of the Good, or the Stoics to 
say more than that virtue yields an understanding of how Nature leads us to impartial 
concern, like asking for something other than the truth?
 I don’t believe it is. True, that we want more explanation does not demonstrate 
that the replies of Plato or the Stoics are incomplete, let alone incoherent or false. But 
they don’t answer to our concerns. They don’t tell us what we want to know; they tell 
us we’re asking the wrong questions. Does that put us in the same straits as 
Thrasymachus? It does so only if we demand a response that addresses as narrow a 
range of interests as those he recognizes. The injustice of Thrasymachus’ demands on 
Socrates stems, in large part, from the narrowness of the premises he will accept in 
support of a reply. But the range of premises we will accept are considerably broader 
than these, though we do exclude premises that will be plausible only to the Stoic sage 
or to someone with antecedent knowledge of the Good. We are more in the position of 
Glaucon and Adeimantus — of being willing to grant a wide range of premises about 
what people can have reason to do, and wanting to see that concern and respect are 
among these.175 
 From that perspective, we do not have to see the Stoics as wrong to see them as, 
in the end, unresponsive. Our project grants the validity of the objections from concern 
and respect (and of the intuitions behind them) to see if a eudaimonist account can 
meet them. Instead of answering the objections, the Stoics reject them as the product 
of a kind of confused thinking. This means that the Stoic variety of eudaimonism will 
not help us to do so, even if we chalk up the deep intuitive implausibility of parts of 
their theory to our not having grasped that theory in full. We need a different strategy 
to meet our worries about concern and respect. In chapters 5 and 6 I sketch just such a 
strategy.
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175David Schmidtz makes precisely these points in his 1995 book (cf. pp. 118-9, 256-8), and I owe to 
him the analogy between our problematic and that of Glaucon and Adeimantus.
5. EMPATHIC IDENTIFICATION
There is no general doctrine which is not capable of eating out our morality if 
unchecked by the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men.
 — George Eliot, Middlemarch
 Our review of ancient ethical theories has discovered that they fail to give 
completely satisfying accounts of how respect for others can be accounted for on 
eudaimonist grounds. Moreover, though Aristotle has given an account of how 
non-instrumental concern for others can be reconciled with eudaimonism, that account 
is hardly complete. In this chapter and the next I offer my own view of how a 
eudaimonist virtue ethics can explain these intuitively-important features of our 
relationships with others, by showing that they are essential components of the best 
kind of human life — the life that each of us has reason to seek. 
 My account turns on a feature of human moral psychology which I take to be of 
the first importance, which I will refer to as empathic identification. Empathy176 is a 
significant element in other ethical theories: it is at work at various points in Aristotle, 
and it is prominent in the accounts of David Hume and Adam Smith.177 The account I 
shall give differs from these in important ways, as I shall note in my discussion. The 
most important difference is an emphasis on the normative aspect of empathy. This is 
a concern which is absent from Hume’s and Smith’s descriptive and explanatory 
psychological projects. I will sketch my conception of empathic identification and 
explain how it functions as a medium for the interpersonal transmission of reasons for 
action. Then I will argue that we have reason, grounded in our own eudaimonia, to 
cultivate the capacity and disposition to identify empathically with others. Then, in 
Chapter 6, I will argue that our intuitions regarding respect for persons can be 
vindicated by my account, and that it can fill in some of the missing elements in 
Aristotle’s account of non-instrumental concern.
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176I have in mind no sharp distinction between empathy and sympathy, but see note 35. There are 
numerous forms of empathy; here I will be interested only in the form which arises from “role-taking” or 
simulation, as I discuss below.
177As well as Arthur Schopenhauer and, in contemporary work, Martin Hoffman.
The Psychological Backdrop of Empathic Identification
 We human beings are reflective and imaginative creatures. By ‘reflective’ I 
mean that we have the capacity to think about and act in response to the world, to our 
thoughts about the world, and even to our thoughts about our thoughts. We can take 
our own mental states as objects of thought, and that is a distinctive feature of human 
cognition. 
 Not only can we take our thoughts as objects of thought, but we can think about 
and act upon representations of things that aren’t there. We can imagine things to be 
in a certain way that they aren’t, or imagine that we are in situations we aren’t, and 
we can set our practical reasoning capacities to work on these imagined inputs. This, 
too, is a feature of the way we think and function that distinguishes us from lower 
animals.
 Together, these two properties of our mental equipment have important 
ramifications for how we negotiate our ways through the world, and even more 
striking ramifications for how we negotiate our ways with each other. They allow for 
and make important our capacity for empathic identification with other people. It is 
the way this capacity for empathic identification contributes to our good as humans, I 
will argue, that explains how concern and respect for others are essential components 
of a eudaimon life, and thus how a eudaimonistic virtue ethics can account for the 
intuitions we seek to explain.
Empathic Identification Defined
 The “standpoint of empathic identification” is a way of thinking about situations 
or states of affairs as framed in a certain way, with certain features of a situation 
made salient by considering it as from a particular perspective — from the perspective 
of the person with whom we are identifying. We see things as they look from the 
other’s standpoint. Taking up the standpoint of empathic identification need not 
necessarily involve any conscious or deliberate decision to do so, although it may. For 
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the most part, I think that taking up this standpoint is natural and unremarkable: 
most people who function normally with others do it all the time, entirely 
unselfconsciously, just as they employ other techniques in the vast arsenal of human 
cognitive capacities entirely unselfconsciously.
 On my view there are two aspects to taking up the standpoint of empathic 
identification. First, we imaginatively “project” ourselves into the condition or 
situation of another person —what I will refer to as simulating them.178 By 
simulating we can “see” or experience the world as others do. We can make judgments 
informed by the situations of others by doing so, and we can experience affective 
responses to the conditions that others are in.179 We can also gain insight into 
ourselves, our actions, plans, and situations, by seeing ourselves from the perspective 
from which they see us.180 This is, I believe, an extremely important component of our 
capacity for social interaction.
 But more is required for empathic identification as I employ the notion. It is not 
enough that we merely experience the world and ourselves (imaginatively) as others 
do. We also must do so in a way which opens us to discovering reasons for action from 
such perspectives, in a way that corresponds to the reasons of those with whom we are 
identifying. On my account, what allows for the “transmission” of reasons from one 
person to another in the requisite way is the emotional components of the respective 
experiences, and in particular the emotional responses generated through empathic 
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178This is a significant departure from Hume, for whom sympathy is the result of an inference from the 
causes or effects of a passion of another to the nature of that passion. Cf. Treatise III.III.I, p. 576. My 
account here concurs with Smith, for whom what I am referring to as simulation plays an important 
role. Sympathy “arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in your situation, 
and thence conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances” (Smith 1790/1976, p. 317). Like 
Hume and Smith, my primary interest is in the way we empathize with other persons, though I believe 
empathy with animals is also possible, and may shed light on how we ought to treat them.
179Cf. Ian Ravenscroft, who defines empathy as “the capacity to bring about in ourselves another's 
affective states without actually placing ourselves in their situation” (Ravenscroft 1998).
180In Middlemarch Dorothea experiences this seeing of herself from the perspective of others (in this 
case that of  her husband Casaubon) very graphically: “her conviction that he had been asking about the 
possible arrest of all his work, and that the answer must have wrung his heart, could not be long 
without rising beside the image of him, like a shadowy monitor looking at her anger with sad 
remonstrance” (ch. XLII). This passage and others from Middlemarch are insightfully discussed in 
Hampton 1997.
identification.181 In other words, our empathic emotions, like our emotions generally, 
can be reason-bearing.182 This idea requires some unpacking.
Emotions and Reasons
 A general account of how what we perceive and experience leads to reasons for 
action would be quite complex; what I offer here is merely a sketch of what I take such 
an account to be. Moreover, a cautionary comment is needed right up front: our 
everyday use of the notion of ‘reasons’ is ambiguous, and reflects somewhat conflicting 
attitudes about it. On the one hand, there is a sense of ‘reason’ in which it is a 
perfectly objective fact whether or not I have a reason to do something, and my 
thoughts or beliefs about the matter are of no relevance whatsoever. On this sense, I 
can be mistaken in believing I have a reason to do something. If I think a glass of 
gasoline is vodka, I may think I have a reason to drink it, but I will be mistaken. This 
is the sense in which the ancients thought of reasons, and it is one I think we 
sometimes employ still. 
 Sometimes, however, we take ‘reasons’ to be things we have merely by thinking 
we have them, so that our subjective states determine what reasons we have. In this 
sense, my belief that the liquid was vodka gives me a reason to drink it. In this sense I 
wasn’t mistaken about having a reason, though I was mistaken in the belief that gave 
rise to my reason. It seems right to cite a reason to explain my doing what I did (since 
what I did was perfectly rational and intelligible), rather than to cite a mistake, or to 
give the wordy explanation for my action that I thought I had a reason when in fact I 
did not.
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181Ravenscroft believes that it is possible to simulate others while taking “off-line” the processes which 
give rise to affective responses to the simulated mental states (Ravenscroft, op. cit.). I think in general it 
is not possible to separate the affective responses from simulations as he supposes: affective processing 
plays a crucial role in the evaluative component of thought, so non-affective simulation is likely to be 
severely constrained.
182I thank Chris Griffin for this locution. The reasons emotions bear are not merely motives, which are 
the focus of the Hume and Smith accounts. Motivation is only one aspect of reasons; sometimes we have 
no reason to do what we are motivated to do, or are not motivated to do what we have reason to do. I 
discuss these matters below.
 I take it that this ambiguity in our employment of the notion of ‘reason’ tracks 
distinct roles that that notion plays in our discourse. Sometimes we use reasons to 
explain what people do, or to specify what motivated them to do what they did. In 
these cases the subjective sense seems appropriate. Other times, we are thinking of 
what justifies us in doing what we do, and in these cases the objective sense seems 
more appropriate. I do not think anything important hangs on usage, because I think 
anything that can be said using one sense can be said (perhaps more wordily) using 
the other.183 But in general when I use the word ‘reason’ I shall mean it in the 
objective sense. Eudaimonism is a view about what reasons we in fact (objectively) 
have, not necessarily what reasons we take ourselves to have, and since what I am 
attempting to give is a eudaimonistic account, in the main the reasons that are at 
issue are reasons in the objective sense. But at times I will be discussing motives and 
explanations, and in these cases the subjective sense is more natural. I will, however, 
try to be clear about my departures from the objective sense of ‘reason.’
 Let’s begin with a simple example (borrowed from Thomas Nagel, who in turn 
borrowed it from Hume) to illustrate how emotions bear reasons. If I have a gouty toe, 
and you inadvertently set the leg of your chair down on it, I will feel pain. That pain 
alerts me to a reason to act, specifically to get my toe out from under your chair. I do 
not of course reason from my pain to a decision to move my foot; the processes which 
connect my pain and what I do in such a case are considerably more compact than 
that. But that my pain bears a reason emerges in two ways. First, if you asked me to 
explain why I howled, jumped up, and thereby knocked you off your chair, I would do 
so by adverting to the sharp pain I was experiencing in my foot. That experience has 
explanatory power (I have identified what motivated me to act), and that, as observed 
above, is one characteristic of reasons: they explain why people do much of what they 
do. Second (though in this case perhaps not distinct from my explanation), I might 
justify what I did by reference to my experience of pain. My doing what I did is 
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183For an argument that what I am calling the “subjective” sense of ‘reason’ is the primary one, see 
Schmidtz, unpublished.
something which I endorse and which I expect you (once you are in possession of the 
facts) to endorse. My pain registers a kind of damage being done to my foot, and that 
damage justifies my jumping up and in the process knocking you off your seat. It 
would not, however, justify my going on a rampage, seizing a baseball bat and 
smashing everything in sight (though it might explain why I did so). The justificatory 
role of reasons is tied up with the rational endorsement of what we do, and on a 
eudaimonist account the basis for endorsement is a contribution to one’s eudaimonia. 
On my account the pain is alerting me to a connection between what is happening 
about me and to me in ways that are pertinent to my welfare and to my eudaimonia. 
That is how I discover reasons through it, and through other affective states. 
 But how do emotion and other affective processes (pleasure and pain, perhaps 
some aspects of desire) contribute to our rational capacities to detect and evaluate 
reasons? A preliminary point regards the way I am conceiving of emotions and 
affective states or processes. Here I am not, in the first instance, referring to our 
experiences of emotion — of the phenomenal nature, for example, of being in pain, or 
being angry. Instead, I am referring to the neurophysiological and anatomic processes 
which underlie these experiences. They may result in quite salient phenomenology 
(your chair on my gouty toe is one of these), or they may not. The physiological 
processes which seem to underlie the phenomena are exceedingly complex and only 
dimly understood.184 They appear to involve distinct parts of the brain (including the 
amygdala, the hypothalamus, and parts of the prefrontal cortex) as well as other 
bodily systems (the autonomic nervous system, the endocrine and various motor 
systems). But emotions thus understood need not be consciously experienced. The 
point is that whether we are conscious of them or not, these systems and their 
operations can be the physical bearers of what we, as rational creatures, understand 
as reasons.185
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184See Damasio 1994 for a good non-technical summary of the rough state of what we know about these 
processes.
185I shall not speculate on how reasons and their physical bases are connected. My project is ambitious 
enough as it is!
 Now, the starting point for eudaimonism is that all reasons are grounded in our 
interest in eudaimonia, in having a good life. My basic claim, then, is that emotions 
are connected in a vital way with this interest. This connection takes two forms. One is 
a constitutive connection: an emotional life of a certain kind is a significant constituent 
of the best kind of life. But what is important here is an epistemic connection: our 
emotions signal where our interests lie, and how our circumstances and conditions 
bear on our welfare. 
 The epistemic role of emotions is one that has emerged from the recent (and 
burgeoning) empirical and philosophical research on the psychology and physiology of 
emotion. There is much dispute over details, but in general there is agreement that in 
some way emotions reflect evaluations of our conditions. At its simplest, the idea is 
that emotions carry aversive or attractive values which cue us and prepare us 
physically and cognitively for dealing with our environment in an effective way.186
 Of course, this idea requires some defense in the context of a eudaimonist 
conception of reason and value, since simple survival is not the basis for reason or 
value as it might be for lower species with similar affective equipment. However, an 
important part of the story of eudaimonist virtue ethics is the idea seen first in Plato, 
then explicitly in Aristotle, that our emotions and desires can be shaped and trained so 
that the values they reflect conform to our rational judgment. The virtuous person’s 
emotions have been trained so that their aversive and attractive cues track genuine 
value — what we have reason to seek as congruent with our eudaimonia. They can do 
so both at a very simple level (e.g. responses of pain to violations of our bodily health 
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186The literature which supports this generalization is massive. An early and stark form of the view is 
sketched in Zajonc 1980. Jenifer Robinson discusses the startle reflex as a typical example of this role of 
emotion in Robinson 1990, and Antonio Damasio gives a thorough and detailed (though still very 
speculative) account in Damasio 1994.
 Here, as in so many other cases, Aristotle was there first. He defines passions or emotions as 
feelings which are “attended by pain or pleasure” (Rhet. II.I, NE III.5); pleasure in turn registers the 
“unimpeded activity of our natural state” (NE VII.12, 13).
or integrity) and at much more complex levels (e.g. responses of anger to denigration 
by others).187
 Here we can help ourselves to a distinctive aspect of Aristotle’s thought — that 
affect and rationality are mutually reliant in a way that is best explained by the idea 
that our affective responses embody the values that we accord objects or states of 
affairs. The structure of that interrelationship has been cogently described by N.H.J. 
Dent (Dent 1984). Dent’s idea is that we begin (developmentally, as well as 
theoretically) with a hodge-podge of desires (sense-desires and “passional” desires) 
which for eudaimonia require the imposition of the kind of principled structure that 
practical reason supplies. Virtue is, in part, the discipline of desires to agree with 
deliberative decision as to what is valuable.188 The upshot of desire so trained is this:
by our practically rational judgment and determination we 
endeavor to give to our life that shape and direction we 
think it best it should possess, one which it would not, save 
by chance, assume if we simply acted as and when we were 
prompted to do by our aroused desires. However, ... the 
endeavor to give our lives this shape and direction is not an 
endeavor which proceeds entirely separately from, nor 
necessarily in opposition to, the purposes which engage us 
out of our sense- and passional desires. It is an endeavor 
which can be, in good part, carried through the motivation 
that such desires provide; they can come to embody and enact 
our deliberatively adopted concerns precisely because we have 
so ordered them that they direct us to what is appropriate, 
in the appropriate way, with the appropriate degree of 
concern, and so on.(Dent 1984, p. 193)
It is important to note that Dent is describing a virtuous psychological state. Passional 
desires may not reliably point to one’s good; it is precisely characteristic of vice that in 
it one’s valuations (including those embedded in affective responses) are skewed so 
that they do not reflect one’s genuine good. In the normal case emotion is an efficient 
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187On this account both the identification and the recognition of value essentially involve both emotion 
and cognition. In particular, I mean to block both the Humean notion that reason cannot redirect and 
shape the values to which our emotions respond (cf. Treatise III.II.V), and the idea that value judgments 
are “cognitive” in any sense that is exclusive of any central role for affect. I think the right picture is 
that both aspects of ratiocinative activity are involved “all the way down.”
188On Dent’s account this is actually true only of passional desires. The story as to the relationship 
between sense-desires and practical rationality is more complex, but the details are not important here.
and highly reliable indicator of the values it has been trained to reflect, so without the 
right education and habituation, it will reliably reflect a mistaken structure of 
values.189 That is why my claim is the qualified one that affect is potentially a reliable 
indicator to one’s good, hence to reasons to act.
 In the ideal case, anyway, emotion plays an important role in signaling to us 
how our real interests are affected by what is going on around us. Sometimes, what it 
signals may be available to conscious awareness, other times it may not. (Our capacity 
to “feel” what is right may very often outstrip our capacity to analyze explicitly what is 
right about it.) But once the emotions are trained to track one’s real welfare 
(eudaimonia), emotional reactions are reliable signals of reasons to act, and we can be 
justified in acting on them. Emotion is an important indicator of what we have reason 
to do, and sometimes it is the only register of what there is reason to do available to 
our mechanisms of practical reasoning.
 That, in outline, is the general story of emotions and reasons which underpins 
my account. In empathy further steps are involved. Our emotions bear reasons to act 
because they can be trained to be reliable trackers of our eudaimonia. But the 
emotions that arise through empathy are, as I shall explain, tracking the welfare of 
others. My view is that empathy, in particular the affective components or 
concommitants of empathy, serves as a medium for the transmission of reasons from 
one person to another. So an account is due for the idea that the affective components 
of empathic identification can afford us reasons to act in the same way that our 
“native” emotional responses do. 
 In empathic identification, what we do first is empathize: we simulate others by 
imaginatively projecting ourselves into their conditions. Some care is required in 
specifying in detail just how we do this, but I take the intuitive idea to be simple 
enough.190 Roughly speaking, we use our imaginations to generate pretend “inputs” 
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189An Aristotelian instance of the slogan, “Garbage in, garbage out.”
190For a discussion of differences between ways of conceiving of the simulation process, see Gordon 
1995b.
into our practical reasoning and related cognitive systems. But we don’t act on the 
“outputs” of these systems as we normally would; instead we take the systems and 
their outputs “off-line” and read off of them states or outputs which we attribute to the 
person we are simulating.
 What is important for my purposes is that imagined inputs generate affective 
responses just as perceptual or other veridical inputs do.191 This means that when we 
empathize with another person, it is possible for us to feel much the same affective 
response to the situation that they do.192 Given the reason-bearing nature of our 
emotions, then, it is possible for us to take from our empathic identification reasons for 
acting that are similar to those of the target of our empathy. In this way empathic 
identification is a medium for the transmission of reasons.
 This, once again, is a greatly simplified account, and more is needed to flesh it 
out. A first point is that we must take the reason-giving force of others’ experiences to 
be reason-giving in roughly the way they do. Thus, if I set the chair down on your sore 
foot, from my empathic identification with you in your pain, I discover a reason to go 
get some ice and a towel for your foot, in a way that is similar to your reason to seek 
ice and a towel for your foot. This qualification is to block a way of misunderstanding 
what empathic identification might allow. Suppose a person were “bent” so as to get 
sadistic pleasure from causing other people pain.193 One might think, then, that it 
would be to the advantage of such a person to cultivate their capacities of empathic 
identification so as to get really good at determining just what will cause others the 
most pain, and thus generate for themselves the most pleasure. This, on my account, 
would not be empathic identification, but a perversion of it, because the normal 
135
191The literature here is scattered but ample. For an example, see Taylor and Schneider 1989.
192The same is also true of fictional characters. Good representational art (literature, film, perhaps 
other media) creates such characters in the expectation that we will empathize with them, and I take 
the value of such art in part to rest on that possibility. The nature and value of empathic engagement 
with fictional characters is, I think, a fascinating issue, but one I cannot take up in more detail here.
193Thinking about these sorts of pathologies as ways of being “bent” is due to C.S. Lewis.
reason-giving valence of the experiences of others would be inverted.194 Here the 
notion of valence picks out, as it does in chemistry and psychology, both the polarity 
(the positivity or negativity) and the amplitude of a response to an experience. On my 
view, it is empathic identification with the reason-giving force of others’ experiences as 
they experience them which is both a crucial component of the eudaimon life, and 
which explains concern and respect for others.
 I have broached the notion of the valence of reasons here because it picks out 
what is pathological about the ersatz “reasons” the sadist gets from his victim’s pain, 
but more needs to be said about the form or nature of genuine reasons as they are 
transmitted. Suppose that reasons are responses to value, and that, following Irving 
Singer, we can distinguish kinds of value.195 One kind is what I shall refer to as public 
value. Things have value of this sort when they have properties that are very 
generally and publicly recognized as satisfying people’s needs and desires. For 
example, a car has public value insofar as it is reliable, comfortable, fun to drive, and 
so on.196 Private value, in contrast, is the value a thing can have insofar as it satisfies 
some particular individual’s needs, desires, or motivations. My teddy bear had private 
value for me that greatly eclipsed its public value. 
 Both of these categories of value reflect the degree to which a thing answers to 
antecedent desires, needs, or motivations, but a third category of value is what Singer 
refers to as bestowal value. This is a value that does not exist prior to the act of 
bestowal. Singer maintains that this form of value is typical of value a lover ascribes 
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194Max Scheler characterizes such cases as ones in which “vicariously visualized” feeling is present but 
participation in feeling is absent (Scheler 1954, p. 14). My point here is not a distinction among feelings 
or affects, as his is, but instead the reasons that arise in such pathological cases from the affective 
states involved.
195Singer 1984, ch. 1. He refers to these categories (respectively) as objective appraisal value, 
individual appraisal value, and bestowalvalue. 
196Public value should not be mistaken for agent-neutral value. It is instead a generalized conception or 
summary of the individual agent-relative value which the thing in question has for lots of individuals. It 
is clear from Singer’s account that this is the way he conceives of it. Speaking of the objective appraisal 
value of a house, Singer says that “it exists only insofar as there are people who want the house” (Singer 
1984, p. 4). There is nothing about the house to command valuation by people whose needs and desires 
it would not meet.
to his beloved: the beloved comes to have a value for the lover which is not merely her 
public value nor her private value (for him) — it is a value she acquires for the beloved 
solely in virtue of his bestowal of it.197
 Now, the nature of the reasons we get through empathic identification varies 
depending on the nature of the value to which the reasons of our target correspond. If 
our target has a reason in virtue of some public value, we will get a reason of the same 
type through seeing what he sees about that value. Suppose the target of my empathic 
identification has a developed an appreciation for the ballet. One way for me to acquire 
a similar sort of appreciation is to try to see ballet as he sees it. If I succeed, I can 
recognize and respond to those features of the ballet which give it public value, and 
when I do, I will have just the same sort of reasons for e.g. seeking and promoting 
ballet that he does.
 This is not the case with private value, and even less with bestowal value. In 
these cases the reasons we get through empathy are “filtered” through the relation of 
our target of empathic identification to what she values or has reason to seek, and it is 
that relation which we get reason to promote. If my friend loses glasses which she 
needs to read, then in empathizing with her I don’t get a reason to find her glasses so 
that I can read, as I would if it was a public value which was giving her reason to act. 
Instead, I get a reason from the private value of her glasses to her, and that is a reason 
to find the glasses so that she can read. If I set my chair down on Nagel’s gouty toe, it 
is the private value of the relief of Nagel’s pain (to Nagel)that gives Nagel reason to 
act, and which is transmitted to me through my empathy with him.198 And the 
bestowal value my friend accords to his wife gives me reason to support his love for 
her, rather than to love her myself. So the nature of reason I get through empathy 
depends on the nature of the reasons which the person I am empathizing with has. In 
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197The categories listed are not mutually exclusive. In particular, I take all bestowal value to be private 
value, but not vice versa. Some private value does not require bestowal.
198This is, of course, a different story than the one Nagel tells. I address this example at length — and 
my claim that only agent-relative, not agent-neutral, value is at stake in such cases —  in Chapter 6.
any case, however, the valence of those reasons remains unchanged in genuine 
empathy.199
 This raises a final but important point about the reasons that empathic 
identification gives rise to. It would be a mistake to think that they are transmitted to 
the empathizer without the need for, or unconditioned by, the effective use of the 
empathizer’s own practical reasoning to determine what, all things considered, he or 
she ought to do. Even in empathy we need to use our own practical wisdom to 
distinguish genuine reasons from considerations that may be taken for reasons but in 
fact are not. For example, my friend might be so frustrated with his wife that he feels 
like walking out on their marriage. His experiences with her give rise to a belief that 
he has reason to do this, all things considered, and it may be important for me in 
empathizing with him that I enter into his perspective enough to appreciate what 
reason he believes he has from that perspective. But I need not take that to be reason 
for me to promote or endorse his leaving her, all things considered. One reason is that 
(unless he is virtuous) his emotions may not be tracking what he has genuine reason 
to do. Another is that, even if they are tracking genuine reasons for him, I may have 
other reasons which arise from my own observations of their relationship, and these 
may override the reasons I come to appreciate from his perspective. Though I do not 
dismiss the reasons my empathic identification with my friend gives me, what I have 
reason to do is not necessarily determined by them. The role of practical wisdom here 
is critical: while we have (as I shall argue) reason to empathize with others, we never 
have reason to lose touch with recognition of what is of genuine value, of what 
genuinely contributes to the best kind of life. All of our affective experience must be 
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199In some cases it may be the type of affective experience that gives reasons, rather than the specific 
form of that experience takes. Consider the reason-giving force of the pain which results when a chair 
lands on gouty toes. Even people without gout can empathize with the great and sharp pain which 
would ensue, at least to a degree sufficient to give them appropriate reasons to act. (Notwithstanding 
the claim that some forms of pain —I am thinking specifically of the pain of childbirth — must be 
experienced to be understood. Even in those cases, however, the fact that it is great pain is sufficient to 
justify finding reason to relieve it through empathy.)
subordinate to and trained by this insight, and our empathic emotions are no 
exception.200
 A further important aspect of practical reasoning in “governing” empathic 
identification is that it is how we as empathizers distinguish ourselves from those we 
empathize with. John Deigh distinguishes empathy from emotional identification on 
the grounds that the former, but not the latter, “entails imaginative participation in 
the other’s life without forgetting oneself” (Deigh 1995, p. 759). Similarly, Robert 
Gordon writes of the need to “contain” the “emotional contagion” we get from others: 
The decision-making we perform in simulating another must 
itself be segregated from our own decision making; it must be 
decoupled from the mechanisms that ordinarily translate 
decision making and intention formation into action. Here, 
too, only a thin line will separate one’s own mental life 
from one’s representation of the mental life of another. 
(Gordon 1995a, p. 739)201
However thin this line may be, it is bright. Part of the virtue of practical wisdom 
involves not subordinating our own decision-making to that of others, as would be the 
case if we automatically took, via empathic identification, what another sees as 
sufficient reason to do, all things considered, to be sufficient reason to act upon 
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200The role of practical wisdom explains how a couple of important objections can be blocked. First, it 
need not be thought that my failure to appreciate what seem to be reasons to my friend as reasons, 
indeed as decisive ones, marks a failure to empathize just in virtue of the fact that I thereby see things 
as in an important way different from my friend. The norms which govern empathic identification are 
finally determined by practical reason. (I thank Julia Annas for raising this point.) Moreover, this 
explains, at least in part, how and to what degree a virtuous person may empathize with less virtuous 
or even vicious persons, even get subjective reasons through their empathic identification with them, 
but not share in their targets’ practical conclusions. I think it is possible to empathize to some degree 
even with a monster like Hitler. I can empathize with lots of his experience insofar as he is (was) 
human: his desire for loyalty, his anxiety and fear of people whom he does not understand, and so on. 
However, his emotions did not at all track what he had reason to do, and what he took himself to have 
reason to do does not become a reason for me through empathy with him.
201Scheler distinguishes “fellow-feeling” from “identification” on precisely these grounds, and addresses 
a number of forms of identification as pathologies (Scheler 1954, pp. 23ff). In his terms it is 
fellow-feeling, not genuine identification, that my view embraces.
ourselves, all things considered.202 On my account what is required by empathic 
identification is that the reasons others have become reasons for us, not that 
everything they take to be a reason become a reason for ourselves, and even if it does, 
not that it be decisive.
 What I have offered so far is only a sketch of a perspective or outlook which on 
my view is to do substantial explanatory work. I have characterized empathic 
identification as a process in which we imagine ourselves to be in the place of another 
person. In doing so we experience an emotional response similar to those of the person 
with whom we are empathizing, and, if we are virtuous, our emotions give us reasons 
for action — in this case reasons that reflect the reasons of the target of our empathy. 
Much more explication is required to fully flesh out this sketch, and important 
questions about it must remain unexplored here. We need now to turn to the critical 
question as far as generating a eudaimonistic theory is concerned. What reason do we 
have to identify empathically with others, let alone to form a disposition to do so 
naturally and unconsciously? This question is crucial, because if I hope to vindicate a 
eudaimonist theory of reasons for action, I must show that empathic identification is 
at least congruent with the best human life. In the next section I argue that it not only 
is congruent with eudaimonia, but is an essential component of the best human life.
Empathic Identification as Necessary for Eudaimonia
 Why ought we to take up the standpoint of empathic identification? 
Eudaimonism is committed to the claim that whatever reasons for action we have 
come from our interest in good lives. Thus, if we are to have eudaimonic reason to take 
up the standpoint of empathic identification —  let alone to cultivate the disposition to 
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202Cases where one decides to accept the authority of another person might be considered exceptions to 
this general claim. I am not sure this is the right way to think about submission to authority, but it does 
not in any event undercut the point made for empathic identification. Nor does the point that “peer 
pressure” can at some times be enormous to go along with the plans or actions of others, and that we 
naturally find ourselves agreeing with others’ judgments under these circumstances. I take it that it is 
part of practical wisdom to be able to resist such pressure when that is the right thing to do, and to 
accede to it when that is the right thing to do (as when a bunch of us are deciding where we want to go 
out to eat). I thank David Schmidtz for raising this point.
do so as a regular and routine way of interacting with others — we must be able to 
make sense of the idea that it is conducive to, even necessary to, the best kind of life. I 
will argue that in fact that is so, because we all have eudaimonic reason to be 
reflectively rational, and empathic identification is an essential constituent of 
reflective rationality.
 By ‘reflective rationality’ I do not intend to denote any complex psychological 
description of mental states or activities. First and foremost the idea refers to our 
capacity to take as objects of thought and evaluationour mental states themselves. We 
do this with beliefs when we consider what reasons we have for holding them. We 
aspire to shape the way we represent the world to ourselves by assessing what 
practices we have for forming beliefs generally, and what considerations should bear 
on the particular beliefs we hold.203 We try to rectify our system of beliefs (first order 
and higher order beliefs included) so as to provide ourselves with the most accurate 
representation we can get of the environment in which we live and act. 
 We try to rectify our desires, too. Here the fit of mental state to world is not the 
same as in the case of belief, but at the very least we try to organize and shape our 
desires rather than to seek them willy-nilly. We prioritize and adjudicate among our 
desires, in part by ascribing relative importance to them. This requires a reflective 
standpoint — one which is distinct from a standpoint identified with any particular 
desire — in order to adjudicate between them. So here too rectification is important, 
and reflective rationality is the means by which we accomplish it.
 Thus the conception of reflective rationality I have in mind is a fairly basic one. 
Moreover, the way in which I have set it out explains why it is natural to think that we 
have eudaimonic reason to be reflectively rational in this way, even if one does not 
accept the Aristotelian view that this sort of rationality is the dominant constituent of 
eudaimonia.  Most of us (certainly most moral theorists)agree that a life that eschews 
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203I mean to suggest neither that our epistemic practices are completely transparent to us nor that we 
have direct voluntary control over particular beliefs. But neither is it plausible to suppose that we have 
no power to improve our epistemic practices nor that by indirect methods we cannot subvert or support 
beliefs we already hold.
reflective rationality of this sort is unlikely to be a good life. That does not mean there 
are not skeptics about this claim, nor that there aren’t large numbers of people who 
live their lives avoiding reflection to one degree or another.  My account has the 
implication that people of the latter sort in so far forth live lives that are less 
worthwhile, less eudaimon, than they could be with the practice of reflection, and that 
seems plausible. About the skeptics, I will say little, except to observe that they pose a 
challenge for moral theory generally (indeed, perhaps theory generally) which it is 
beyond the scope of this project to try to meet. There is no shortage of bases for doubt 
about my account in particular, and I will confine myself to trying to alleviate those.
 Suppose, then, that we agree that our reflective rationality, as I have 
characterized it, is something we have reason to perfect, as essential to the best kind 
of human life. If it is then essential to effective reflective rationality to enter into and 
have one’s practical reason informed by the perspective of empathic identification, we 
will have eudaimonic reason to identify empathically with others. This is what I will 
try to show. There are three steps to my argument. First, I argue that we have 
eudaimonic reason to see ourselves as others see us —that we have reason to cultivate 
the habit and disposition of taking others’ perspectives in assessing our attitudes and 
conduct. Second, I argue that a natural outgrowth of this first disposition — together 
with our imaginative capacities for counterfactual and hypothetical reasoning — is 
adopting the perspective of others more generally (that is, not merely confined to how 
we appear from that perspective), and that we have eudaimonic reason to promote this 
natural development. 
 These two steps show that generally adopting the perspective of others — by 
simulating them — is something we have eudaimonic reason to do, but this is short of 
a justification of empathic identification since it does not yet show how the reasons 
others should become reasons for us through this process. This reason-transmitting 
element is what distinguishes full-blown empathic identification from mere 
simulation. The third step, therefore, is an argument that we have eudaimonic reason 
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not merely to be able to see things as others see them, but to find others’ reasons to be 
reasons of our own through seeing things so.
 Two caveats are in order before setting out the argument. First, this is a 
justificatory story, not a developmental one. Developmentally, things are more 
complex.204 Second, the account I am about to give is avowedly an instrumental one. It 
attempts to justify the development of a disposition for empathic identification in 
terms of the instrumental value of such a disposition for eudaimonia. That does not 
imply, however, that the reasons which arise from empathic identification are 
themselves instrumental — they may be, but they need not be. Once we have such a 
disposition, the fact that it is conducive to our eudaimonia to have it need not enter in 
at all to practical reasoning or acting on the basis of the reasons that arise through it, 
just as we saw, in Aristotle’s conception of friendship, that the eudaimonic value of 
friendship need not feature in either the motivation or the proximate justification of 
what I do on my friend’s behalf.205
 Step One. The first step I take to be relatively simple and straightforward. Our 
nature as human beings requires social interaction — cooperation, mutual reliance, 
toleration —to survive, let alone to thrive. Obviously it’s true that when we are 
children we are dependent on the goodwill of others to live into adulthood. But few of 
us can be (and fewer still are) self-reliant in any robust sense, even as adults. The 
advantages of cooperation, division of labor, etc., in the production of goods and 
services necessary for living — and living well — are obvious enough as to not need 
belaboring. But I take it as evident that we generally need others psychologically and 
socially as well. It is a general fact about us as human beings that we need the 
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204However, babies exhibit at least the precursors to empathic responses (sympathetic crying) within a 
day or two of birth; and other “modes” of empathy —less complex cognitively than the simulation form I 
discuss here — are in place in early childhood. Cf. Hoffman 1984.
205As opposed to the justification “full-stop” of what I do. My view here parallels Schmidtz’ argument 
that what he calls “maieutic ends” — ends to adopt ends — can give rise to final ends as well as to 
instrumental and constitutive ends (Schmidtz 1995, ch. 3). Though the terminology is different, I 
believe the structure of the views is the same.
company of other human beings. And if we are to have these needs met, we must be 
the sort of person others want to have around. 
 To some degree, we can organize and discipline our behavior and our attitudes 
towards others to serve this end entirely from within our own perspectives. We will 
learn pretty quickly, for example, that others will not take well to our lying to them or 
breaking promises to them, or harming them in various ways, and so on. But other 
social grievances are not so obvious, and are more difficult to correct. It is difficult to 
see, for example, how exactly to determine that it is the fact that we are boring that is 
driving away potential companions, if not through considering ourselves as others see 
us.
 I mentioned earlier the idea that rectification of beliefs, desires, and other 
mental states is a project for reflective rationality. Our beliefs, for example, need to be 
rectified so that they accurately reflect the world we act in. That idea has an 
important application here. As members of social communities and relationships with 
others, we need to rectify our actions and attitudes in such a way that (at least some) 
others will want not merely to cooperate with us, but also will want to have the more 
intimate and personal relationships with us which make life worth living. My claim is 
that our resource best-suited to this aspect of rectification is our capacity to see others 
as they see us — to adopt their standpoint for evaluating the implications of the kinds 
of persons we are and the kinds of things we do.206 So we have reason at least to 
simulate others to this degree.
 The second step. If the foregoing is right, then given the obvious eudaimonic 
reason we have to succeed in being involved with others productively and socially, we 
have eudaimonic reason to cultivate the capacity, and engage regularly in the practice, 
of seeing ourselves as others see us. How does this extend to the more general practice 
of seeing things generally as others see them?
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206I emphatically do not mean to suggest that this resource is always adequate, or gets things right. I 
suppose that one place we are masters at self-deception is in matters of this sort. The point is that, 
however unreliable it may be, we have no better way of calibrating ourselves to the demands of basic 
social interaction.
 An initial point might be that by simulating others more thoroughly, we can do a 
better job of making ourselves congenial to others. In other words, we can take the 
first step more effectively if we go beyond merely seeing ourselves through others’ eyes 
to seeing others’ conditions more generally. I think this is true as far as it goes, and 
that it goes some way towards explaining the eudaimonic reasons we have for 
cultivating this further capacity, but it is not the whole story.
 Consider for a moment another important feature of our practical rationality. 
We are capable of assessing and deciding upon, not only things (situations, conditions) 
as they are given to us but also as we can imagine them. This capacity for imaginative 
generation of alternative combinations of conditions and circumstances is vitally 
important to us, because it allows us to engage in counterfactual, hypothetical, and 
conditional reasoning.207 Such reasoning is valuable because it allows us to anticipate 
(with more or less success) the costs of various alternative courses of action without 
actually having those costs imposed upon us. It is thus a cheap way to learn.208 Given 
the importance of the capacity imaginatively to model counterfactual circumstances 
and conditions, we have eudaimonic reason to develop and foster it.
 Now I suggest that given this natural capacity and our reason for exercising it, 
and given the reason we have to learn to occupy others’ perspectives so as to be able to 
see ourselves as others see us, a natural development is a more general capacity 
imaginatively to model other persons’ conditions as they perceive them. We begin by 
wanting to see ourselves as others see us. At the same time we seek to enrich our 
imaginative repertoire — our capacity to exploit our imaginations of various situations 
and alternative courses of action within them, so as to improve our deliberative 
capacities. It would be odd, then, if we did not begin to consider others’ circumstances 
— as represented to the agents in those circumstances, rather than to ourselves as 
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207We might think of these as examples of simulating ourselves under other conditions.
208This argument plays an important role in Gregory Currie’s assessments of the role of imagination in 
effective practical reasoning and in interpersonal interaction. Cf. Currie 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 
unpublished.
mere observers or bystanders — as exercises in counterfactual practical reasoning.209 
In effect, then, our general capacity for and disposition to simulate others is a natural 
byproduct of two processes we have reason to perfect: seeing ourselves as others see 
us, and taking up imaginary entry-points and perspectives for practical reasoning. In 
addition to the fact that we have instrumental reason to simulate others generally (it 
simply makes us better companions), these considerations support the idea that we 
have eudaimonic reason to simulate others quite generally — to see not merely 
ourselves, but situations and circumstances, as others see them.
 The Third Step. As indicated above, however, this is not yet a justification for 
empathic identification, because we might be able to see things as others see them 
while having very different reactions than they do to what is seen from that 
perspective. Bill Clinton no doubt could simulate Bob Dole’s outlook on the importance 
of winning the 1996 presidential election. However, the reasons this outlook gave Bob 
Dole to try to win the election would not emerge for Bill Clinton, however thoroughly 
he simulated Dole’s state of mind. He might be moved in various ways by Dole’s 
disappointment, but one thing that would not come of that would be any sort of 
decisive reason for Bill Clinton to seek Dole’s election.
 While it is not a requirement of empathic identification that decisive reasons for 
acting emerge from taking the perspective of others, on at least some occasions they 
might. One problem for my account is that it seems that we could very generally adopt 
the perspective of others — come to see things as they see them — without finding 
that perception of things moving or reason-giving at all in the way that the subjects of 
our simulations do. For empathic identification to play the role required of it in my 
theory, it has to be something which generates at least some sort of reason in us 
corresponding to the reasons others have in virtue of their conditions. Simulation 
alone (as described thus far) does not obviously provide such reasons. 
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209In fact, I think that we do begin to consider others’ conditions this way so naturally that it is 
reflected in some of the most common idioms of everyday language: “If I were you I’d...”, and the like.
 The missing link is afforded, as suggested earlier, by the affective responses to 
simulation which make sympathetic reasons (reasons that arise for one person because 
they arise for another) possible.210 While I do not suggest these affective concomitants 
of simulation are inevitable, I think they are natural — they occur for most of us when 
we simulate others, unless we cultivate the habit of suppressing them. My claims, 
then, are that the affective concomitants of simulation are capable of bearing reasons 
in sympathy with the reasons of others, and that we have eudaimonic reason not to 
suppress or habituate ourselves out of such affective responses to our simulation of 
others.
 The basis for the first of these claims is the psychological fact that imagined (or 
simulated) episodes of cognition have affective consequences, roughly in 
correspondence to the affective consequences that would result from episodes of 
cognition resulting from veridical events. If you vividly imagine yourself walking down 
a dark alley (late at night, in an area known for violent crime), and further that you 
suddenly become aware of footsteps behind you, matching yours step for step, but 
steadily closing the distance between you, while when you look behind you you can 
catch at most the movement of shadow while the steps cease — pretty soon you will 
begin to experience some of the affective concomitants of the perception that these 
things are occurring. Your heart rate will increase, and your body will begin to prepare 
for fight or flight, in much the way that it would if you were perceiving rather than 
imagining these data. The same is true of the states we arrive at through simulating 
others. We can get angry at slights to those we identify with, grieve at losses to those 
147
210The relationship between sympathy and empathy is not a tidy one. I have chosen to employ the 
notion of empathy in my central conception because it reflects imaginative identification with a very 
broad range of mental states and emotions, rather than being limited to states of pleasure and pain, as 
sympathy often is. Here I introduce the notion of a sympathetic reason to draw attention to the 
connection or affinity between states that a change in one effects a change in the other. Nothing 
important hangs on the terminology.
we identify with, cringe at the pain of those we identify with.211 Simulation engages 
the affective responses that normally attend our perception and cognition.
 This need not necessarily occur, of course. We can to some degree learn to 
suppress or react perversely to the affective states that arise naturally through 
simulation. We have reason not to do this (or to the degree we do it already, to try to 
reverse the process), as I shall argue below. But our nature is such as to make us 
emotionally resonant with those whose mental states we simulate.
 We have seen that in the normal case our affective states give us reasons to act 
(at least if they have been trained in virtue). Our emotions are (potentially) reliable 
indicators as to where our good lies. Given the reason-bearing force of our affective 
states, and the fact that these states are generated through the process of seeing 
things as others see them, it should be apparent how we can acquire reasons to act 
that shadow those of the persons we simulate. Our empathetic emotional responses 
can bear reasons just as our emotional responses to our own experiences do, with one 
significant exception. I have suggested that our emotions play a natural epistemic role 
with respect to our own welfare, and that given the connection between our welfare (as 
part of our eudaimonia) and our practical reasons, our emotions thus bear reasons for 
us. But the natural link between our emotions and our welfare is missing in the case 
of our empathic identification. Here, at least in the first instance, they are yielding 
signals about other people’s welfare, rather than our own. So an additional step is 
required for our empathic emotions to be genuinely reason-bearing. In this case, we 
must ascribe or bestow the requisite value, or reason-giving force, to the good of those 
with whom we are empathizing, at least to the degree necessary to have our empathic 
emotions be reason-bearing. That we have reason to ascribe or bestow this sort of 
value on the good of at least some others I shall argue shortly. My point at present is 
that when reasons are transmitted between persons in this fashion, simulation 
becomes full-blown empathic identification. It is a way we can share in each other’s 
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211Cf. Hampton: Eliot “impresses upon us how much emotional impact is involved in fathoming, and 
taking seriously, other people as they are, with their distinctive views and experiences of the world” 
(Hampton 1997, p. 41).
reasons in addition to a more deliberative and “purely cognitive” process of adopting 
each others’ ends.
 It is through the reason-giving force of our affective states, then, and the 
“communicability” of affective states through simulation, that the reason-giving 
nature of full empathic identification is possible. There is an important role for the 
rational endorsement of the deliverances of emotion in both cases. It is evident that 
reason has this role in the case of discovering reasons in our emotional responses to 
our actual situations. Our emotions will reveal reasons only if they have been trained 
to track genuine value — what is genuinely conducive to our eudaimonia. That our 
emotions have this relation with our good is both necessary and sufficient for us to 
endorse the deliverances of emotion as reason-bearing.
 The role of reason in the evaluation and endorsement of the reason-giving force 
of our empathic emotions is even larger. In the end, it is responsible for placing the 
reasons that arise from empathizing with others into context — evaluating them in 
the light of the nature and conditions of the other, for example, and of our relationship 
to the other. But it has a prior role as well, because insofar as we shape our affective 
responses through our reflective endorsement of them, it is in virtue of this educative 
function of reason that the affective components of our empathic responses have the 
reason-bearing force that they do.
 But why should we endorse the reasons we get through empathic identification? 
Need we really accept the deliverances of our empathic emotional responses as 
reason-giving? Why ought we not suppress the process through which the interests 
and concerns of others give us reasons to act, when they may well conflict with the 
reasons which might arise from our own proper interests?
 The answer is that the complex of cognition and affect is integrated in our 
embodied brains in such a way that we can not “turn off” our natural affective 
responses to simulated perceptions and representations without also suppressing our 
affective responses to our imagination and cognition more generally. We are not built 
so as to be able to “compartmentalize” our emotional responses to imagined and 
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veridical conditions, even less to compartmentalize our responses to imagined 
situations that are “ours” and those of others that we enter into empathically.212 Doing 
so distorts the basic system of cognition and emotion which constitutes our capacity for 
practical reasoning.213 If we value that capacity for itself, that will provide sufficient 
reason not to distort it in this way. But even if we do not, the instrumental value of our 
capacity for practical reasoning for the pursuit and achievement of any other ends we 
may have surely provides such reason. The vicious person, like the virtuous person, 
has “head and heart” in agreement: judgment and emotion, affect and cognition are 
united in their direction for action. But in the vicious person violence has been done to 
native capacities for practical reasoning, and this is something we have reason to 
avoid.214
 Is this an adequate justification for the claim that we ought not alter our reason 
in this way? This question is similar to the ones raised in Chapter 4, about the 
justificatory adequacy of Platonic and Stoic accounts of our reasons for respect. It may 
be helpful here to ask, following Gregory Kavka (Kavka 1984), to whom the 
justification is due. The reasons given above will not be sufficient to persuade the 
thoroughly vicious person or the wanton (Thrasymachus or Callicles), and it is easy to 
see why it will not. The vicious person’s reason and judgment have been shaped so as 
to conform to his desires (cf. Dent 1984, Korsgaard 1986). He has, in effect, rejected 
the rule of reason in his action and his life, making of it instead a servant of his 
passions.  It should not be surprising, then, that he will not be moved by reasons to be 
otherwise. Such appeals amount to making a case for revolution to a despot. On the 
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212These claims should be distinguished from the ideas that we can train ourselves not to use our 
imaginations or not to empathize, which it is certainly possible for us to do. The present point is that, if 
we do these things, we can’t then simply disconnect the emotional consequences of those activities.
213As would attempts to conceal from ourselves the plights of others when recognizing them would be 
costly. This would amount to an emotional form of self-deception, in which one part of our mind acts not 
only to obstruct recognition of reasons for action, but also to obscure the fact that it is doing so. (Cf. 
Talbott 1997 for a description of self-deception along these lines.) Such self-deception dis-integrates our 
rational and affective capacities and is thus something we have reason to avoid engaging in.
214Dent argues that the vicious person has in effect limited his own freedom by shaping his reason in 
the way necessary for vice, as opposed to incontinence (Dent 1984, p. 210ff).
other hand, those who are not in the grip of this sort of hegemony of desire are in 
position to accept and be moved by reasons such as these, and it is these to whom the 
arguments above are directed. The success of this rationale, then, will be at least 
partly contingent on the nature of the person who assesses it. But this degree of 
contingency has both a long history and modern defenders, and the desire for a more 
categorical argument may not be a helpful one.215
 On my view there are, in effect, at least two levels of motivating and justifying 
reasons to act. At the foundation level, we have reason to seek the best kind of human 
life. This is always a justifying reason, and to a great extent it can (though it need not 
always) motivate us. It justifies us in becoming a person of a certain sort: the sort of 
person who is disposed to identify empathically with others and discover higher-level 
reasons for action which are in sympathy with the higher-level reasons those others 
have themselves, through the affective components of the process of empathizing. The 
reasons which arise from this process are not directly connected with the eudaimonia 
of the empathizing agent, as are the reasons which arise from their affective responses 
to their own conditions and circumstances. Instead, they have the reason-giving force 
they do because the virtuous agent endorses them as reason-giving; this is something 
which he or she has eudaimonic reason to do. Given this endorsement, the virtuous 
agent becomes the sort of person who is motivated by the conditions of others, and who 
can justify her responses to those conditions by citing the conditions themselves as 
reason-giving. They are, in fact, reason-giving for the virtuous person, just because the 
virtuous person has chosen to see them so.
 To summarize the argument I have sketched, then, reflective rationality is an 
essential component of the best kind of human life, and empathic identification with 
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215Recall Aristotle’s caution early in the Nicomachean Ethics that his lectures can help only someone 
who has been “brought up in good habits. For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently 
plain to him, he will not need reasons as well” (I.4: 1095b5). For a modern argument to this effect, see 
Schmidtz, who argues that “Some people in some situations have no compelling reasons to be moral. It 
is conventional to think of a successful answer to the ‘why be moral’ question as one that convinces or 
ought to convince literally everyone to be moral. This convention is a mistake, because there are real 
reasons to be moral, and the real reasons are not reasons for everyone. To look for universal reasons is 
to look for something other than the real reasons” (Schmidtz 1995, p. 258). I deal with worries about the 
scope of the vindication of reasons for respect again in Chapter 6.
others is an essential component of reflective rationality at its best. Thus, we have 
eudaimonic reason not merely to practice empathic identification, but to cultivate it as 
a disposition and as a natural aspect of our practical reasoning. I will conclude this 
chapter with a response to one worry about the psychological picture I have sketched.
Integrated Selves and Levels of Reasons
 Some ethical theories end up with a “dualism” of sources of reasons, though this 
is surely not a desirable outcome. Sidgwick’s account is notoriously of this form, and in 
contemporary work Thomas Nagel’s theory in View from Nowhere has this problem. I 
will argue in Chapter 6 that Nagel’s problem can be avoided by recognizing that 
agent-relative reasons —recognizable entirely within a subjective perspective —are 
capable of accounting for the intuitive phenomena which drive Nagel to posit an 
“objective” point of view. However, one might worry that my view is subject to its own 
duality problems. 
 There are two forms of such worries, and both stem from the fact that I have 
distinguished different “levels” of reasons which figure in justifications of different 
sorts. Ultimate justificatory questions are, within eudaimonism, always answered by 
appeal to eudaimonia, but I have claimed that proximate justifications can be and are 
given in terms of reasons based on the interests and conditions of others. One worry, 
then, is that reasons at these distinct levels might conflict in a way which destroys the 
integrity of the view as an account of practical reason.
 Recall William Wilcox’ objection to Railton’s “two-level” version of 
consequentialism, one which was designed precisely to reconcile consequentialist 
commitments to maximize utility with the sorts of commitments that are endemic to 
friendship.216 Railton suggests that one’s commitment to utility maximization — the 
“counterfactual condition” which makes one’s outlook count as consequentialist —
functions as a check on the kind of commitment to others and their welfare which 
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216Chapter 1, pp. 29f.
friendship requires. Wilcox pointed out in reply that the psychological force of Railton’s 
counterfactual condition is that one intends to do things in specific circumstances (i.e. 
to act on utilitarian grounds), and these intentions, according to Wilcox, “are too 
pervasive to leave room for the commitment to particular persons necessary for 
friendship” (Wilcox 1987, p. 79). To put the objection in somewhat different terms, 
what one has reason to do as a consequentialist, and what one has reason to do as a 
friend, are sometimes (often?) incompatible, so if the reasons given by one’s 
consequentialist commitment are to be accorded this counterfactual authority, there 
will simply be no practical room left for the reasons of friendship. The content of 
commitments to consequentialism and to friendship are in fundamental conflict, and a 
single agent cannot simultaneously hold both, without a dis-integration of his practical 
faculties.217
 I am uncertain whether this objection to consequentialism is sound.218 What is 
important is to see that in any event no comparable objection can be leveled against 
my account. On it our commitment is to become a certain kind of person, to adopt 
certain dispositions and ends, in virtue of the fact that doing so is living the best kind 
of life a human being can live. But this commitment does not function as a check — a 
“counterfactual condition” — on the responses to reasons that we acquire in virtue of 
our attachments formed in friendship or love. Those attachments include their own 
constraints —self-abdegnation and self-denigration are no part of genuine friendship 
—but our commitment to our own eudaimonia does not impose on the mandates of 
friendship in the way Wilcox is worried about. In fact, a eudaimon human life just is 
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217This, too, is an old insight. Cf. James 1:8: “... a doubleminded man [is] unstable in all his ways.” I 
thank Rhonda Smith for drawing my attention to this passage.
218In part this is due to my uncertainty as to how Railton believes the consequentialist ought to 
respond to it. Wilcox supposes that maintaining one’s commitment to consequentialism in the form of 
this “counterfactual condition” is necessary to remain a consequentialist, and I think given this 
requirement, his objection is sound. But it’s not clear that only such a commitment could count as 
genuine consequentialism. Suppose I believe that only a full-hearted commitment to friendship, with all 
the commitments it requires, will truly maximize utility. Then as a committed consequentialist I ought 
to forget about acting on the principle, “maximize utility,” and just try to be a good friend. Railton at 
points seems to suggest this approach, similar in form to the “esoteric” form of consequentialism 
Sidgwick advocates, but as Wilcox points out (p. 81) it is not clear any longer what job Railton’s 
“counterfactual condition” is supposed to be doing. But my present objective is not, of course, to assess 
the viability of various consequentialist strategies.
one in which one’s relationships with others are characterized by the kind of 
unstinting commitment Wilcox values.
 But a second form of worry waits in the wings. Even if we don’t have a lethal 
conflict between the kinds of considerations this account recognizes as reasons, still it 
may be psychologically unattractive. In particular, it may posit an undesirable sort of 
motivation for many acts of e.g. friendship or love, or require a sort of 
compartmentalization of our practical reason in order to avoid the “wrong” sorts of 
reasons creeping into our deliberations.219 When we act for the sake of a friend or 
loved one, presumably the thought that being a friend serves the end of our own 
eudaimonia is “one thought too many,” and ought not to be part of our deliberations. 
But how and why should such reasoning be excluded? Don’t we have to “segregate” our 
thoughts at the different levels in some way, to avoid this sort of motivational 
contamination?
 This was a problem for some ancient eudaimonist accounts, and Julia Annas 
has argued it is too serious to be ignored:
On a two-level view, normal human moral activity depends on 
the agent’s having two kinds of thought, but always keeping 
them carefully compartmentalized in his mind....It is clear 
that without special effort the two kinds of thought are 
bound to come into collision on occasion. But if they are 
kept apart deliberately, this would seem to be itself the 
result of a metadeliberation about the agent’s priorities; 
but if this involves a concern to avoid conflict, it seems 
that the metadeliberation must itself have considered 
together the very two kinds of thought that it is concerned 
to keep apart; it segregates them because it already knows 
that they are going to conflict....It needs to distinguish 
levels of the self. (Annas 1993, p. 241)220
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219Hurka presses this objection in Hurka 1999, p. 67.
220Annas makes this point in her discussion of Epicurean eudaimonism, which has a very different 
conception of the good than does the form of eudaimonism I am concerned with, and which in 
consequence advances a very different form of moral psychology. The sort of response I give in the text is 
simply not available to the Epicurean, but further discussion of the comparative liabilities of Epicurean 
eudaimonism is beyond the scope of the present project.
 The form of eudaimonism I am sketching not only does not require such 
compartmentalization, it actively resists it to the extent it is possible to do so. 
Reflective rationality is, as I have described, an essential part of the human good, and 
of the eudaimon life. But reflection does not require compartmentalization. It requires 
taking as objects of assessment and judgment the thoughts, attitudes, desires, and 
feelings that occur more or less spontaneously in response to one’s environment. 
Practical wisdom requires developing habits of thought and action which integrate 
these components of the “inner life” into a congruent whole; the guiding aim of living 
one’s life in such a reflective fashion ought never to be far out of mind. This is just to 
say that even in our unreflective moments we want to live and act in such a way as to 
earn our own endorsement and approval, rather than shame and guilt, and I have 
argued that cultivating a disposition for empathic identification merits this kind of 
reflective endorsement.
 A helpful model for the way this can work is developed (surprisingly enough) 
within Barbara Herman’s Kantian account. She has to confront an analogous objection 
to the role of the motive of duty. Critics of Kantian morality have argued that concern 
with duty can itself be “one thought too many” in responding to the needs of others, 
and Herman argues that this need not be so (Herman 1993, chapters 1 and 2). The 
role of this basic principle, she argues, is actually conducive to personal integrity 
rather than compartmentalization:
...insofar as in acting from emotions as motives the agent is 
able to respond ‘directly’ to the other, the regulative 
presence of the motive of duty cannot alter the direction of 
response....There is reason to encourage the complementary 
influence of emotions even when the motive of duty is 
sufficient to bring about the required action. An agent whose 
emotions cooperate with the motive of duty has a desirable 
kind of internal unity....(p. 32)221
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221Herman’s interpretation takes on eudaimonist overtones when she says that the “kind of place that 
Kantian morality is supposed to have” is as “a project whose point is to shape and limit other projects so 
that they are compatible with an ideal sense of how a person ought to live” (Herman 1993, p. 40).
The role of emotion is even more central in the roughly Aristotelian conception of 
eudaimonism I am defending, and Herman’s point applies with even greater force to 
the justificatory role of concern for one’s own eudaimonia. The desire to have a good 
life does not, under normal circumstances, motivate me to perform any specific action. 
What I normally do, practically speaking, is act on my nexus of higher-level desires, 
interests, plans, and responses to those around me. Practical wisdom requires that I 
shape these higher-level motives in a way that is guided by my eudaimonia, but far 
from needing to keep these thoughts apart, eudaimonism requires that they be as 
transparent to each other, as amenable to interlevel reflection and judgment, as 
possible. The conception of the good at work in this view recognizes that, while we are 
reflectively rational animals, we are other kinds of animals too: we have a wide variety 
of needs and interests that are not satisfied by the activity of reflective rationality. So 
it can be and often is good for us to act in nonreflective ways. Some ways of acting 
nonreflectively are ones that we can recognize and endorse reflectively, while others 
are not, and ideally the structure of reasons upon which we act is one that is open to 
our inspection and evaluation at any degree of reflectiveness. We can distinguish 
multiple “levels” of reasons, but in practice those levels are integrated by and in a 
single agent seeking a unified eudaimon life.
 This helps to explain why Wilcox’ objection is not a problem. The very content of 
the best kind of life — of eudaimonia — includes explicit commitment to friends of the 
sort we (along with Railton and Wilcox) want to recognize and endorse. This means 
that the fundamental justificatory role eudaimonia plays in an agent’s structure of 
reasons can be fully transparent to her even when her commitment to a friend incurs 
costs, in that she loses things she would otherwise like to have. She does not have to 
keep her commitment to her own eudaimonia opaque in order to act in full heart on 
her commitment to her friend, because that commitment is a part of her eudaimonia. 
She may have to give up something she would otherwise have liked to have, but there 
is nothing novel or especially intractable about having to make those sorts of choices. 
On any plausible account, agents have to choose between goods all the time. This kind 
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of choice is merely one among others in which the practical wisdom of the virtuous 
agent must come into play. Thus, concern for others within the eudaimonist 
framework is not only possible, but it is possible within an integrated, harmonized 
conception of one’s own practical agency and commitments.
Summary
 In this chapter I have laid the groundwork for an argument that eudaimonism 
is not only compatible with but champions non-instrumental concern for others, and 
requires respect for others as our intuitions demand. I have claimed that empathic 
identification with others is something which comes at least to some degree naturally 
to us, and moreover argued that it is something we have reason to cultivate as a 
disposition. If my argument is successful, I have established a connection between 
empathic identification and eudaimonia, as a concept which mediates the linkage 
between eudaimonia and respect and concern for others. But the connections between 
empathic identification and respect and concern themselves still need to be 
established. Those connections are the subject of Chapter 6.
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6. EMPATHIC IDENTIFICATION, RESPECT, AND CONCERN
... my life is not more beneficial to me than to be so disposed in spirit 
that I would not do violence to anyone for my own advantage.
 — Cicero, De Officiis III.29
 It is time for a summing-up. In the previous chapter I set out a conception of 
empathic identification and argued that our interest in living the best kind of human 
life gives us reason to cultivate a disposition to identify empathically with others. The 
next step is to argue that eudaimonism can accommodate our intuitions that 
non-instrumental concern for other persons is worthwhile, and that we are under 
constraints of respect in our treatment of others. John Cottingham has defended a 
“minimal definition of morality” which tells us to “help your friends, and do not harm 
your neighbors, [and] ‘neighbor’ here can be construed as globally as you like” 
(Cottingham 1983, p. 98). In this chapter I will maintain that a person with a 
disposition to empathic concern will have reason to treat others in ways very like those 
Cottingham proposes. Before defending that claim, however, I want to situate my 
proposal relative to the ancient views we have considered.
 The greatest virtue of the Stoic account — its reach to all humanity, irrespective 
of contingent ties of commitment via community or family — is preserved in my 
account. As Cottingham suggests, one ought not to harm others, and for this 
proscription “the furthest Mysian” matters as much as my fellow-citizen or next-door 
neighbor. But the Stoics achieve this reach only by recourse to a justificatory argument 
that rejects our intuitions as to the legitimacy of a stronger, partial concern for my 
fellowcitizen or next-door neighbor (or father, or daughter). In general, I believe, what 
is necessary is an account on which both universal respect for others and special 
(partial) concern for some few others is endorsed, and in the Stoic story the force of 
these two moral principles tends to be conflated. My account avoids this mistake.
 I take Aristotle to have demonstrated the possibility of non-instrumental 
concern within a eudaimonist framework. Here I will try to build on his account of 
philia, showing that empathic identification is congruent with and indeed helps to fill 
158
out his account of how such concern possible. On the other hand, as just noted, my 
account of respect offers a principled basis for treating all human beings justly in 
virtue of their humanity, and thus avoids the parochialism that impugns Aristotle’s 
account.
 I have ascribed to Plato the original insight that our emotions — including, 
especially, our experiences of pleasure and pain — are largely plastic and moldable in 
light of practical wisdom. This is, of course, a thread that was picked up and developed 
by Aristotle, but it is an important component of my view about how our emotions — 
including our empathetic emotions — can come to bear reasons. In this respect my 
view can rightly be seen as a development of Plato’s original insight. 
 It can in another respect as well. Recall that in Chapter 2 I argued that Plato 
had largely demonstrated that we have eudaimonic reason to seek what we might call 
“psychic justice,” but that he fell short of supplying a satisfying connection between 
psychic justice and the behavioral constraints of respect. My account offers the missing 
connection. Something like psychic justice (viz. virtue, construed as practical wisdom 
and emotion in harmony) connects with the patterns of action required by respect for 
others through features of our psychological nature as human beings. Structurally, 
then, my account resembles Plato’s, though its claims about human nature draw more 
upon Aristotle. 
 A full account of the kind of life and action engendered by empathic 
identification is, of course, beyond the means of a single chapter to provide. However, I 
will begin with a brief account of the contribution of empathic identification to the 
kind of non-instrumental concern for others broached by Aristotle. I will then sketch 
how empathic identification sustains respect for others. I conclude the chapter and the 
dissertation by rebutting two major objections to the project of extracting an account of 
respect from eudaimonist theory.
Empathic Identification and Concern
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 We have seen that Aristotle offers an account of friendship (philia) which 
suggests how a eudaimonist virtue account can make sense of non-instrumental, 
non-derivative concern for others.  Thus I take it that part of the philosophical task 
chartered in Chapter 1 of defusing this objection to eudaimonism has been 
accomplished. Here I will supplement Aristotle’s account with insights which come 
from recognizing the significance of empathic identification, and elaborate on the way 
the resulting view meets the objection from concern as it was formulated in Chapter 1. 
I do not, of course, suppose or suggest that Aristotle was thinking of empathic 
identification when he developed his account. I offer the following as a theoretical 
extension of Aristotle’s view, not as part of but instead as congruent with the 
conception of non-instrumental concern he defends as part of his moral theory.
How Empathic Identification Enriches Friendship
 Let’s begin by recapitulating what we learned from Aristotle. The problem of 
non-instrumental concern for others is met by understanding that we may come to 
care for others immediately —non-derivatively, non-instrumentally —as part of our 
own good. A significant feature of Aristotle’s account is the claim that the boundaries 
of what counts as our good are elastic, and can come to encompass elements of the 
good of (some) others.222 What he tells us is that there is a way in which friends can 
become “second selves” through the kind of intimate discourse, shared deliberation 
and activity that comprise friendships of the best sort. When this occurs, the good of 
the friend is sought immediately, directly, and noninstrumentally, rather than as a 
means to one’s own eudaimonia. The fact that having such relationships is a necessary 
part of the best kind of life is a reason — indeed is the fundamental reason — for 
having such relationships, but once one is in such a relationship it is the way that the 
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222Aristotle is quite clear that the number of others with whom we can stand in this sort of relation is 
very limited: “great friendship too can only be felt towards a few people” (NE IX.10: 1171a13). That 
might be a problem if we were justifying respect for others, since we think respect is due all others 
irrespective of the particulars of our relationships to them. But it is not a problem for concern. What 
matters is that it is possible, within a eudaimon life, to have relationships with others that have this 
non-instrumental nature. The objection itself endorses the kind of partiality which follows from 
Aristotle’s view.
friend’s good partially constitutes one’s own that provides both a motive and a 
justification for seeking it.223
 Empathic identification and the elements which comprise it fill out this story in 
at least three ways. First, the affective component of friendship is a valuable and 
finally (that is, non-instrumentally) desirable element of our friendships. We want 
friends and loved ones whose concern and appreciation for us is not merely cognitive 
but also emotional. We want their full engagement with us; cold and standoffish 
friends are not those we most cherish. But emotional engagement is a cardinal 
element of empathic identification. Since empathic identification requires and involves 
affective involvement with the target of empathy, it is one way in which such affective 
involvement with a friend comes into play. It is, of course, only one way; there are lots 
of other ways of being emotionally involved with others. The point here is just that 
empathic identification is one of these ways.
 Second, the simulative aspect of empathic identification plays an important 
epistemic role. I do not claim (and do not think it is defensible to claim) that the only 
way we can come to interpret others —to ascribe beliefs, desires, intentions, and other 
mental states to others — is to simulate them, but neither is simulation dispensable. 
It is an important way for us to come to understand the contents of another person’s 
mind.224 Thus, to the extent that intimate and committed relationships of friendship 
or love are extended and enriched by fuller understanding of the thoughts of the 
friend, the simulative aspect of empathic identification can make an important 
contribution to the best kind of friendship.
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223In this sense the end of developing and having such friendships might be what David Schmidtz 
refers to as a maieutic end: the end of acquiring a further end of a certain kind (Schmidtz 1995, pp. 
60ff). Schmidtz observes (rightly, in my view) both that having a reason to adopt a final (as opposed to 
an instrumental) end does not undercut its finality —that is, it does not reduce it to instrumentality —
and that the acquisition of final ends (including, we might suppose, the non-derivative value we come to 
accord to the good of a friend) need not be conscious or deliberate (p. 77).
224In “Simulation, Theory, and Emotion” I argue that simulation may be especially important in 
situations characterized by novelty, urgency, and significance, in which application of a “theory of mind” 
may have drawbacks.
 Finally, I believe that empathic identification should be seen as a significant 
contributor to the process of shared deliberation which, for Aristotle, is characteristic 
of the best kind of friendship. Recall first that empathic identification is of eudaimonic 
value just because it is an exercise of our practical faculties which develops and 
perfects them. Empathic identification involves coming to recognize and acknowledge 
reasons of various sorts through the cognitive and affective processes involved in 
seeing things as through the eyes of another. It amounts to acquiring reasons for 
acting through a process of simulation, allowing empathic identification with another 
to transmit reasons from the target of identification to the empathizer.
 But shared deliberation can benefit from improved practical reasoning as much 
as individual deliberation can. Shared deliberation is enhanced in two ways by the 
practice of empathic identification between friends. First, insofar as each cultivates 
the general disposition of empathic identification and becomes practically wiser by 
doing so, each “brings to the party” of shared deliberation greater practical wisdom. 
But second, and more direct, the process of empathic identification is one in which the 
empathizer comes to a sympathetic appreciation of the considerations and reasons 
which obtain for the target of identification, without losing the perspective of her own 
judgment and practical faculties. This means she is able to bring to sharpen her 
friend’s thoughts and plans through a critical perspective which is the more effective 
both because of the context of commitment and trust in which it is exercised, and 
because of the greater intimate knowledge of the target’s thinking through the bonds 
of friendship. King Solomon anticipated Aristotle when he wrote, “As iron sharpens 
iron, so one man sharpens another” (Proverbs 27:17); it is just this kind of sharpening 
which empathic identification between friends makes possible.
 I believe empathic identification can be seen as largely responsible for the 
benefits of shared deliberation which Aristotle describes. Through it, friends can come 
not only to critically engage the practical faculties of each other, but also to be moved 
to adopt ends and attitudes and to see reasons which are shared with the friend. 
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Empathic concern thus can play a vital explanatory role in a view of friendship which 
is wholly compatible with eudaimonism.
 One of the two objections to eudaimonism which are the focus of this 
dissertation — the objection from concern — has now been addressed. It remains to be 
shown how respect for persons can be vindicated by empathic identification. To that I 
now turn, and to do so I draw on two unlikely sources — John Stuart Mill and Arthur 
Schopenhauer.
Mill, Schopenhauer, and Feelings of Justice
 In Chapter V of Utilitarianism Mill sets out to reconcile to his account of 
utilitarianism the intuitions or “feelings” we have that certain wrongs — “injustices” 
—can be distinguished from wrongdoing generally. The distinction, he argues, lies in 
the fact that in cases of injustice the wrong harms some definite individual (or 
individuals), and the recognition of such a wrong is accompanied by a desire to punish 
the wrongdoer (Mill 1861/1979, p. 50).
 What is of interest here is not the general account Mill gives of justice, but his 
explanation of why injustices (or rights violations, which on his view amount to the 
same thing) excite the kind of passionate moral objection that they do. On Mill’s view, 
what accounts for this is the conjunction of two “natural” and “instinctual” sentiments: 
“the impulse of self-defense and the feeling of sympathy” (p. 50). Obligations of justice, 
he tells us, are concerned with a kind of interest which is “extraordinarily important 
and impressive”: our need for security, “to everyone’s feelings the most vital of all 
interests” (p. 53). Mill says, 
no human being can possibly do without [security]; on it we 
depend for all our immunity from evil and for the whole value 
of all and every good, beyond the passing moment, since 
nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any 
worth to us if we could be deprived of everything the next 
instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. 
(ibid.)
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What Mill appears to have in mind here is that without security, no other good can 
really be a good for us, because its capacity to benefit us in anything beyond the 
immediate present is up for grabs. Now virtue theorists will take exception to the 
claim that the good of virtue is up for grabs in this way, but Mill’s point is nevertheless 
plain enough. For our lives as embodied rational agents to be bearers of value for us —
for them to be able to possess the kind of continuity and structure that makes them 
capable of being good human lives — we must have at least some degree of security in 
them.225 And our interest in and passion for justice arise from this very foundational 
value of security. 
 Now, Mill may be thinking of justice as referring to a narrower set of issues than 
we are likely to apply it to. He is clearly preoccupied with overt sorts of harms, and we 
may be inclined to think the notion of justice applies to far more than cases of harm. 
The important point, however, is that justice as he uses the idea roughly tracks respect 
for others as we are concerned with it. Justice so understood underwrites the bare 
possibility of our existence as social creatures:
Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules which 
concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and 
are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other 
rules for the guidance of life....The moral rules which 
forbid mankind to hurt one another ...are more vital to human 
well-being than any other maxims....they are the main element 
in determining the whole of the social feelings of mankind. 
...Thus the moralities which protect every individual from 
being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered 
in his freedom of pursuing his own good,226 are at once those 
which he himself has most at heart and those which he has the 
strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and 
deed. It is by a person’s observance of these that his 
fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of human beings is 
tested and decided... (p. 58)
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225This point is made negatively, of course, by Hobbes.
226Note that Mill extends his basic account beyond acts of direct harm to include acts of confinement 
here, and in a similar way could be extended to include, say, the imposition of slavery. In all these cases 
what is at issue is a radical compromise of a person’s agency via the forceful physical intervention of 
others. It may be difficult to work out a precise account of when such interventions might be 
appropriate and when not, but there is little doubt that Mill is right that such interventions stand in 
need of justification, and that they do so for just the sorts of reasons he indicates.
 Now in Mill’s utilitarian account, the interest each of us has in his own security 
is generalized through “sympathy” to the apprehension of “a community of interest 
between himself and the human society of which he forms a part” (p. 50). Since my 
account is not utilitarian, I do not wish to argue for the same sort of extension of 
interest Mill does. Still, his conception is suggestive of the contours of empathic 
identification.
 Mill’s account of the almost visceral reactions we can have to injustices of at 
least some sorts is psychologically plausible. Acts of injustice, as instances of the kind 
of act to which we most violently object, engage the antipathy of the virtuous person 
not only when they are directed at himself, but also (through empathic identification) 
when they are directed at others, even — especially — when the agent of the 
prospective injustice is himself. 
 The basic idea here is that in the virtuous agent who has ingrained empathic 
identification as a disposition, the effects of harm (or prospective harm) to another are 
alive to him in a way similar to the way the thought of prospective harm to himself is 
alive to him. Due to the basic and vivid nature of responses to these thoughts, the 
force of reaction to prospective harms is great. In one’s own case, of course, the thought 
or image of prospective harm is quite motivating and, it is plausible to think, in 
general reason-giving. If I see your chair about to come down on my gouty toe I both 
am motivated to move my foot and have genuine reason to do so. Through empathic 
identification, however, something like that same force and vitality of the motivation 
and justification for getting my foot out of the way applies when I see it is your foot in 
the way, in virtue of my identification with you. This is true whether I see someone 
else inadvertently about to set their chair down on your gouty toe, or whether a course 
of action to advance my own interest I am considering requires that I set my own chair 
down on your toe, deliberately. The latter, of course, would normally be a case of 
injustice in a way that the former would not. The point is that the reasons you have to 
avoid the harms which would constitute my unjust treatment of you are, if I am 
empathic, reasons for me too — they are reasons for me not to engage in injustice.
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 This is precisely Schopenhauer’s suggestion as to the motivating force of 
empathy (or, in his account, “compassion”):
the first ... effect of compassion is that it opposes and 
impedes those sufferings which I intend to cause to others by 
my inherent antimoral forces. It calls out to me ‘Stop!’; it 
stands before the other man like a bulwark, protecting him 
from the injury that my egoism or malice would otherwise urge 
me to do. (Schopenhauer 1841/1965, p. 149)
Schopenhauer, indeed, believed (as I do) that the power of empathy to block unjust 
action extended not merely to bodily injury of the obvious kind but also to further 
interests that motivate us and which comprise the rough borders of our intuitions 
about respect:
I shall just as little seize another man's property as I 
shall his person; I shall cause him just as little mental 
suffering as bodily; I shall, therefore, refrain not only 
from every physical injury, but also from the infliction of 
mental suffering through mortification, alarm, annoyance, or 
slander....The maxim, [injure no one] arises in noble 
dispositions...from the knowledge, gained once for all, of 
the suffering which every unjust action necessarily brings to 
others and which is intensified by the feeling of enduring 
wrong....Rational reflection raises noble dispositions to the 
firm resolution, grasped once for all, of respecting the 
rights of everyone, of never allowing themselves to encroach 
on them, of keeping themselves free from the self-reproach of 
being the cause of another's suffering. (ibid., p. 150)
 However, there are two features of Schopenhauer’s account which do not carry 
through to my own. First, he thought that human nature was intractably wicked and 
unjust, or more precisely that one element of it was, so that absent the restraining 
effect of empathy we would always be acting only out of “egoism and malice.” Thus, his 
view is one of competing forces or vectors in human nature which, under the best 
conditions, would settle in favor of empathy.
 This is not part of the role I wish to suggest for empathy. The picture I propose 
is a roughly Aristotelian one in which empathy is habituated and becomes a 
disposition in the sense that natural inclinations are trained to seek virtuous action. 
Thus, in the virtuous agent the kind of internal tension or strife Schopenhauer 
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suggests is not a factor. As Aristotle argues, such tension is a sign of continence, not of 
virtue, and is not part of the best kind of human life. In the best kind of life, empathic 
identification becomes “second nature” and it is not in competition with malicious 
motives.
 A second point is that on Schopenhauer’s view it is the cognitive recognition of 
principles (viz. of justice) which in the general case impede unjust action. We learn 
from experiences of empathic revulsion to unjust acts that we don’t like doing them, 
and we formulate practical principles which capture that recognition. It is these 
principles which (typically) determine our conduct:
Without principles firmly held, we should inevitably be at 
the mercy of antimoral tendencies when, through external 
impressions, these tendencies were stirred to emotions.... 
Self-control is the steadfast adherence to and observance of 
principles, in spite of the motives that act against them. 
...compassion operates in the individual actions of the just 
man only indirectly, by means of principles, and not so much 
actu as potentia. (ibid., p. 150-1)
While it is certainly true on my account that the virtuous agent is capable of 
representing the principles upon which she acts as action-guides of this form, I think 
Schopenhauer’s picture is misleading in two respects. One, it suggests a deliberative 
model of just action that is, for the most part, not necessary when a possible course of 
action is manifestly unjust. Two, it suggests that unjust courses of action suggest 
themselves to the virtuous agent as viable possibilities. This is the wrong way to 
understand the effect of ingrained empathic identification, and the cultivation of 
wisdom and virtue generally. The absence of conflict in the virtuous person goes so 
deep as to transform the way she sees the contexts in which she acts. This 
transformation is deep enough and complete enough (in the virtuous hence eudaimon 
agent) that courses of action which are unjust in the way Schopenhauer describes do 
not appear to her as possibilities at all, just as possible courses of action which involve 
doing harm to ourselves do not, in the normal case, crop up in our practical 
deliberations. The effect of empathic identification with others is to shape the way we 
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understand the contexts in which we act as ones in which harm to others rules out 
alternatives ab initio. They are, so to speak, never in play at all.227
 Philip Mercer argues that attempts to account for reasons to be just by 
according a “conative” quality to sympathy (or empathy) as my account does cannot 
succeed by themselves (Mercer 1972, p. 84). First, though such a move lends 
reason-giving force to the interests of others — it shows us that others count — it does 
not show for how much they count. Second, as he observes, “conative sympathy is ... 
likely to be conditioned by such contingent circumstances as time, place, mood, 
interest, and so on...” (ibid.). Thus, he concludes, conative sympathy is “in need of 
qualification by reason” (ibid.)
 With this suggestion I wholeheartedly agree. The reason-giving force of any 
affective process is conditional on the validation or endorsement of rational reflection, 
and an essential part of the cultivation of the right sort of affective responses 
(empathic and otherwise) consists in selecting and reinforcing those responses which 
accurately track value and reasons for action — in ourselves and others.228 Empathy 
is no more an autonomous source of reasons than is any other affective response. What 
reasons we have arise from the ways we must live in order to have good lives. What 
empathy allows is the transmission of such reasons from one person to another — but 
it never gives reasons independently of what is genuinely of value in the lives of the 
empathizer or the person being identified with. Empathy is the affective bridge 
between persons that allows the genuine reasons of one person to become the genuine 
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227Does this mean the empathic person cannot or should not identify with a vicious or evil person? In 
some ways yes, in some ways no. The virtuous (empathic) person may be able to see, from the vicious 
person’s perspective, something of why she does what she does. A virtuous person may be able to 
recognize as an intelligible motivation, for example, a (vicious) overriding desire for material gain, even 
while seeing it in its proper perspective as not a genuine reason. The virtuous person clearly does not 
share in the overall hierarchy or structure of reasons in which the vicious person finds such 
considerations as decisive. Empathy can modify or temper the sharp divergence between the incorrect 
perception of values and reasons the vicious person has and the genuine reasons that are the objects 
and products of practical wisdom, but it does not do away with the virtuous person’s recognition that the 
vicious person is simply wrong about what reasons he or she has.
228I mean that response-types, rather than response-tokens, need rational endorsement. On particular 
occasions virtuous persons need not stop to reflect on what they are feeling. As indicated, they have already 
trained their emotions to be responsive to reasons, hence to earn rational endorsement.
reasons of another. The point here is that the picture of the virtuous agent I wish to 
draw is one in which, as in the accounts of Aristotle and Dent, reason and empathic 
emotion are coordinated and integrated, rather than independent and in conflict.
 The central significance of the governing role of practical wisdom can be 
brought out even further by considering a possible objection to the scope of respect for 
others which empathic identification can justify. Why can’t my empathy, and thus my 
respect, be limited to those that are like me in some crucial way? It is a deep aspect of 
human nature to divide up humanity into us and them, and accord differential 
treatment to them. If my social and security needs can be met by identifying myself as, 
say, an Aryan Nazi, and rejecting Jews as creatures somehow not deserving of respect 
in virtue of their subhuman nature, why reason do I have to do otherwise?
 The answer lies in the sort of self-conception that is entailed by such an 
attitude. Our natural psychological mechanisms do not differentiate between other 
people in this way; we have to learn to do so. And for this learning to stick, it has to be 
supported by (at least putative) reasons. For me to constrain my empathic 
identification, and thus my reasons for respect, in this way I must conceive of myself 
in the first instance as an Aryan Nazi, and hold the difference between me and the 
Jew in this respect to be a reason not to respect him. Thus, the way I conceive of 
myself is inextricably linked to the way I conceive of others, and the way I value 
myself affects the way I find others valuable (or not).
 Christine Korsgaard refers to such self-conceptions as “practical identities.” She 
argues that contingent and limited practical identities such as Aryanism cannot stand 
as fundamental upon reflective scrutiny (Korsgaard 1996, pp. 120ff). On her view, if 
we pause to reflect how we have reasons from such identities we will see that, at 
bottom, we are the sorts of creatures to whom reasons matter. In other words, the 
process of reflection on why questions — why we have reasons to do anything at all —
will lead us finally to seeing that the reasons we have come from the fact that we are 
reason-seeking creatures.229 Thus, she says, I must recognize my humanity — 
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229That is the “source of normativity.”
understood as my nature as “a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live” 
(ibid., p. 121) — as my fundamental and governing practical identity. To be reflectively 
rational, we can’t in the end conceive of ourselves in any way more limited or exclusive 
than as this sort of reason-driven creature. And this self-conception recognizes no 
distinction between Aryan and Jew.
 I think Korsgaard is largely right, but that her argument fits more naturally in 
a eudaimonist virtue theory than in the Kantian context in which she locates it. Her 
argument is congruent with Aristotle’s view —explored in Chapter 3 — that the 
virtuous man acts “for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to 
be the man himself; and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the 
element by virtue of which he thinks” (NE IX.4: 1166a13). Practical wisdom, and thus 
eudaimonia, require a proper conception of what is most essentially myself. For the 
best kind of life — one which will withstand reflective scrutiny — I must understand 
my humanity (as Korsgaard and Aristotle conceive of it) as what is most centrally of 
value to me. But if I do this the distinction I try to maintain between my Aryan self 
and the Jew disappears.230 Our shared rational nature — our “humanity” — makes 
him a legitimate subject of my empathic identification. I cannot reject his humanity as 
an irrelevant feature about him without distorting the value I accord my own 
humanity. This doesn’t mean people don’t live with such distorted self-conceptions, of 
course —clearly many people do. The point is that there is a significant cost of doing 
so, in terms of the possibility of the best kind of life. The demands of practical wisdom, 
and the recognition of value such wisdom entails, require that my respect not be 
limited to some arbitrary subset of humanity.
The Objection from Respect
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230Except in the presence of false beliefs about the humanity of another. I doubt that such false beliefs 
can survive without a signficant degree of self-deception and cognitive distortion, and we have good 
reason not to engage in either of these. But if they do survive in a particular case, then I believe the 
moral objection against such an attitude is weakened. Such a person is in need of instruction, not of 
sanction.
 Brief though it is this sketch puts us in position to see why both aspects of the 
objection to eudaimonism on the basis of respect are invalid. The objection is that 
eudaimonism is hard-pressed to account for the reasons we have to respect others, and 
if it can be thought to do so at all, the account it must offer is basically wrong-headed, 
as stemming from the effects of wrongful actions on the agent rather than on the 
victim. The story I have told of empathic identification is clearly an account (or at least 
claims to be an account) of how respect for others is justified within a eudaimonist 
virtue theory, so if it is successful the first aspect of the objection is rebutted. But what 
is important to notice is that if it is successful it also squarely defuses the second part 
of the objection.
 For the virtuous person who identifies empathically with others and takes from 
that identification reasons not to harm or injure them, or otherwise treat them 
unjustly, it is precisely the effects of their prospective course of action on others that 
motivate them not to act unjustly and provide reason not to do so. This seems to be 
just what our common-sense intuitions recommend to us as the way the interests and 
welfare of others should affect our practical deliberations. Intuitively, an adequate 
account of respect must be victim-focused, and the account offered here has that focus.
 We have distinguished between the ultimate justification for our actions and 
dispositions and the proximate justification and motivation for acting in particular 
cases. The objection to eudaimonism on the basis of respect supposes that our interest 
in eudaimonia, as the source of all our reasons for action, must come into play both in 
justifying particular actions and in motivating us to do them. This, as should be plain 
by now, is not right. Our interest in eudaimonia gives us reason to be (or become) 
people of a certain sort, with particular deeply-ingrained traits and dispositions. In 
virtue of the dispositions the virtuous person forms, she comes to find reasons in 
places and things she otherwise would not. In the case of potential acts of injustice, 
she finds immediate or proximate reason not to act unjustly, and is motivated not to do 
so, precisely in virtue of the effects her unjust action would have on her victim. And it 
is these proximate justifications and motivations, I suggest, which are the objects of 
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our common-sense intuitions. Thus, a eudaimonist virtue theory can account for our 
common-sense intuitions about the victim-focus of respect for others, and can do so in 
just the right way.
 The sketch I have provided obviously needs further explication before its 
adequacy can be assessed. Even in its present state, however, there are natural 
worries about what I have suggested. An important one concerns the claim that the 
degree of empathic identification needed to secure the eudaimonic benefits mentioned 
in the last chapter is sufficient to meet the requirements of respect. But I defer dealing 
with this and other important questions in favor of coming to grips with a broader and 
deeper objection to the entire method of trying to account for respect as I do here. It 
amounts to an argument that, even given its victim-focus, in virtue of its agent-relative 
account of reasons for action, the kind of reasons for respect eudaimonism gives are 
wrong in another way.
Empathic Identification and Agent-Neutral Reasons
 One important source of doubts about the account just sketched is that it makes 
all reasons for treating others as we should agent-relative. Some have felt that no 
theory which endorses only agent-relative reasons for action can adequately account 
for the normative requirements on our relationships with others.231 Here I want to 
show that by attending to empathic identification those doubts can be alleviated, and 
that the intuitions which seem to mandate agent-neutral reasons as a supplement to 
or replacement for agent-relative reasons, can be accounted for by empathic 
identification within an entirely agent-relative account.
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231Korsgaard argues that theories that “deontological reasons” are agent-relative cannot accommodate 
our intuitions about victims’ right to complain about violations (Korsgaard 1993, p. 47). Nagel took this 
line as a consistent theme in his 1970, 1986, and 1991.  Schmidtz might be construed as maintaining 
something similar, when for example he claims that “Morality is more than one thing” (Schmidtz 1995, 
p. 188). On Schmidtz’ view, it is necessary to supplement a roughly “Aristotelian theory of virtue” — one 
which, I might point out, retains its eudaimonistic flavor — with a “Humean theory of justice” (ibid., p. 
212, n. 20). This suggests that Schmidtz believes that a theory of the Aristotelian stripe cannot do it all. 
In this section I try to show why I believe this is an unduly pessimistic stance.
 My view of the function of empathic identification draws on a conception of 
reasons as being exclusively agent-relative. Agent-relativity is a consequence of 
eudaimonism about reasons generally — the idea that reasons come from the value to 
each agent of his or her own eudaimonia, of living and having a good life.232 
Eudaimonist reasons are paradigmatically agent-relative. Moreover, eudaimonism 
appears to exclude the possibility of agent-neutral reasons. This of course does not 
mean it excludes reasons for me to seek or promote things of value outside my own 
life. Instead, the point is that all reasons arise in relationship to the eudaimonia of 
particular agents, and agents have reasons because of those particular relationships. 
States of affairs or other things of value give agent-neutral reasons for action if the 
reasons they give are reasons for persons or agents quite generally — irrespective of 
any particular relationship in which agents stand to what is of value. This is clearest 
in the case of utilitarianism, which is paradigmatically agent-neutral. On it all of us 
have reason — equal reason — to maximize happiness, or pleasure, or however utility 
is to be understood. There is nothing special about me which gives me reason to 
maximize utility; what particular agent I am makes no difference as to my reason for 
doing so. But it is the cardinal claim of eudaimonism that my eudaimonia is 
reason-giving to me just because it is I who can be eudaimon, it is my life which can go 
well.233
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232In what follows I take for granted that reasons and values are complementary —in particular that 
we have reasons only in virtue of some value or other. Though this thesis is not universally accepted, I 
think it is true, and that it is implicitly accepted by the classical eudaimonists, as well as by a broad 
range of other moral theorists (cf. Korsgaard 1993 and 1996), and I will not defend it here.
233This does not mean that I cannot have agent-relative reason to value or promote things to which I 
stand in no special relationship. For example, I can have agent-relative reason to promote world peace, 
which presumably is something of value almost universally. The point is that my reason for promoting 
world peace comes through its connection with my eudaimonia. It is certainly possible that that 
connection could be missing, in which case I would have no reason to seek or promote it —so it is a 
contingent matter of fact (about me) that I have that reason. But that cannot be the case if world peace 
has agent-neutral value. If that is the value it has, then there is nothing contingent about the reason I 
have to seek it. That value gives me reason irrespective of anything peculiar to me or my situation.
 Note that the facts about me that give me reason to seek world peace (or not) are not 
(necessarily) facts about what I believe or desire. They are objective facts about my eudaimonia and 
what is conducive to it. Though the view is thus relative in certain respects, it is not subjective in the 
way that many forms of e.g. “cultural relativism” are. This point is made capably by Mack in Mack 
1989.
 Now, it is possible to have an agent-neutral conception of the value of 
eudaimonia.234 On such a view, the value of the eudaimonia of any particular agent 
(say, Amy) is equally reason-giving to all agents, not just Amy, just as on utilitarianism 
the end of maximizing utility is equally reason-giving to all agents, not just Amy. The 
interest Amy naturally has in living a good life gives her reason to do things that are 
instrumental to or constitutive of such a life, but on an agent-neutral account others 
have equal reason to try to bring about such a good life for Amy. This is because the 
reason-giving force of things like good lives, just like the reason-giving force of 
maximal utility in utilitarianism, is the same regardless of the relation one stands in 
to them: whether a good life is yours or not, you have reason to promote it or bring it 
about, just as everyone else does. Of course, others cannot act in just the ways Amy 
can to try to bring about such a life, but whatever courses of action are available to 
them to promote her eudaimonia, they have reason to adopt. Moreover, Amy’s 
eudaimonia is just as reason-giving for them as their own. Ben has as much reason to 
seek Amy’s eudaimonia as he has his own eudaimonia, though of course what he can 
do toward the realization of a good life for Amy will be very different than what he can 
do for his own.
 This is not, however, the conception of the reason-giving force I wish to defend 
for eudaimonia. On my view, the eudaimonia of a particular person gives distinctive 
reason-giving force to the agent whose life it is. As I have indicated in previous 
chapters, I believe that this is also the proper conception of the reason-giving force of 
eudaimonia to ascribe to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, and in my discussion of 
Aristotle I have given reasons for resisting the agent-neutral interpretation of his view 
in particular. However, the agent-relative conception apparently leaves some strong 
intuitions unaccounted for, and it is these intuitions, I believe, which motivate those 
who advocate agent-neutral conceptions of reasons.
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234Kraut 1989 and Hurka 1993 employ agent-neutral conceptions of the value of eudaimonia.
 The intuitions are something like this: we think some things are important or 
valuable, not just valuable-to-me or valuable-to-you or valuable-to-Amy, but valuable 
period. Some things don’t just give me reasons or you reasons or Amy reasons, but give 
anybody (or everybody) reasons. The alleviation of pain is often thought to typify the 
sort of thing that has this property. If Amy is in pain, then of course Amy has reason to 
stop it or alleviate it, but beyond that I have reason to stop it and so do you, insofar as 
we can do so. So does anybody in position to do so, regardless of who they are, what 
they believe, or whether or not they care about Amy one way or another. The fact that 
the pain is Amy’s makes no difference as to who has reason to stop it: everybody does.
 Thomas Nagel maintains that this is a potent argument that at least some 
things have agent-neutral (or, in his terminology, objective or impersonal) 
reason-giving force. Pain is an example of something that isn’t merely bad for 
someone, but bad period — its reason-giving force is agent-neutral. The problem with 
thinking that pain gives a merely agent-relative reason for acting, Nagel maintains, is 
that such a reason could accompany an “impersonal indifference” to pain, in oneself or 
in others:
If we assign impersonal value to pleasure and pain, then each 
person can think about his own suffering not just that he has 
reason to want it gone, but that it’s bad and should be 
gotten rid of. If on the other hand we limit ourselves to 
relative reasons, he will have to say that though he has a 
reason to want an analgesic, there is no reason for him to 
have one, or for anyone else who happens to be around to give 
him one.(Nagel 1986, p. 160)
Ascribing the reason-giving force of pain to only the agent who is experiencing it forces 
a sort of dissociated attitude toward one’s own pain: one wants it stopped, but must at 
the same time acknowledge that others have no reason to stop it. Ascribing 
agent-neutral value to pain, on the other hand, captures the force of the intuition that 
anyone’s pain gives everyone a reason to try to stop it. Anyone who is in pain thinks 
that others do have a reason to try to stop it, and that shows that we take the 
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reason-giving force of pain to be agent-neutral and not merely agent-relative.235 While 
pain is probably not the only example of something which intuitively might be thought 
to have agent-neutral reason-giving force, it is hard to imagine a more convincing 
exemplar. I will therefore focus my defense of the exclusivity of agent-relative reasons 
on the case of pain, and suppose that a comparable reply is available mutatis 
mutandis to other alleged sources of agent-neutral reasons.
 My claim is that our intuitions about the reason-giving force of pain can be just 
as well or better accommodated by seeing pain as having agent-relative value as 
opposed to agent-neutral value. In effect, I want to claim that we can explain our 
intuitions about the reason-giving force of pain better through the perspective of 
empathic identification than through Nagel’s objective standpoint. An account of the 
reason-giving force of pain in purely agent-relative terms is less mysterious than 
Nagel’s “objective” or “impersonal” standpoint, and it avoids the problematic conflict 
and collision with the “subjective” perspective which Nagel himself recognizes as a 
troublesome feature of the objective standpoint. I will return to this point below.
 Begin by considering two problems with Nagel’s view. First, if we try to consider 
why some person’s being in pain should matter from a truly and purely objective 
standpoint (that is, not a subjective standpoint masquerading as an objective one), it’s 
hard to see why pain should be reason-giving at all. It can be, as Nagel points out, a 
perfectly objective fact (that is, a fact that holds independently of whether it is 
recognized or believed by anybody) that some subject feels itself or experiences itself 
as being in pain — that’s not in doubt. What is in doubt is why from a completely 
objective standpoint (that is, a standpoint that is different from that of any subjective 
entity) this should be reason-giving. If we can make sense of a “perspective” or outlook 
that is completely severed from any vestige of subjectivity — and hence from any 
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235Setting aside cases of deserved pain, as for example in punishment. I thank Steve Scalet for this 
point.
 Is there any third alternative here? I don’t believe Nagel believes there is. The reasons pain 
gives are reasons for rational agents, period, so the only escape from their force is through irrationality. 
That there are better ways to understand the reason-giving force of pain than this is what I want to 
show. I thank David Schmidtz for pressing this point.
experience of what pain is like — why would we think pain would be recognized as 
reason-giving from such a perspective?236 How are we to make a transition from the 
recognition that subjects take pain to be reason-giving to the acknowledgement that 
pain actually, objectively, does give reasons?
 Nagel recognizes something of the force of this worry. He admits:
It may be that from a standpoint sufficiently external to 
that of ordinary human life, not only chicken salad and 
salami but much of what is important to human beings — their 
hopes, projects, ambitions, and very survival — cannot be 
seen positively to matter. (ibid. p. 131)
But his discussion blurs the force of this problem, because his thought-experiment 
purports to achieve objectivity without doing so. It asks us — persons who are 
occupants of subjective perspectives in which pain is eminently reason-giving — to 
suppose that we are occupying an “objective” standpoint when we abstract from the 
thought that the person suffering the pain in question is ourselves. But this gets us 
only to a more reflective subjective standpoint, not to an objective one.
 The problem is not in the objectivity of the fact that pain is felt, but in the 
conception of a standpoint which is objective in a sense which is contrasted with 
subjectivity, as in being vulnerable to the experience of pain. The difference — and the 
point — is that we are subjects who can recognize the reason-giving force of pain in 
others because we recognize it in ourselves. It is just because we consider Nagel’s 
thought-experiment as subjects who can experience and have experienced pain, that 
we appreciate the reason-giving force pain has. Nagel tacitly admits this point: “When 
the objective self contemplates pain, it has to do so through the perspective of the 
sufferer, and the sufferer’s reaction is very clear” (Nagel 1986, p. 161). This is not a 
merely epistemic point for the objective perspective; it is not merely that this is how in 
such a perspective facts that pain is being felt come to be known. It is a fact about 
what such facts can mean, how experiences of pain can be reason-giving. The only way 
pain provides reasons at all is because it provides reasons for subjects. Nagel both 
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236Mack objects in a somewhat similar way to Nagel’s argument in Mack 1993, p. 218.
overestimates the virtues of “objectivity” and, concomitantly, underestimates the 
power of subjectivity to explain the thought-experiment, and consequently the 
resources of agent-relative reasons to account for our intuitions about reasons under 
such conditions.
 The second problem with Nagel’s case is that the consequences of ascribing only 
agent-relative value to pain are not what he thinks, either in the case of one’s own 
pain or in the case of the pain of others. In the case of others’ pain, because we can be 
and are naturally moved by the pain of others, the fact that they are in pain is or can 
become (through empathic identification) a reason for us to stop it — an agent-relative 
reason. This is an important effect of empathic identification, and it is one we have 
reason (as I have argued) to cultivate. Someone who can remain unmoved by the pain 
of others is defective in a significant way, and it is a kind of defect which is normally 
not found in people simply because it tends to render them unfit for society. Moreover, 
as I argued in the previous chapter, it renders them less able to advance their own 
well-being in virtue of the discord it requires between their affective responses and 
their judgments. As Plato said of unjust persons, they are essentially out of harmony, 
in conflict with themselves, and such is a state we have reason to avoid out of concern 
for our own eudaimonia (Republic 445b).
 We are moved by the pain of others because we can and do occupy the 
standpoint of empathic identification. Because we ourselves experience pain and feel 
the reason-giving force that being in pain has, we can be moved by the pain of others 
and take their pain to be reason-giving for us. Nagel purports not to see how such an 
account can work:
Suppose I have been rescued from a fire and find myself in a 
hospital burn ward. I want something for the pain, and so 
does the person in the next bed. He professes to hope we both 
will be given morphine, but I fail to understand this. I 
understand why he has reason to want morphine for himself but 
what reason does he have to want me to get some? Does my 
groaning bother him? (Nagel 1986, p. 160)
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Yet if we are not moral and social monsters, we will naturally have this response, and 
of course it is just that intuition to which Nagel’s argument appeals.237  
 Moreover, it is because we expect just this sort of response from others that we 
are not susceptible to the kind of “dissociation” Nagel thinks is inevitable if we ascribe 
to pain only agent-relative force. Agent-relative reasons need not be exclusive reasons. 
They can be shared: they can be taken up by others without compromising their 
agent-relative nature, and that is what occurs when we contemplate a person in pain, 
whether it is ourselves considered as one person among others, or anyone else.238 For 
us to feel the reason-giving force of pain, it is essential that we not cease to be subjects 
who can and do feel pain, and experience it as reason-giving. Far from mandating an 
objective standpoint, the reason-giving nature of pain requires that we remain 
subjects, and from within that perspective the reason-giving force of others’ pain is 
readily explained.239
 If this argument is successful, it shows that our thoughts about the 
reason-giving force of pain are actually better explained by thinking of that force as 
agent-relative than as agent-neutral. But then we have a further puzzle: if my account 
is right, why have Nagel and others thought it so obvious that the reason-giving force 
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237Mack, replying to this example, says that “it may be that my groaning bothers him because my 
being in pain, in a way that is vivid and present to him, bothers him. Because I am near to him and he 
is a person of normal sympathies, his sympathy extends to me. So he has a reason to want it to stop — a 
reason that does not extend to the suffering of those whom, perhaps simply because of their distance 
from him, his sympathies do not embrace” (Mack 1993, p. 219).
238I believe the point could be further extended to our response to animals, and in fact is the right way 
to think about the moral requirements on our treatment of animals, but I will not take up that point 
here.
239It is true that the scope of this reason-giving force is narrower than on Nagel’s view. On Nagel’s 
agent-neutral view, pain gives reasons to all agents equally, regardless of how they are situated relative 
to the person that is in pain. On my view, reasons are given only to those who empathically identify 
with the sufferer, and our empathy generally is limited to those with whom we are in contact in some 
way —those whose plights become vivid to us through our imagination. I do not see that this is a 
problem, however. The view certainly accounts for the reasons people have to relieve the pain of those 
they can most directly affect. And nothing about the limits on reasons to relieve pain undercuts the 
general points, made above, about reasons not to inflict pain. We have reason not to inflict pain 
irrespective of the victim and our relationship to him or her (except in special cases such as 
punishment), through the mechanisms suggested by Mill and described earlier. In any event, it is also 
true that, as Korsgaard argues, inflicting pain or harm establishes a personal relationship between 
agent and victim (Korsgaard 1993, p. 48), and that reasons of respect “supervene” on these 
relationships. Though she does not say how this happens, on my view it happens because when such 
relationships are established empathy becomes both possible and natural.
of pain cannot be merely agent-relative, and must be agent-neutral? An error theory of 
some sort is required here.
 My error theory is this. Empathic identification occurs in various degrees, and 
varies among persons. Nevertheless, as I have argued there is a threshold of 
amenability to empathic identification which it is not possible to fail to meet without 
suffering significant social consequences. If one is insufficiently adept at seeing things 
as others see them and finding reasons for action in such perspectives, one will 
naturally be excluded from participation in relationships with others that are 
important (i.e. cooperative endeavors) or desirable (e.g. companionship, friendship), or 
both. These costs are sufficiently high that there is ample purely instrumental reason 
to cultivate one’s capacity for and disposition to empathic identification at least to the 
minimal degree represented by this “threshold.” And part of this threshold is having 
the sort of response to the pain of others that we think is normal: we naturally find 
pain reason-giving. This is just to say, then, that the susceptibility to the reason-giving 
force of the pain of others which Nagel accounts for by recourse to “objective” or 
“impartial” (agent-neutral) reasons is in fact explained by the virtually universal 
disposition to find the pain of others reason-giving, while that reason-giving force is in 
fact entirely agent-relative. In the first instance it is relative to the subject 
experiencing the pain, but others can and do find their own agent-relative reasons to 
stop or alleviate others’ pain through empathic identification. It is part of my view, 
then, that empathic identification at least at this (minimal) level is virtually universal 
and unconscious, and I think there is ample empirical evidence to bear this out.240 It 
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240As Robert Gordon says, “We do this sort of thing so routinely that we are not aware of doing it — 
and we fail to appreciate the sophistication of the maneuver we are engaging in” (Gordon 1995a, p. 731).
is because they are all around us that we think that the agent-relative reasons we are 
responding to are agent-neutral.241
 I mentioned earlier that Nagel, by his own account, is left with a conception of 
selfhood and practical agency that is saddled with a deep schizophrenia.242 View from 
Nowhere is dedicated to the task of considering the effects of aspiration to an ever 
more “external” and “objective” point of view, and it confronts inevitable tensions 
which arise from the fact that our subjective points of view are parts of what the 
objective perspective must accept as genuine and real parts of what there is. In ethics, 
this leads to a discord between “agent-neutral” reasons and “impersonal values” — 
such as, for example, that pain ought to be alleviated irrespective of the subject who is 
feeling it — and “agent-relative” or personal reasons and values (Nagel 1986, p.165ff). 
Nagel’s pessimistic conclusion is that “the human duality of perspectives is too deep 
for us reasonably to hope to overcome it” (p. 185). He is left with a Sidgwickian 
acknowledgement that a dualism of practical reason is inevitable (pp. 194ff). 
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241On the other hand, this very universality may give rise to an attempt to salvage a notion of 
agent-neutral reasons. What if by “agent-neutral reasons” we mean simply those reasons that people in 
fact (virtually) universally share? In other words, what about the claim that my account of the 
agent-relative reason-giving force of e.g. pain amounts to a tacit expansion of agent-relativity in effect to 
agent-neutrality?
 Now, if the claim were put this way I would respond that, if anything, agent-neutrality is being 
contracted to a form of agent-relativity, because such a conception of agent-neutrality is reducible 
without remainder to agent-relativity. And if that is the case, I think a more perspicuous explanation 
and understanding of the nature of reasons, and identification of what reasons we have, is to be had 
through considering the reasons individual agents have, than by adverting to such a conception of 
agent-neutrality. Nagel’s account, for example, utterly obscures the reasons people have to relieve the 
pain of others.
 But I think in fact that agent-neutrality should not be thought of as amenable to this sort of 
reductive analysis. The point of agent-neutral reasons is that there are sources of reasons outside of any 
feature of the particular properties, qualities, or values of agents. This, of course, is just what 
eudaimonism denies. In identifying the source of all reasons for action in the eudaimonia of each agent, 
it affirms only agent-relative reasons; if the argument I have given is a good one, agent-relative reasons 
are all we need.
242It is not clear that Nagel is still committed to this view. Nagel 1994 and 1995 argue for a view that is 
somewhat different than his earlier defenses of deontic constraints.
 A significant benefit of the account I have given is that no such dualism is 
necessary.243 Empathic identification roots the explanation for the reasons we have for 
respect in the same soil which supports all our other reasons. Eudaimonism is a 
unified practical theory, and apart from the specific problems with Nagel’s 
impartialist, “objective,” account, that is a significant reason to prefer it.
 But there is a further source of worry, I believe, about offering an agent-relative 
account for our intuitions about the constraints of respect. The worry, roughly, is that 
as soon as we abandon the claim that the “scope” of agents for whom the reasons are 
reasons is universal, in virtue of their agent-neutrality, we may find that not all agents 
have agent-relative reasons for respect. Some people may “fall through the cracks” and 
thus have no reasons for respecting others, whereas our intuitions suggest that the 
constraints of respect apply without exception to human agents. I consider this worry 
next.
The Scope of Empathic Reasons
 If reasons for acting morally toward others (in particular for constraining our 
treatment of them in the ways we think intuitively appropriate) are only 
agent-relative, then there is a possibility (at least a conceptual possibility, perhaps a 
practical possibility) that there might be persons who escape their reach. There might 
be persons, that is, for whom it is not true that they have eudaimonistic reason to 
respect others. The reasons for becoming (or remaining) empathically identified with 
others in the requisite way somehow break down.
 One attraction of appealing to agent-neutral reasons to ground respect for 
others is that, since such reasons are not contingent on any particular features of the 
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243There are skeptics about the claim that virtue theories, even eudaimonist ones, can plausibly 
maintain that virtues (or the values which we have reason to seek and promote) do not conflict. Such 
skepticism may give rise to the suspicion that the unity I claim for eudaimonism is chimerical. While I 
cannot address this worry in depth here, the idea is that things that are of value have value only insofar 
as they can fit into a unified eudaimon life. Any good life will have to leave undone things which could 
have contributed to that good life had they been done —there are just too many things that are good for 
human beings to do. This does not, however, lead to conflict among a plurality of values, and thus does 
not generate the kind of deep tension which appears in Nagel’s and Sidgwick’s accounts. I take it that 
an account that gives us a single, unified aim for practical reason —albeit one that is difficult to work 
out in detail — is one we would like to have.
agents who have them, no pathologies can disqualify moral agents from having 
reasons to respect others. We can think even of psychopaths, as bent as we can 
imagine —Adolf Hitler, Robert Alton Harris244, whomever —and say of them, no 
matter what, that they have reason to respect others, if we accept an agent-neutral 
basis for such reasons. Nothing about their pathology delivers them from the scope of 
the force of agent-neutral reasons, even though these reasons have absolutely no grip 
on their practical rationality (that’s just what makes them psychopathic). 
 On the other hand, if reasons to respect others are agent-relative, as grounded 
in agents’ interests in having a good life, then it may not be true that psychopaths 
have reason to respect others. It may not hold that empathic identification — and thus 
respect for others — will in fact conduce to what minimal chances they have of a good 
life. In that case we should have to say that they have no reason to respect others. 
This seems undesirable as an implication of  a moral theory.
 The intuitive problem here is that we want to say that what the psychopath 
does (in, say, harming others) is wrong, and it is not clear how we can say so on my 
view. When we say of such an act that it is wrong we are saying three things. First, we 
are saying that its effects are bad. Now, on my agent-relative view, this has to be an 
elliptical way of saying that its effects are bad for those who suffer from the act, 
directly or indirectly. However,  I have argued above that this should not be seen as a 
problem, and in any case this is not the crux of the problem. 
 The real problem is that, in labeling an act wrong, we are saying that the agent 
who did it had reason not to do it — conclusive reason not to do it — but did it anyway. 
Furthermore, in consequence of this feature of a wrongful action, the agent who has 
committed such an action may deserve sanctions (punishment) of some sort or other. 
But on my view it need not be true that a psychopath had a reason not to commit the 
wrongful act, and hence it may also be true that he does not deserve sanctions. That 
sits poorly with our intuitions about the actions of psychopaths.
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244For a gripping discussion of the horrible (in every sense) life of Robert Alton Harris, multiple 
homicide, see Watson 1993, pp. 131ff.
 Now we need not go so far as to say that the psychopath is acting rationally in 
victimizing others. That would indeed be a bitter pill to swallow, but on my account it 
need not be swallowed. It is the fact that the psychopath is in some sense beyond the 
grip of rationality or reasons that leaves him with no reason to respect others, and 
whatever the right account or explanation of what he does at that point, it will not 
merit being regarded as rational.
 Still, there is an intuitive problem here. My response to that problem turns on 
the fact that psychopaths are incapable of perceiving and acting on what they have 
genuine reason to do. In psychopaths the full practical reasoning capacities that 
normal people have are crippled, and what is left is perhaps some effective 
instrumental reasoning abilities driven by ends that are bad both for the psychopaths 
and for those unfortunate enough to cross their paths. These people are degenerate 
cases of human beings, not persons with the kinds of practical reasoning capacities 
that our moral terms apply to and to which our moral intuitions respond. I think the 
right thing to say here is that our moral intuitions are less than fully reliable in these 
cases, and that there is good reason for this lack of reliability.
 Psychopaths fool us. They appear to us to be like other human beings, but they 
are not. They lack the effective capacity to be moved by the plight of others, and the 
effects on others of their actions have no reason-giving force for them beyond their 
instrumental connection with the ends of the psychopaths themselves. In this respect 
they are brutes — they are no longer guided or moved by reason. If we are attacked by 
a grizzly bear, we yell in fear and pain, but we don’t expect the bear to be moved by our 
distress — to empathize with our distress and find in it reasons to cease attacking us. 
It is the same with the psychopath, but his human form deludes us into believing that 
he is guided by or responsive to reason, when he is not. Our inclination to label his act 
as wrong — think that he has reason to do otherwise — is an illusion. It isa natural 
mistake, but a mistake nonetheless. It makes no difference whether we think there is 
an agent-neutral reason “out there” that the psychopath is ignoring, or whether we 
think his nature has been sufficiently bent that it no longer makes sense to appeal to 
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reasons to try to stop him. All that is left in dealing with the psychopath are causal 
implements — goads and rewards to control him into letting others be.
 The same point explains our intuitions that victims are entitled to complain or 
object to their treatment at the hands of the psychopath.245 As Nagel observes, if we 
are in pain we simply suppose that others have reason to stop it (Nagel 1986, p. 159). 
Our thinking about the reasons others have to stop our pain is unconditional — it is 
not dependent on what others have reason to do in virtue of their dispositions to 
empathy. If we are being assaulted by a psychopath, we think our distress just is a 
reason why the psychopath ought to stop. Our thinking about what the psychopath 
has reason to do does not include a step of assessment whether, on the basis of his 
psychological constitution, the psychopath really does have reason to heed our 
demands that he stop. We believe he does have reason to do so, whether he heeds it or 
not.
 But it is significant that in fact we run into very few psychopaths in the course 
of our lives. It is a fact about the people among whom we live and act that they are 
reflectively rational and they do empathically identify with others, and we can and do 
in the normal case rely on their having these dispositions. Expecting that others will 
find reason to stop our pain or alleviate our distress is something that is deeply 
ingrained in us, and it is natural for us to regard others as moveable by our own 
reasons in this way.
 There are of course also more marginal cases —persons who, while not 
psychopathic, who through “hardness of heart” are nevertheless incapable of 
perceiving their reasons to identify empathically with others, and hence incapable of 
acting on the reasons empathic identification yields. We still want to ascribe 
wrongness to their acts of harm others, but they too seem to lack any reason to act 
otherwise.
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245Korsgaard also takes entitlement to objection as a major consideration against agent-relative 
accounts of the reasons underlying deontic constraints (Korsgaard 1993, pp. 47ff).
 But insofar as it is at all possible for persons to be ruled by reason — to make 
their lives into expressions of their practical, reflective rationality — the eudaimonist 
theory of the good entails that they have overwhelming reason to do so, and hence to 
cultivate empathic identification. There is a bright line theoretically between those 
who are incapable of living their lives in this way, and those for whom it remains 
possible, however difficult it is to do so. In the latter case the centrality of reflective 
rationality to whatever else can be good for a human life ensures that such persons 
have as much reason as anyone to respect others.246 
 But those who are beyond the reach of full practical reason are in the same boat 
as the psychopath in this respect. They differ from the psychopath in that the ends 
their instrumental reason seeks are not overtly incompatible with the interests of 
others as the psychopath’s are. But they have crossed an important line so far as our 
moral intuitions go. This line is something like the one between having free will and 
being causally determined, and I do not pretend to have a general account of that line. 
But the point here is that we can and do generally treat people as though they are not 
merely the pawns of deterministic forces, but instead are amenable to reason. We treat 
people, that is, as though they can respond to reasons, including reasons about what it 
is good for them to do. Our intuitions are less reliable when it comes to human beings 
who lack this capacity, whether they are fully psychopathic or merely creatures who 
can no longer deliberate about and by moved by their own good.
 All of this has important ramifications for our treatment of these people. Of 
course, whether or not the psychopath (or the merely hard of heart) has reason to 
respect others, when he fails to do so we are justified in defending ourselves and 
others against him. But on my view we may have lost the capacity to punish the 
psychopath (or even the hard of heart) as a matter of desert. I do not see this as a 
problem, however. By hypothesis such people are beyond the reach of the pertinent 
kinds of reasons, and it is thus appropriate that we treat them as cases of behavioral 
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246This is a way of claiming, as Aristotle did, that while virtue does not exhaust the human good, it is 
necessary for it, and that it plays a crucial role in allowing other aspects of the good — so-called 
external and bodily goods — to contribute to the human good.
management. To the extent their instrumental reasoning capacities are intact, the 
threat of punishment is an appropriate way to condition their pursuit of their own 
ends (“behave or your ends will be defeated by imprisonment”). To the extent they are 
not, then they are brutes in human form, and treatment as such is appropriate for 
them, even though the concept of desert may have ceased to apply to them as rational 
animals.
 In short, though admittedly the thought that psychopaths have no reason to 
respect others strikes us as odd, there is no real adverse upshot to it. We naturally 
think that they do, but that is because we are used to thinking that people are 
amenable to reasons, and in particular reasons that arise from the conditions of other 
persons. Psychopaths defy that expectation, so we should not be surprised that our 
intuitions on their account are not highly reliable.
 This completes my sketch of how empathic identification harmonizes our 
intuitions about the respect we owe other persons with eudaimonism, and thus rebuts 
the objection to eudaimonist virtue theories that they cannot adequately account for 
the constraints we feel are imposed on our actions by others and their interests.
Conclusion
 I have argued that two sources of objection to eudaimonism on the basis of 
intuitive constraints on our treatment of others should be rejected. The first, the claim 
that eudaimonist virtue ethics cannot endorse non-instrumental concern for others, I 
regard as effectively rebutted by Aristotle. I have elaborated a bit on the nature of the 
psychology of the virtuous agent who has such concern, and claimed that that 
psychological structure also reveals how a virtuous agent can reasonably be 
sufficiently committed to others. In this respect there is nothing objectionably 
self-serving about the nature or degree of involvement with others which eudaimonism 
recommends.
 To meet worries about respect for others, I have had to go beyond the positive 
arguments of the ancients and draw on an account of empathic identification to 
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explain why agents who seek their own eudaimonia will also treat others as respect 
requires, and will do so for reasons that we intuitively find acceptable, even appealing. 
There is much more to be said to make this line of response out as a viable and 
compelling conception of the basis upon which we owe respect to others, but I hope to 
have offered enough here by way of description and defense to make plausible the idea 
that, far from being incapable of answering to our intuitions about respect, 
eudaimonist virtue ethics is congruent with and a theoretical basis for an 
understanding of how we can, do, and should regard others.
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APPENDIX A: INCLUSIVISM AND MORAL COMPETITION 
 Nicholas White criticizes accounts of the human good such as the one I offered 
in Chapter 3 on Aristotle (White 1994, 1995).  He refers to the strategy employed there 
as “inclusivism,” and argues that inclusivist interpretations of Aristotle allocate a 
morally insufficient role to others’ interests. Here I try to address White’s objections.
 White’s complaint begins with the fact that a conception of eudaimonia which is 
broad enough to include both what would normally be thought of as the agent’s own 
good and the good of a friend is bound to have internal conflicts among its 
constituents.247 Now, according to White, Aristotle fully acknowledges that the goods 
of selves and others can conflict in ways which are not subject to harmonization (White 
1995, p. 265).248  This means that there is no “guarantee” that any particular good will 
be pursued to any particular degree (White 1994, p. 66; 1995, p. 268). There is, and 
can be, apparently, no minimum threshold for the realization of any given component 
of the good, including the good of a friend (White 1994, p. 68). So differing parts of our 
good inevitably give rise to what is in essence a zero-sum game for scarce goods: either 
the agent can get them, or the friend can get them, but not both. Something has to 
give, and nothing in inclusivist eudaimonism (IE) assures that self-satisfaction will 
not always win out.
 White sees this scenario played out in Aristotle’s discussion of conflicts over 
scarce “noble” goods in NE IX.8. These are cases in which (in White’s terms) 
“competition arises over nobility” (White 1995, p. 272). When they occur, he says, 
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247White 1994, p. 65; 1995, p. 268. Actually, White argues that there can be conflicts among the 
constituents of the agent’s proper good, a fortiori between his proper good and the good of the friend. 
This is particularly true of the allocation of time and energy. 
248The extreme of this sort of problem is thought to be evident in Aristotle’s recognition in NE Book X 
that lives of contemplation (theoria) and to virtue (ethike arete) are mutually incompatible, and 
mutually exclusive. 
The aim of being maximally altruistic conflicts with the aim 
of maximizing one’s own well-being. One must choose the one 
or the other. (White 1995, p. 273).249 
Crucially, White claims that we can only understand Aristotle’s account of self-love in 
such contexts if we see it as accepting conflict and advocating a substantively egoistic 
resolution to it (White 1995, p. 274). So on his view IE views of friendship fail in the 
end to escape an objectionable form of egoism.
 Further, White offers specific arguments against the notion of overlapping or 
common goods I have attributed to Aristotle in understanding his claims about friends 
as second selves as a way of escaping this objectionably egoistic conclusion. The first 
argument is negative: White criticizes what he refers to as “Mill’s idea” that “the 
desire for a given part of happiness for its own sake is not to be distinguished from the 
desire for happiness itself” (White 1995, p. 277). The second is positive: he offers his 
own non-inclusivist recommendation as to how to understand Aristotle’s claims that 
friends’ good and virtuous action can be valued for themselves in light of his insistence 
that happiness is the end of all we do. I will address his critical first argument after 
assessing his alternative.
 On White’s view Aristotle should be understood as advancing a sort of joint 
notion of the desire for or pursuit of goods: “something can be desired or aimed at both 
for its own sake and for something else, in the sense of being aimed at partly for the 
sake of each” (White 1995, p. 278). The idea here is one of overdetermination: a good is 
desired on two independent grounds, either of which is sufficient to motivate or justify 
seeking it on its own. On this interpretation there would be nothing about the 
(counterfactual) failure of one of the grounds to hold to preclude seeking the good on 
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249Strictly speaking, these cases are not zero-sum games: White says they assume the form of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma if each insists on getting the greatest good (White 1995, p. 273).
the other grounds alone.250 White attributes this view to Aristotle on the basis of 
claims in NE I to the effect that “intelligence, sight, and certain pleasure and honors” 
are goods in themselves, even if we also pursue them for the sake of something else 
(1096b18-9), and that, though we chose for the sake of happiness “honor, pleasure, 
reason, and every excellence” we nevertheless choose them for themselves, “for if 
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them” (1097b1-5).
 But overdetermination has a serious problem as a way of understanding 
Aristotle’s thoughts here (and in his similar discussion of the way that we seek a 
friend’s good). It runs squarely into one of Aristotle’s formal requirements on 
eudaimonia. The requirement in question is that the best life be one which cannot be 
made better by the addition of any other good. At some times this requirement is 
expressed under the rubric of “completeness” (teleios),251 at others as “self-sufficiency” 
(autarkes),252 but in any case the point is that the eudaimon life cannot be improved 
by adding to it anything outside it.
 Here’s the problem. Suppose that White is right that virtuous action and 
friends’ goods are choiceworthy both for their own sake and for the sake of our 
happiness, with either of these considerations being sufficiently reason-giving to 
justify and motivate that pursuit in the absence of the other.  This is just to say that 
these goods have reason-giving force for us, independently of their contribution to our 
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250An alternative would a combination idea: neither ground for seeking the good is sufficient to be 
effective in its own right, but in combination, the two grounds are motivationally sufficient. An example: 
If I am making spaghetti sauce and see that I am out of fresh Italian parsley, that may give rise to a 
weak desire to go to the store for some, instead of making do with some dried substitute. Likewise, if I 
see that I am out of tomato sauce, I get a similar weak desire, so as to avoid using some combination of 
tomato paste and tomato juice. Either of these desires, by itself, won’t get me to the store. But if I see I 
am out of both, the combined force of the two weak desires becomes effective, and off I go. This model is 
one White does not consider (perhaps because on it eudaimonia would appear to fail Aristotle’s 
stipulation that these goods are choiceworthy on their own —see text), and I will not take up its 
implications for his argument.
251Aristotle says that the first of the three ways in which we call something “complete” is when “they 
lack nothing in respect of goodness and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found 
outside” (Meta. V.16: 1021b33; cf. also V.26: 1023b26).
252At NE 1.7: 1097b15-20 Aristotle defines the “self-sufficient” as “that which when isolated makes life 
desirable and lacking in nothing,” and on that basis then says that eudaimonia cannot be “counted as 
one good thing among others — if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the 
addition of even the least of goods.”
eudaimonia. Then over and above our eudaimonia, these would be good to have or 
bring about. A eudaimon life which failed to include these goods would 
straightforwardly be lacking — in particular it would be lacking in the value 
represented by these goods apart from their contribution to eudaimonia. 
 But this is an incoherent conception of eudaimonia. Aristotle’s formal 
requirement that it be incapable of improvement by addition means that there cannot 
be reason-giving force to these goods apart from their contribution to 
eudaimonia.White supposes that “it is wrong to picture Aristotle as thinking that one’s 
own happiness is the sole basis of ethical and altruistic considerations” (White 1995, p. 
279), but Aristotle’s insistence on the completeness and self-sufficiency of eudaimonia 
requires that we picture him in just this way. Nothing outside of or apart from one’s 
eudaimonia can be a source of reasons for action; if there were, eudaimonia would not 
be self-sufficient — a life with eudaimonia and these extraneous goods would be both 
more complete and more self-sufficient than the eudaimon life alone. The fact that 
such goods might also be sought for the sake of eudaimonia is wholly irrelevant. 
Either they have reason-giving force independent of their contribution to eudaimonia 
or they do not, and Aristotle clearly comes down on the side that they do not.
 This leaves us a puzzle, of course: we need to explain how they can be pursued 
for their own sake, while nevertheless acquiring all their reason-giving force from 
their contribution to eudaimonia, but that is just what my common-goods account, in 
contrast to that of White, provides. So let us consider what might be said on its behalf 
in reply to White’s worries about Mill’s idea.253
 Of these there are two. First, White thinks there is an important distinction 
between desiring some “part of happiness” for itself and as a part of happiness (White 
1995, p. 277). This is borne out, he maintains, by the fact that distinct parts of 
happiness can conflict; however, he does not say exactly how these two thoughts are 
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253I am not keen on assimilating the view I have put forward to Mill’s, for a number of reasons, only 
one of which is the confusion within Mill’s hedonistic conception of happiness. More to the point, 
thinking of the matter as one of “parts of happiness” seems to me to be unhelpful. Perhaps this is the 
source of the obscurity White finds in it. Still, the similarities are such as to make examination of 
White’s objections fruitful.
connected. I will return to this point in a moment. Second, there is (he says) no reason 
to believe that Mill’s idea occurred to Aristotle, particularly given its incongruity with 
Aristotle’s distinction between final and instrumental desiring (White 1995, p. 277). 
The distinction Aristotle draws between desiring something for itself and desiring it 
for something else appears to be neither the same as, nor compatible with, the 
distinction Mill draws. 
 Now, it can’t be an argument against the common-goods view that Aristotle 
never entertained it: if I am right, it underwrites his important and frequent reference 
to friends as second selves, so such a charge simply begs the question. But is there an 
incongruity between the idea that friends can share goods — that the good of friend 
can come to constitute part of my good in the way I have suggested — and the 
distinction between final and instrumental desiring? I do not see any. If we take an 
ordered structure of ends and activities as an accurate representation of Aristotle’s 
conception of the selves we most identify with and which determine our good, there is 
no apparent reason why the final/instrumental distinction cannot apply to the parts of 
our good which we share with others (that is, which is common to their good and our 
own, in the way I have sketched) in just the same way that it applies to those we do 
not.
 Perhaps White’s thought is that the final/instrumental distinction applies 
awkwardly, at best, to our desire for our friend’s good as such: do we desire that good 
for itself, or instrumentally? Aristotle clearly answers that we desire it for itself, and I 
see no reason to doubt that response. But he also explicitly accepts the idea that there 
are things which are sought both in themselves and for the sake of something else (NE 
1.7), and the common-goods approach reveals how that is perfectly intelligible for the 
good of one’s friend.
 Perhaps the first point — that cases of conflict bring out a tension in the ways 
we are thought to desire our own good and that of our friend — goes more to the heart 
of White’s objection. After all, he argues vigorously for the view that in NE IX.8 
Aristotle is arguing for a kind of self-love which in cases of scarcity of ethical good (to 
193
kalon) amounts to substantive egoism (White 1995, p. 272ff). He seems to see this sort 
of “moral competition” as crucially determining how Aristotle should be read on 
friends’ goods, and the direction it points as away from common or overlapping goods.
 Here White seems to have taken over significant parts of Kraut’s argument that 
scarcity of the moral good requires that we understand Aristotle’s conception of moral 
competition to be a zero-sum game, in which what one agent gains the other loses 
(Kraut 1988, 1989).254 The details of the respective accounts differ as to how and why 
moral good should be thought scarce, but in any case the idea is that under some 
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254Kraut is not as clear or consistent on this point as one would like. In his comment on Annas (1988), 
he says that Aristotle conceives of moral competition as a “real,” though mutually beneficial rivalry, and 
that since virtuous activity requires material resources that are themselves scarce, “it can happen that 
in taking an opportunity or resource for myself I leave less for others” (pp. 20-1). In his longer 
discussion in Kraut 1989, he develops the idea that occasions for moral competition arise in cases in 
which the “optimal good of individuals” conflict (p. 116). “Aristotle’s defense of self-love,” he says, 
“commits him to the view that there is a good that everyone should try to acquire, but that only one 
person can have — the good that consists in being the most virtuous member of one’s community” (p. 
118). However, Kraut also thinks this good is not among the goods in which happiness consists; this 
raises the question why it should be thought a good at all. Kraut does not say, and thus leaves an 
unexplained oddity in Aristotle’s view. 
 In general, as Kraut recognizes, Aristotle does not suggest that happiness is determined by the 
comparative quantities of good one has relative to others (p. 119). However, Kraut holds that in the 
special case of virtue, this kind of comparative good does matter — that it is and ought to be an end for 
the virtuous person to outdo all others. The only apparent  motivation for this claim is one ambiguous 
passage (IX.8:1168b25), and given its oddity, and the fact that it can be read more naturally and 
consistently with the balance of the chapter (i.e. in emphasizing the difference in kind of goods that 
distinguishes genuine self-love from the objectionable ersatz kind) by having Aristotle be consistent on 
this good as well, there is no reason to resort to Kraut’s (or White’s) take on the passage, with its 
consequent unexplained anomalous moral psychology.
 More generally, Kraut observes, Aristotle thinks there are spin-off benefits to all involved — 
including the wider community — from such competition, so that the “loser” does not really lose, all 
things considered (p. 117). The analogy Kraut suggests is of a competition among musicians for the best 
performance: everyone gains from the music that results, and though there can strictly speaking be only 
one “winner” of the competition, even those who do not thus win benefit from the improvements in their 
own performance which the competition brings out. So the “zero-sum” reading in Kraut 1989 is 
mitigated by a number of considerations which undercut its force; it remains, however, a “zero-sum” 
reading for the good of being the most virtuous.
 Kraut’s reading forces him to an odd answer to a question that arises as a direct result of his 
reading: whether we take Aristotle to mean that the virtuous person always wants to get the best kind 
of good whenever a division of goods is called for (p. 121).  The kind of fairness in competition Kraut 
goes to great pains to explicate becomes a worry only given his needless assumption that Aristotle 
thinks there is a comparative good in moral excellence. Kraut also argues for a way in which virtuous 
activity “enlarges the pie” of fine activity. In this he is quite right. But there is nothing about this 
argument which depends on his claims about the comparative good of winning moral competition; the 
latter can be given up without detracting at all from the point that virtuous activity creates benefit for 
everyone.
 The main point is this: it is not the regard for friends as equals that does the work for Aristotle’s 
account of “moral competition” (though of course the virtuous person does in fact regard his or her 
friends thus); Aristotle’s account turns on the fact that their good is to a significant extent shared — 
they mutually regard the other’s good as part of their own, and each sees the other as a second self.
circumstances (at least), the goods of friends will conflict. On Kraut’s view, when they 
do the virtuous friend will seek to share the opportunities equally.255 On White’s view, 
Aristotle comes down unequivocally on the side of self-serving resolution to the 
conflict.
 There are good reasons to object to this understanding of Aristotle’s view of 
moral competition, only one of which is that it confines our choices to these 
unappealing alternatives. The first substantive point is that it overlooks the degree to 
which friends have their goods in common — each is a second self to the other. In an 
underappreciated passage in Book VIII, Aristotle claims that “in loving a friend men 
love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a 
good to his friend” (VIII.5: 1157b32). The point here is not that friends fail to 
distinguish other from self, nor that conflicts cannot occur between the respective 
interests of each. It is that the way friends regard such conflicts is radically changed 
by the place the good of one’s friend has in one’s own overall good: it no longer is 
something alien, something to be weighed against one’s own (proper) good. It is much 
more like conflicts between parts or aspects of one’s own good.
 Thinking about conflicts between the goods of friends this way, I believe, helps 
considerably in making sense of Aristotle without resorting to the desperate measures 
of Kraut or the pessimism of White. It is unproblematic (for outlooks that don’t 
pretend to monism about value) that our lives cannot contain as much as we’d like of 
all the various things that can be good for us. Tradeoffs between goods are necessary. I 
cannot earn as much money as I’d like, or have as much leisure as I’d like, if I also 
want to study philosophy. I regard that tradeoff as worthwhile, so I make it. Life is 
nothing if not an endless series of such decisions, over minutiae and over life-changing 
matters. Aristotle’s theory unquestionably recognizes and accepts these sorts of 
conflicts.
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255Kraut 1989, p. 125.  Perhaps what he has in mind is something like the “possession arrow” in 
basketball, which evens out who gets possession of the ball when both teams can make equal claim to it 
(viz. what used to be a “jump ball”).
 So it cannot be a problem for IE merely that aspects of the good of one’s friend 
and of one’s own (proper) self can conflict, because this is just an instance of the 
general problem of tradeoffs among competing goods. A problem would arise only from 
the claim that such conflicts should be resolved only along the lines of whose proper 
good is at stake. Only if Aristotle maintained that when goods conflict one should 
always choose one’s own proper good over that of one’s friend would there be a worry 
here, and of course Aristotle says no such thing.256
 The closest he comes to saying anything like it comes in the debate over moral 
competition. Here, he says, the good man 
is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. ...he may 
even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to 
become the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself. 
In all actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good 
man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is 
noble. (IX.8:1169a29-b1)
White understands Aristotle as in effect giving a decision rule for conflicts between 
oneself and one’s friend over doing noble action: Choose along the lines of one’s proper 
self — take the greater share in the noble.257
 But Aristotle need not be understood as giving such a rule at all. A much better 
way to interpret the passage is to see it as a de re description from the perspective of 
an observer of the course of action the virtuous person adopts. I will return to this 
below, after noting first that there is sort of a paradox in reading Aristotle as White 
does.258 White’s objection is that for the good person to do what he takes Aristotle to 
suggest seems rather tawdry: it is self-serving and objectionably egoistic. In effect, 
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256Irwin claims that “Since I do not make my friend a part of myself, and do not make the two of us 
into one self, I am not indifferent about which of us gains the benefit” (Irwin 1988, p. 430). Irwin is right 
about not making friends into single selves, but (if my interpretation is right) he is wrong about making 
friends into part of oneself, or (more to the point) their good part of one’s own good. Moreover, even if 
one is not “indifferent about to who gains the benefit,” that does not show that the answer to that 
question will determine what choice to make; though not indifferent I might nevertheless be motivated 
to bring about the greater good for my friend or loved one instead of myself.
257Cf. “the good man, seeing that in certain circumstances he can get the greatest good only by getting 
more than his friend, chooses to do so” (White 1995, p. 280).
258Something like this paradox is recognized by Price 1989, p. 112.
then, Aristotle has the good person making the wrong choice: genuine virtue, we might 
think, would dictate doing the opposite. The really noble thing for the good person to 
do would be to defer to his friend. 
 But once we say this, we are saying, paradoxically, just what Aristotle says. The 
point is that what the good person seeks is the noble. It is the noble that (de dicto) he 
chooses and which determines his choice, not his own proper good as opposed to that of 
his friend. In determining his choice by the noble, the good person makes the nobler 
and more virtuous choice. The air of paradox here can be dispelled simply by giving up 
the idea that what Aristotle is urging is a competitive stance over moral good. What 
determines the choice of the good person is what is noble, not competition for a scarce 
good.
 In his essay, “First and Second Things,” C.S. Lewis argues that “You can’t get 
second things by putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first 
things first” (Lewis 1970, p. 280). One way of thinking about what Aristotle is 
proposing for the thoughts of the good person is that he has first things first: by 
choosing the noble, he also gets the greatest good for himself. Conversely, when one 
puts getting the greater good for oneself first (as in “the prevailing type of self-love”), 
one gets neither that greater good nor nobility.
 We thus understand Aristotle best if we take him to be making a de re claim 
about what the good person chooses, when the good person chooses the noble. The 
object of choice is represented to the good person confronted with a choice to make as 
the noble, not as the greater good.259 It is, as he says, always for the sake of the noble 
that the virtuous person chooses (NE 1116b30, 1138b21, 1140b6, 1144a18, EE 
1230a27). There is no reason to attribute to Aristotle the idea that the end of the good 
person’s action — the object of choice — is explicitly represented as the greater good, 
even though (i) it is true that the noble is the greater good, and (ii) the good person is 
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259I argued in Chapter 3 that the noble is not in the first instance represented to the virtuous person as 
noble, but instead as the value realized therein. So actually the way the choice of the noble is 
represented to the virtuous person is at two removes from a conception of it as the greater good.
capable of recognizing that this is so.260 Where Aristotle refers to what the good 
person chooses as “the greater share in what is noble,” it is explicitly from the 
standpoint of an observer: “ the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater 
share...” (1169a35, emphasis added). 
 It makes sense to see this as a de re description of what appears de dicto to the 
good man very differently, since Aristotle is concerned here to characterize the kind of 
choice which, on his view, differentiates the self-love of the virtuous person from the 
“prevailing type” of self-lovers — and that just is choice of the noble. The context of 
Aristotle’s topic in chapter IX.8 is the distinction between ersatz self-love and the real 
thing on the basis of the different goods which are the objects of choice in either case. 
Hence it is most natural to read Aristotle as extending his characterization of the 
object of choice for the genuine lover of self — as a further explication of his inclusivist 
doctrine of the human good — than to see him as making a superfluous if not 
gratuitous point about a moral competition that at most could represent an 
afterthought to his characterization of love and friendship.
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260Indeed, if pressed for  a justification of his choice, his justifying reasons would ultimately terminate 
with such a claim. This is the cardinal tenet of eudaimonism.
 It will be apparent that the argument I am pressing here is a restatement of the distinction 
Annas makes between what motivates the virtuous agent and what explains or justifies his or her good 
choices and actions (Annas 1988; Kahn makes a somewhat similar distinction in Kahn 1981), although 
White objects to this distinction (White 1995, p. 295, n. 32). I believe this reformulation withstands his 
objection.
APPENDIX B: EUDAIMONIA AND SELF-SACRIFICE
 The way commitment to others is compatible with eudaimonistic virtue theory 
helps to address the objection that on eudaimonist accounts self-sacrifice of a noble 
sort (e.g. death in battle or for a worthy cause) cannot be rational. Recall that Hardie 
maintained that Aristotle, for one, could not endorse the sacrifice of one’s life for 
morally worthy objectives in view of his commitment to a “complete life” as a 
component of eudaimonia (Hardie 1965, p. 293).
 This is, I believe, both to burden Aristotle’s conception of the “complete life” with 
an unduly quantitative interpretation and to miss the nature of the commitments that 
the virtuous agent can have which can justify such a “sacrifice.” (The scare quotes 
around the word are necessary because, while the loss of one’s life surely counts as a 
loss, on Aristotle’s view, it is being exchanged for something one counts as more 
valuable, and it is not clear that such an exchange should count as a “sacrifice”.) In 
Aristotle’s own terms, the virtuous agent is committed to and motivated by the kalon 
(the fine or noble), and comes to value it in such a way that it matters more than the 
value of one’s life, especially a life without the kalon: “bravery consists in following 
reason, and reason bids ones choose the noble” (EE III.1: 1229a2). The virtuous man 
can choose both eudaimonia and the sacrifice of his own life in circumstances that 
require him to do so, because to do otherwise would require him to reject the noble in 
favor of a lesser good.
 It is not the case, as some have suggested, that such a decision cannot be 
rational. The objection is that, if one chooses to save one’s life there will be many more 
opportunities for the exercise of other virtues, more than counterbalancing the loss of 
rejecting the noble in this one case. That way of understanding the situation misses 
completely the nature of commitment, whether the commitment is to the kalon, or to 
friends or loved ones. Violating such a commitment when circumstances press a choice 
does not leave one unchanged, and in position to “even the score” with better, less 
consequential, decisions down the road. It shapes one’s nature and character in a 
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distinctive way. A person who backed down from commitment at that point would 
know something about himself —would have to live with a deep blemish on his 
conception of himself and his history. Metal once bent can never be strong again, and 
choices such as these are the occasions in which men’s souls are tested and either 
vindicated or bent.
 A modern example of this sort of choice confronted a number of German citizens 
during the Second World War, when circumstances forced them to choose between 
acquiescence to the Holocaust or giving their own lives to repudiate Naziism.261 Those 
that chose the latter did so because, in a crucial way, doing otherwise would have cost 
them everything. Alfred Schmidtz-Sas, executed by the Nazis in 1943 at the age of 48, 
wrote in his cell:
As in the game of chess, so too in life it matters not
Whether the duel be fought with pieces carved of wood or 
gold.
How one plays, and what one plays for, that alone
Reveals the man.
Whether, upon post-mortem, menials hurry off the corpse,
Or obsequies of state consign one to a splendid tomb,
How one dies, and what one dies for, that alone
Reveals the man. (Gollwitzer et. al. 1956, p. 176)
His attitude in confronting death was far from one of self-sacrifice: “I stand face to face 
with the world in inexpressible purity, stand at its center, and these last hours are in 
truth the zenith of life — the zenith of life” (ibid. p. 178).
 Nor was this exalted sentiment the singular expression of an older man, whose 
life perhaps could be considered “complete” even at 48. Consider the words of Kim 
Mathe-Bruun, tortured and executed in 1945 at the age of 22 for resistance to the Nazi 
regime:
I travelled a road that I have never regretted. I have never 
evaded the dictate of my heart, and now things seem to fall 
into place. I am not old, I should not be dying, yet it seems 
so natural to me, so simple. It is only the abrupt manner of 
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261Here I am indebted to Philippa Foot’s sensitive and provocative treatment of this remarkable 
testimony in Foot 1988.
it that frightens us at first. The time is short, I cannot 
properly explain it, but my soul is perfectly at 
rest...(ibid. pp. 84-5).
 It is hard to regard a life experienced from within as Mathe-Bruun’s was as 
anything but complete. Whether these martyrs were fully virtuous or not is not for us 
to determine, but what emerges from their missives is that they were committed in the 
way that Aristotle and eudaimonist virtue theories can and do commend, and to 
something that was clearly worth that commitment. As George Shuster observes: 
“What makes their plight ... so breathtaking is that there was no charge to bring 
against them save that they had loved the good” (ibid., p. xvi). It is this love — 
whether for the good, or for the good of another — which the eudaimonist commends 
as part of the best kind of human life. Circumstances may be so adverse as to require 
in the service of such commitments that one give one’s life, but even that exchange is 
not open to the shabby sort of calculation that Hardie attributes to the virtuous agent. 
Commitment is wholly compatible with what we have reason to choose in view of our 
own eudaimonia, and neither immediate and unstinting concern for the welfare of 
others, nor the willingness to lay down one’s life when conditions require it, 
compromise a fundamental commitment to eudaimonia.
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